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ABSTRACT 
The rising popularity of Korean contents in Asia known as Hanryu ('Korean 
Wave'), which was partly supported by Korean cultural policy, has many 
implications with regard to cultural policy in periphery countries under 
globalisation and the open-door versus cultural diversity debate. This thesis 
assesses how recent cultural opening under globalisation in Korea has affected 
Korea's cultural industries both quantitatively in terms of economic performance 
and qualitatively in terms of cultural content, identity and diversity. These 
questions are examined in the context of the changing relationship between the 
cultural industries and cultural policy in Korea since the end of the 1990s. The 
research draws upon statistical data, historical material and interviews. 
By researching how the Korean experience has developed, this thesis attempts to 
look at Hanryu not just as a phenomenon in its own right, but also considers the 
secondary impact of this phenomenon on perceptions of culture and identity. In 
particular the thesis considers Hanryu in terms of the cultural influence on 
neighbouring countries manifest through tourism and a new interest in Korean 
language and culture. Such cultural effects are less easily measured than 
economic data but are important to an understanding of causes and effects of 
Hanryu. Finally this thesis places the Korean experience in the broader context of 
cultural policy in periphery countries responding to globalisation and the 
relationship between national cultural policy and the global cultural economy. 
It is still too early to reach conclusions on the future of Korean cultural industries 
based simply on the recent trends However, since the mid 1990s, the Korean 
cultural industries have been transformed dramatically. Cultural policy has 
contributed to this trend and strengthened the competitiveness of Korea's cultural 
industries. At the same time the thesis considers some of the limitations and 
criticisms of Hanryu, including potential loss of cultural diversity and an anti- 
Korean backlash in some other Asian countries. 
The Korean cultural industries have benefited from imitating the Hollywood 
system and developing a distinctive hybrid cultural content and business model. 
This has made possible an alternative approach to policy and management which 
lies between two extremes of protectionism and free market ideology. The thesis 
comments on some of the difficulties and limitations in sustaining such a balance 
and concludes by considering the sustainability of Hanryu both in Korea and in 
the broader Asian context. 
LIST OF GRAPHS 
Graph 1. Change in Export Earnings for Korean Films (1995-2004) ............... 20 
Graph 2. Export and Import of Korean TV Programmes (1998-2005) ............. 22 
Graph 3. Export and Import Amount of TV Programmes by Network Broadcasters 
(1998- 2004) .................................................................... 109 
Graph 4. Market Share of Korean Film Since 1985 ................................. 138 
Graph 5. The Number of Screen in Korea (1995-2004) ............................. 143 
Graph 6. Export of Korean TV Programmes per Country in 2004 ................. 207 
Graph 7. Export of Korean TV Programmes per Country in 2003 ................. 207 
Graph 8. Export Price per Episode of Korean TV Programmes (2000-2004).... 296 
LIST OF TABLES 
W Table 1. Graduates and Employees in Institutions of Animation, Characters and 
Cartoons ........................................................................ 169 
Table 2. The Comparison of Expected Employees in Cultural Indus try and Other 
Industries ....................................................................... 170 
Table3. Products Included in the First Stage Opening to Japanese 
Culture ......................................................................... 172 
Table4. Products Included in the Second Stage Opening to Japanese 
Culture ............................................................ ............ 173 
Tables. Products Included in the Third Stage Opening to Japanese 
Culture ............................................................. ............. 175 
Table6. Products Included in the Fourth Stage Opening to Japanese 
Culture ........................................................... .. 177 ............. 
N Table 7. Incomes from Various Sources of Daejanggeum ................ ................ 272 
Tables. Korean Soap Operas Broadcast in Japan .................................. 386 
Table 9. The Entry of Korean Films to International Film Festivals ............ 389 
DIAGRAM 
Diagram 1. The Range of CJ Entertainment's Activities ................................ 301 
Diagram 2. The Range of Orion's Activities .......................................... 305 
PART I. INTRODUCTION AND 
METHODOLOGY 
PART. I Chapter 1. The Korean Wave: a New Trend in Media Flow? 
Chapter 1. The Korean Wave: a New Trend in Media 
Flow? 
1.1 The Korean Wave as a Counter-Flow 
According to various literatures on the globalisation of culture, the centre 
expands into the periphery, especially with regard to cultural imperialism, but 
recent research (Chadha and Kavoori 2000; Cunningham and Jacka 1996) has 
argued that the periphery itself collides, responds and hybridises. Not to mention 
that `power shifts, empires crumble' in the entertainment industry, as the 
Hollywood Reporter (Nov. 18,2003) recently claimed. There have been some 
different trends which may not be big but certainly are visible. 
Korea has long history of struggle against U. S. cultural dominance, like many 
other countries around the world. However, the recent experience of Korean pop 
culture differs greatly from what it was in the past. Since the end of the 1990s, 
Korean pop culture, including TV programmes and films, has been exported to 
Asian countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Vietnam and 
Thailand with great popularity, and recently even to Europe and the USA. This 
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unexpected cultural wave happened not only overseas but also in the domestic 
market. In this context, this thesis will examine the present situation and the 
implications of the Korean Wave as an example of a counter-flow under 
globalisation. In subsequent chapters, we need to explore what exactly happened 
to Korean cultural products since 2000. Then, this thesis will analyze the 
implication of Korean Wave under globalisation and the chances and challenges 
of Korean way in cultural policy. 
This thesis has been divided into three distinct parts. Part I consists of chapters 1 
and 2 and is intended as an introduction to the research topic. Chapter 1 provides 
an overview of the Hanryu phenomenon and related issues concerning 
globalisation and cultural policy. It also outlines the design and structure of this 
thesis and the research methodology. Chapter 2 will serve as a literature review 
to put the Korean cultural industry's special case in global context. 
In Part II, 1 will set out the background for this research beginning with a brief 
review of the history of the Korean TV and film industry in chapter 3. In chapter 
4,1 will provide an overview the development of Korean cultural policy 
2 
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focusing on how cultural policy has been changed since Kim Dae-jung regime 
responding to globalisation. Some big issues such as Hollywood's direct 
distribution and Korean market openness to Japanese mass culture will be 
highlighted. Chapters 5,6 and 7, which constitute the analytical part of this 
thesis (Part III), will elaborate on how certain Korean mass cultural forms 
generate the possibility of imagining a regional identity, as well as certain side 
effects. 
In chapter 5, the conditions which made possible the recent success of Korean 
pop culture will be examined in the context of theories on media flow. In chapter 
6, this thesis will delve into the nature of Korean cultural products and how they 
can appeal to other peoples in Asia given that both content (consumer-side) and 
industry infrastructure (provider-side) have been rearranged. Finally, in chapter 7, 
I will examine the impact and implications of government policy in the TV and 
film industry. Doing so will inform us of the role of government in the Korean 
wave. Through this process, the major arguments this research addresses may be 
summarised as follows: 
" Does national cultural policy still have a critical role to play in a world 
3 
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which is tending to be unified by the process of dismantling barriers to 
trade and cultural flows under globalisation? 
" Can we say that the recent success of Korean cultural products resulted 
from government policy? 
" What does the Korean experience imply in terms of world cultural flow? 
" Can we explore an alternative model of cultural flow with regard to the 
Korean case? 
To clarify further, this thesis consists of three major parts (Introductory, 
Background and History and Analysis), in which each of the following is 
developed: 
" An outline of the key issues and characteristics of Hanryu and a brief 
literature review of theories of cultural flow (Chapters 1 and 2) 
" An examination of the development of cultural policy in the Korean TV 
and film industry in response to globalisation (Chapters 3 and 4) 
" Analysis of the Korean experience as a periphery nation challenging global 
trend (Chapters 5,6 and 7) 
" An exploration of the possibility of a cultural bloc as a regional centre in the 
global cultural economy (Chapter 8) 
Before examining the causes and effects of this boom, this chapter, which is 
intended as an introduction and for raising questions, is going to examine other 
trends, define phenomenon of Koran Wave and explain the methodology of this 
thesis setting out methods and structure in more detail. 
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1.2 Overview of the Korean Wave in Pop Culture 
Trends of counter flows have led to the creation of sub-centres of audiovisual 
production in the peripheries. As Hannerz (1996: 16) argues, `the structure of 
centre-periphery relationships has many tiers. ' Here, a sub-centres model could 
be denoted as tiers in Hannerz's terminology. For example, Mexico and Brazil 
for Latin America, Hong Kong for the Chinese-speaking populations of Asia, 
Egypt for the Arab world, and India for the Indian populations of Africa and Asia. 
These regional sub-centres are mediated critically and appropriated socially and 
culturally in the contexts they infiltrate (Lull, 2000: 230). Furthermore, with the 
development of local adaptations and hybridisation, even `contra-flows' or 
`counter-flows' (Boyd-Barrett and Kishan Thussu, 1992) have resulted. Mexico 
and Brazil, for example, have exported their programmes to the U. S. as well as 
to other Latin countries. 
However, the successes of these sub-centres can be seen to be owed mainly to 
geo-linguistic markets based on the same languages and ethnic diaspora. Here, 
Sinclair's argument (1996: 26) is worth noting. He elaborates that these 
5 
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countries, as sub-centres, have three things in common: `first, their relevance to 
the geo-linguistic region hypothesis, that is, the broad proposition that export 
markets will develop amongst countries which share a similar language and 
culture. ' The second thing he points out is that sub-centres have histories of 
colonisation. The colonial legacy has been formative and consequential for the 
contemporary markets of cultural products. 
For example, with the competitive advantage of language and, in a sense, 
diasporic roots originated from colonial history, Canada and Australia have been 
successful exporters of media products in spite of relatively small market size 
and their postcolonial status in their modern histories (ibid.: 12). The geo- 
linguistic region in such cases goes far beyond the immediate geographic 
clustering to include the respective diasporic communities on other continents. 
As well as the Chinese and Arab diasporas, for instance, there is also the Indian, 
which has created substantial markets in Europe, North America, Africa, Asia 
and the Pacific (Brown et. al, 1994; Castles 1995; Cohen 1997). 
Third, these markets of sub-centres have certain unique characteristics as well as 
6 
PART. I Chapter 1. The Korean Wave: a New Trend in Media Flow? 
common ones. In this respect, Hannerz (1996: 12-13) mentions that sub-centres 
in the periphery may `base their production on meanings and forms wholly 
internal to the region, or they may operate as cultural brokers, translating 
influences from their first-tier centres into something more adapted to regional 
conditions', a phenomenon known as hybridisation. Essentially, global cultural 
interaction leads to the creation of hybrid forms, which contain unique and 
universal elements at the same time (Lull, 2000: 230). As such, Sinclair and 
Hannerz's examination above provides a good insight into the sub-centre in 
periphery and its media flow. 
In the basis of his argument, I would like to elaborate on the fact that the sub- 
centres tend to have a sizeable and sustainable market for their cultural products. 
Back up by successful domestic market, cultural products can travel abroad 
sustainably. Economy of scale in a sizeable market tends to give a country an 
advantage for exporting to other countries. The exception here is Hong Kong, 
where a relatively small domestic market is nevertheless compensated for by the 
immediate proximity of its huge diasporic market in mainland China, Taiwan 
and Singapore. This Chinese speaking market serves a similar function to the 
7 
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strong domestic market in sub-centres such as Mexico, India and Brazil, 
providing a commercial base for exporting into other markets. 
In other regional centres such as Mexico, India and Brazil, which have big 
domestic markets, the diasporic market played an important role in the germinal 
stages of their development of foreign markets. Another strong powerhouse in 
East Asia apart from Hong Kong is Japan, which has had considerable success in 
exporting its animations, so called `Japanimation', as well as its TV dramas 
(Mowlana and Rad, 1992). However, Japan cannot be said to be a sub-centre, but 
should rather be considered much closer to the centre in world media flow in 
terms of its scale of economy and its influencing power. This unexpected 
cultural wave happened not only overseas but also in the domestic market. 
Thus, the boom of Korean soap operas and films in Asian countries cannot be 
explained by the geo-linguistic market theory, which is based on geographic and 
linguistic factors. With a language unique to its peninsula, Korea has been an 
importer of Western media products for a long time, and was, unofficially, a big 
consumer of Japanese pop culture despite the fact that the import of Japanese 
S 
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cultural products was banned from 1945 to 1998. The question remains, then, 
how and by what kind of theory this trend can be explained. Some people may 
say that this renaissance of Korean pop culture is just a temporary trend and 
cannot last (Korea Herald, Dec. 29,2004). Indeed, it is still rather early to assess 
adequately the extent and vitality of the export `career' of Korea's cultural 
products because the popularity of Korean cultural products is a recent 
development and the total revenue earned from their export is relatively small in 
comparison with that of the cultural industries of major countries such as the 
U. S., Japan and the U. K. Even so, this trend in Korea, which has been suddenly 
and strongly influencing other Asian countries, is unusual and cannot be 
explained by the existing theories. 
In particular, Korea has provided a radical model of rapid transition from a 
wholly protectionist policy towards a policy of `cultural opening' since the late 
1990s. This is exactly when the Korean wave in popular culture began. Now, the 
country's small but dynamic cultural industry has attracted international 
attention. In this context, there exists a basic question about whether the Korean 
wave is influenced by or has resulted from Korean cultural policy towards 
9 
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globalisation. In Transnational Connections (1996: 6), Hannerz pinpoints that 
the actors in world trade under globalisation seem to have changed from nation 
states to transnational conglomerates. 
Here, the underlying assumption is that the shift towards market dominance by 
transnational and multinational companies is inevitable and that nation states 
have become increasingly powerless and hence irrelevant. In this context, we 
have to rethink the universal validity of government involvement in cultural 
industries. Thus, this thesis will examine the present situation and the 
implications of the Korean wave as an example of a counter-flow under 
globalisation. Accordingly, we need to explore what exactly happened to Korean 
cultural products since 2000. 
In subsequent chapters, this thesis will consider various trends, both external and 
internal, which might have had an impact on the recent boom in Korean films 
and TV industries overseas. Before examining the causes of this boom, this 
chapter, which is intended as an introduction and for raising questions, is going 
to examine when and how the Korean wave started and how it has influenced 
10 
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industries in and outside of Korea. This will be followed by details of the 
methodology used in order to explain how the research has been approached. 
1.2.1 Definition and Development of the Korean Wave `Hanryu' 
Unlike a decade ago, Koreans now seem to have a healthy appetite for their own 
culture. Korea is one of only three countries in the world where the market share 
of local films is greater than that of Hollywood (Yonhap News Agency, Jan. 28, 
2005), and its television networks broadcast foreign programmes only around 
midnight, leaving Korean shows free to sweep the ratings (Korea Times, Nov. 29, 
2001). A series of films, soap operas and pop idols, after their conquests at home, 
have made successful landings on markets abroad, particularly in neighbouring 
Asian countries. The new word `Hanryu' ('Korean wave' in English) was born in 
this context. Examples of some of the film and television productions associated 
with Hanryu are included in chapter 6. 
Of course, Hanryu did not come about overnight. Broadly speaking, it can be 
said that the popularity of Korean pop music and television soap operas in China 
and Taiwan was the start of the Korean wave abroad. Films joined this boom 
11 
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quite recently. The outbreak of Hanryu can be traced back to 1997, when the 
Korean TV drama, What Is Love All About, broadcast on state-run Chinese 
television, CCTV, set the stage for Hanryu in China, following an MBC-TV 
drama, Jealous, which was imported as the first popular cultural product from 
South Korea in 1993 (Korea Times, April 6,2004). 
In 1997, Korean dance music was aired on a frequency borrowed from a local 
FM station in Beijing. This represented significant progress because the Korean 
music charts started to be regularly broadcast on Chinese-language TV and radio 
stations, which implies that they were not only aimed at Koreans living in China. 
Backed up by that regular broadcasting, sales of albums containing popular 
South Korean dance music from bands such as H. O. T. and NRG topped the 
Chinese charts (Korea Times, Aug. 23,2001; New York Times, Jan. 10,2006). 
As Korean soap operas and popular songs became massive hits, the Chinese 
media called the trend `Hanryu syndrome' (China Daily, Nov. 8,2001), which 
alludes to the title of a promotional Korean music CD. The CD, Hanryu, was 
made as part of the Culture and Tourism Ministry's effort to promote Korean 
culture in China and contained Chinese language songs performed by famous 
12 
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South Korean singers to appeal to local people. The CD became a big hit. Now, 
Hanryu has become a phrase to describe the wide popularity of Korean pop 
culture among its neighbours in Asia such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore 
and so on. The word was even introduced into a contemporary Chinese 
Dictionary (Kim Jong-sung, 2003). 
Thus, in essence, Hanryu means spreading South Korean popular culture 
including films, soap operas, computer games and popular songs throughout 
Asia and beyond, reinforcing the country's growing reputation as an Asian hub 
for the cultural industries. The term Hanryu has become synonymous with 
Korean pop culture in other Asian countries (See notes in Appendices). As seen 
above, in a sense, Korean wave was originated from government promotion of 
Korean cultural products for foreigners which is not directly related to Korean 
diaspora. 
South Korean fever has even played a role in the image changes that have been 
visible on some Beijing streets in recent years. According to the Yonhap News 
Agency (Aug. 10,2001), `the Huawei central shopping district is flooded with 
local youths who have dyed hair that resembles that of their South Korean idols. 
13 
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Many shops display clothes, footwear, accessories and posters carrying pictures 
of South Korean pop stars. ' In reaction to this Korean wave in China, Chinese 
dailies have carried headlines like `Hanryu Sweeps China', reminiscent of U. S. 
headlines which announced a British invasion when the Beatles landed there in 
the Sixties. This was notably the case in 2001 when Korean boy band H. O. T. 
held a concert in a Beijing gymnasium filled with tens of thousands of screaming 
Chinese fans (China Daily, Nov. 8,2001). Recently, thousands of Chinese 
teenagers have begun visiting Korea every year to attend concerts by local pop 
singers, meet their idols and visit TV drama locations. 
Thus, since 1997, the popularity of Korean pop culture has been palpable right 
across China. Taiwan is another emerging market for Korean TV dramas and 
films. The origin of Korean fever in Taiwan also stemmed from Korean pop 
songs and TV dramas. A successful concert by Clon, a South Korean dance duo, 
in March 1998 led to an increase in its album sales in Taiwan to more than 
400,000 copies. In 2000, Clon outsold Britney Spears, the Backstreet Boys and 
almost all other artists (The Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct. 18,2001). 
14 
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Korean TV dramas in particular, such as What Is Love All About?, have been 
aired with such immense popularity that a number of Taiwanese programme 
producers have begun imitating the Korean style. Around the same time, 
broadcasts of the Korean soap opera Autumn Fairy Tale also grabbed huge 
attention among the Taiwanese, with Korean dramas being aired on three 
broadcasting stations and seven cable networks. The hero and heroine of Autumn 
Fairy Tale, Song Seung-hun and Song Hye-gyo became stars overnight and fans 
have even started undertaking pilgrimages to locations in Korea where the TV 
drama was shot. 
Quite recently, even the Korean epic drama `Daejangguem' experienced large 
success despite the fact that its storyline was based around the Chosun dynasty 
in Korean history, which could make it difficult to understand for a foreign 
audience (People's Daily, Sep. 3,2005; China Daily, Oct. 16,2005). Recently, 
many cable TV companies in Asian countries have been airing Korean TV 
programmes. For example, in August 2005, Chinese station SCTV launched the 
first prime time TV slot in China dedicated to Korean soap operas (Mydaily, 
Aug. 25,2005). 
15 
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Likewise, the Korean wave has hit the regional centres of Asia like Hong Kong, 
Singapore and even Japan. In Japan, Hanryu occurred first in pop music with 
BoA, a 15-year-old Korean singer who created a sensation in Japan as her debut 
album, Listen to My Heart, rose to the top of the Japanese music chart, Oricon in 
2002 (Financial Times, Feb. 8,2003; Korea Times, March 1,2005). Later in the 
film industry, Swiri was the start of the Korean boom. Swiri, the first Korean 
film to be exported to Japan, earned USD 1.3 million when it first opened on 36 
screens in Japan in 1999. 
This represented over a third of the production costs for the film. As the film 
became an unprecedented hit at the Japanese box office, it was shown at over 
127 screens across Japan, attracting more than a million viewers. Shortly later, 
JSA (Joint Security Area) set an export record of USD 2 million and was 
released on 230 screens throughout Japan. This advance on the Japanese market 
continued with the recognition of the marketability of Korean films and the 
success of Swiri and JSA in 2000 being followed by films like Friend and My 
Wife is a Gangster in 2001. These films attained high-priced contracts in the 
export market with their domestic box office successes serving as stepping 
16 
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stones to international sales. 
With regard to TV drama, in 2002, a purely Korean television drama, All About 
Eve, was the first Korean production to be broadcast by a major Japanese 
network since the television drama Friends, co-produced by Korean broadcast 
station MBC and Japanese broadcast station Fuji, was aired as part of an earlier 
cultural exchange programme in 2002. Due to these successes, cultural exports 
from South Korea to Japan have nearly doubled since 1998, especially movies, 
video games and television programmes (New York Times, Feb. 22,2004; BBC 
News, Dec. 13,2004). 
According to research by the Korea Foundation for Asian Culture Exchange 
(KOFACE), as of August 11th 2005,23 channels in Japan including, terrestrial, 
cable and satellite channels, have been broadcasting around sixty Korean soap 
operas in total (see table in appendices). It is evident that the role of the Japanese 
market has been immense in the rise of the export unit price of Korean cultural 
products in other markets and for the growth of the overall actual sales. Now it 
seems that Japan has developed an appetite for all things Korean, like many 
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other Asian countries. This phenomenon is a new trend that has been sweeping 
Japan in such areas as food, movies, the Korean language, and computer 
software games (ibid. ). Following the new, rising popularity of Korean films and 
dramas in Japan and China, Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and 
Singapore have also been influenced by the Korean wave. Korean soap operas 
and films have also had a warm reception there. It has been said whether you are 
in Singapore, China or Taiwan, it is hard to turn on the TV and avoid Korean 
dramas (Korea Times, Nov. 29,2001). 
Korean TV dramas are among the highest-rated shows on Vietnamese television. 
As is the case in Taiwan and China, Korean TV dramas are so popular that they 
have influenced local fashion and culture in Vietnam. As in Huawei street in 
Beijing, on the streets of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, fashion-conscious young 
Vietnamese can be seen dressed in Korean fashion with young trendy women 
adopting the makeup styles and products of Korea (BBC, Oct. 24,2003; 
Chicago Tribune, Dec. 27,2005). However, some people wonder whether 
Hanryu will last or whether it will disappear shortly as a frenzied fad. 
Responding to such pessimism, Corrado G. M. Letta (Korea Times, Feb. 22, 
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2004) argues that Korean pop culture is continuing to make waves elsewhere 
around Asia in various fields of the cultural industry. He points out that the 
`Korean actress Kim Hee-sun is the most popular actress in China beating 
Chinese actresses, and Korean dramas Autumn Fairy Tale and Winter Love Story 
are the two most popular TV dramas throughout Asia. 
Besides, Korean movies are gaining a growing popularity on international 
screens, and the blockbuster Taegukgi clearly demonstrates Korean cultural 
products' success abroad. All these facts are good signs that the Korean wave 
will continue' (ibid). Ina sense, his argument is convincing. Unlike the past in 
Japan, where awareness of Korean culture was limited to an appreciation of a 
few Korean Trot (Korean traditional folk song which is similar to the Japanese 
traditional folk song, Enka) singers, this time there is a much wider appeal and 
appreciation for all things Korean. 
Meanwhile, the Korean Film Commission reported that the total amount earned 
from exported films in 2001 equalled USD 11,249,573 for over 102 films, 
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which represented a huge increase in comparison with the USD 200.000 earned 
in 1995. Additionally. in 2004, the total amount reached to USD 58 million as 
seen in graph above. 
Northeast and Southeast Asia account for 73% of the total export amount and the 
amount exported to Japan alone occupies 51% of the total. If we look at the 
number of exported films, it is evident that the Southeast Asian market is the 
strongest. As the market was not initially that big, and the degree of recognition 
of Korean films was low, the unit export unit price was at first not very high, and 
neither was the total amount exported. 
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However, as the demand for films based on the local popularity of such cultural 
products as TV series has continued to grow, the major companies are now 
increasingly importing Korean films. Although the export unit price of films 
exported to Southeast Asia is still low, if the amount exported continues to grow 
on such a scale, and the unit price rises, it is expected that this underdeveloped 
market will also grow to a big market in the long term. This is especially so in 
the case of Thailand, one of the Asian countries drawing a large amount of 
attention at the moment. Taking into account such factors as the expansion of 
theatre facilities and the growth of an available audience, the possibility of its 
growing to a main market is considerable. 
As for TV soap operas, thanks to this Korean wave in Asian countries, the three 
major television networks, Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Munwha 
Broadcasting Co. (MBC) and Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), which own 
most of the licences for Korean TV dramas, reportedly earned USD 20 million 
through the export of their drama series abroad in 2002, an increase of USD 6 
million in 2001 (MCT 2003). Moreover, in 2005 the total export amount of 
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Korean TV programmes became over $100million as you can see below (MCT 
2006; Variety, Jan. 23,2006). 
Graph 2. Export and Import of Korean TV Programmes (1000$) Source MCT 
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The companies attributed the increase in earnings to the expansion of the 
international market for domestic soap operas into countries such as Taiwan, 
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and South America, as well as Japan 
(Korea Times, Dec. 29.2002; Korea Times, Sep. 11,2005). Swiri, the start of 
Hanryu in film, ranked highest at Hong Kong box offices for three consecutive 
weeks in 1999. Moreover, when distributed in the U. S. by American distributor 
IDP. Swirl earned gross profits of nearly a hundred thousand dollars. The success 
of Siviri overseas was followed by other Korean films such as My Sassy Girl and 
J. SA in 2002. Earlier, in 1999. a psychological thriller called Tell Me Something 
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topped the box office in Hong Kong, beating strong Hollywood competitors such 
as Sleepy Hollow and Hurricane Carter (Variety, Jan. 9,2002). The year 2002 
brought a further surprise with the smashing success of The Way Home, a low- 
budget film about a city boy and his grandmother living in a secluded place. The 
film was sold in a high profile deal to the U. S. major Paramount and became a 
hit in Mexico (Korea Times, Sep. 11,2005). 
Back to the Korean wave, it started with different cultural products in different 
countries as seen above but spread to encompass a variety of cultural products 
being exported at the same or similar time, which is a critical characteristic in 
the distribution of cultural products. That is to say, though every country in Asia 
has a broadly common reception for the Korean wave, each has a slightly 
different flavour. This is because each country has a different ethos and based on 
this, their audiences decode and respond to cultural products in different ways 
(Silj, 1988; Liebes and Katz, 1990). For example, in Taiwan, Daejangguem had 
the best reception of any Korean drama, whereas in Japan, Winter Sonata was 
most popular. In recent times, the range of Hanryu has been expanding to 
fashion, food and travel. The trend soon spread out from the mainland to Taiwan, 
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Hong Kong, affecting ethnic Chinese in other Asian countries and eventually 
Japan, leading all these Asian peoples to be fascinated by not only Korean music 
and drama, but also its films, food and fashion. 
1.2.2 The Impact of `Hanryu' 
Having looked in detail over what has happened recently to Korean cultural 
products overseas, we now need to elaborate the implications of the trend under 
globalisation. Put simply, the Hanryu trend may be explored by examining the 
trade in cultural products (exports of TV programmes and films), but it is not the 
only way. To be sure, the increase in the trade in cultural products such as songs, 
programmes and films based on hard quantitative data is a fundamental factor in 
exploring this trend. When it comes to the actual export sales of these cultural 
products, Korea's recent boom can be eclipsed in comparison with that of major 
powerhouses such as the U. K., Germany and, needless to say, that of the U. S. 
However, there are other critical factors which should be taken into account, like 
indirect or direct investment, the export of talent and facilities, and the 
upgrading of the national image. 
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In this context, one edition of Business Week (June 9,2003) noted the changed 
relationship between Japan and Korea: `Japan, once the teacher of analogue 
technology and cultural products to Korea, is now being embarrassed by its 
former pupil with Korea's rapid advancement in digital technology and cultural 
industry. ' Now, various Japanese mass communication organisations study and 
prepare reports on the trend-setting Korean IT industry (Korea Times, Aug. 1, 
2001). Likewise, considering Korea's situation as a peripheral import country 
not long ago, the recent success of Korean pop culture is worth particular 
mention. Indeed, Korean films and soap operas are flourishing as never before in 
markets abroad. 
In previous sections I have considered the direct, quantitative impacts which can 
easily be measure in numbers. In this section, I am looking at indirect, 
qualitative impacts of Hanryu. There are indirect indicators of cultural change 
changing foreign attitudes to Korea and Korean culture / language reflected in: 
movement of tourists (esp. from countries formerly hostile or indifferent to 
Korea such as Japan and Taiwan); adoption of Korean language and language 
classes; international critical acclaim for Korean cultural products especially 
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film; employment of Korean artists in neighbouring countries, not only in film / 
music but in other sectors of the economy via advertising. 
First, as seen above, Hanryu is not just spreading culture out of Korea, but also 
drawing people in. The number of tourists travelling to Korea has been 
increasing sharply because of the number of visitors who wish to attend concerts 
or visit locations where films and television dramas were shot. Hanryu has 
resulted in particular in an increase in the number of Asian tourists travelling to 
Korea. According to the Korea National Tourism Organization (KNTO), the 
number of Chinese tourists visiting South Korea jumped to 482,227 in 2001, a 
sharp increase on the 140,985 recorded in 1994 (Korea Times, Aug. 1,2001). It 
is not surprising that journalists from other countries visit Korea to report hot 
news about the Korean entertainment industry (Korea Times, July 14,2003). 
Owing to such improved cultural understanding between Korea and Japan in 
terms of Hanryu, the number of travellers between the countries averages about 
ten thousand per day. Among them, seven thousand Japanese go to Korea and 
three thousand Koreans go to Japan. About half of the total foreign tourists 
visiting Korea are Japanese (Korea Times, Aug. 1,2001). In 2003, around 
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seventy Chinese journalists from eleven major Chinese cities undertook a 
business trip to the resort island of Cheju in Korea to look around the set of 
Korean hit drama All In for the purpose of investigating Hanryu (Korea Times, 
July 14,2003). 
Additionally, the popularity of Korean hit dramas Autumn Fairy Tale and Winter 
Sonata also led to an increase in the number of Taiwanese travelling to Korea. 
Their tours were focused on getting a first hand look at the locations where the 
drama was filmed. In 1998, the number of Taiwanese tourists had decreased to 
about 108,000, although the annual average had been approximately 300,000 
before the severance of diplomatic relations in 1992, when Korea switched its 
diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China (MCT, 2003). 
According to KNTO, by the end of October in 2002, more than 112,000 
Taiwanese had visited South Korea, a 4.6 percent increase on the corresponding 
period in 2001. The rate of increase was higher than that of all foreign tourists, 
which averaged 1.5 percent. The recent success of Winter Sonata contributed to 
the rise, and most Taiwanese tourists wish to visit Korea because of the drama 
(ibid. ). The significant factor here is not so much the increase in tourist numbers 
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per se, but the reasons attributed to the increase. There seems to be a connection 
between the success of Korean cultural products (Hanryu) and changing visitor 
attitudes which are reflected in visitor numbers and in the interviews I have 
conducted with officials and ordinary consumers. 
Second, with the craze for Korean cultural products, people in other countries 
have developed a much broader interest in Korean culture. That is to say, Korean 
cultural products have become a catalyst for curiosity about Korean culture and 
Korea itself. Korean dramas in particular have served as an important bridge for 
the Taiwanese to encounter Korean culture. Jerry Hsiao, 30, an office worker in 
Taipei said that `my friends come into contact with Korean culture through 
Korean soap operas' (Hsiao, interviewed in May 2002). Many Chinese youths 
are also enamoured by all things Korean, from hairstyles to lifestyle. This is 
where these particular cultural products differ from the others. Though you may 
like Samsung mobiles, this does not necessarily engender an interest in Korean 
culture or make you want to learn Korean. 
However, when you are fond of Korean soap operas or Korean stars, you tend to 
be more curious or interested in Korean food or life styles or even the language 
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as a result of your encounters with these specific cultural products. Zhang Yong 
Wen, an official in charge of the culture and tourism field at the Chinese 
Embassy in Seoul pointed out that `the Korean wave presented a good guideline 
of future ways to boost cultural ties between the two countries. Chinese people 
feel closer to Korean culture thanks to access to pop culture, even if they have 
never been to the country' (Korea Dimes, Aug. 23,2001). 
Along with changing visitor attitudes, the second indicator of changing attitudes 
to Korean culture is the increased interest in Korean language. Chiyako Inoue, 
43, a homemaker from Matsue, in western Japan, said that `she became so 
enthralled by a South Korean drama that she began studying Korean' (New York 
Times, Feb. 22,2004). Korean lectures on TV and in language schools are 
attracting many more Japanese. Japan's sudden attraction to Korean culture and 
the Korean language is particularly striking given Japan's colonial history in 
Korea from 1910 to 1945. According to Japan's Ministry of Education, the 
number of Korean language programmes in high schools was 163 in 2000, 
compared with 73 in 1994 and 7 in 1986. The number of private language 
schools that teach Korean has also mushroomed (Kim Young-deok, 2002). 
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The recent fetish for Korean items in Japan is a good base to build upon in order 
to develop a future-oriented relationship between the two countries. Greater 
exposure to Korea can have a positive influence on the Japanese people and their 
perception of Korean culture. This opens the way for Japanese investment in 
Korea as negative images of Korea, e. g. militant labour disputes and 
confrontation between North and South Korea, are eventually overcome. 
Korean Director Lee Gyuhyoung argues that `fans of Winter Sonata are women 
in their 40s and 50s, the age group that has the most discriminating attitude 
towards Korea. They saw negative aspects like the war and periods of 
dictatorship, so they were very ignorant about Korea. However, now their 
attitudes are changing and they are looking at Korea differently (interviewed in 
Nov. 2004). ' 
When it comes to China, since South Korea mended its fences with China in 
1992, ending half a century without diplomatic ties, brisk cultural exchanges 
between China and Korea have served as a catalyst for understanding each 
country's culture and for deeper cooperation. Dan Cui Jin, a professor of 
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Chinese Regional Studies at Hanshin University who has lived in Korea for 
eight years, said that `Chinese and Korean people have considerably different 
modes of living and ways of thinking. For example, Chinese people are inclined 
to individualism, similar to Westerners, while Koreans tend to make much of 
cooperative life. The two nations would have been unable to set up such close 
economic ties without mutual understanding based on cultural exchanges' 
(Korea Times, Aug. 22,2002). 
South Korean fever has also had a positive influence on improving Taiwanese 
sentiment toward Korea, which had been at its lowest point since 1992. Cho, C. 
H., director of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism in Korea, explained that 
`local sentiment toward Korea has not been good since diplomatic relations were 
broken, but Hanryu has fundamentally changed the local perception of Korea, 
and many people now say they want to know more about Korea and visit the 
country' (Interviewed in Oct. 2004). His view was reinforced by general public 
opinion in the Taiwanese press, claiming that Hanryu has facilitated civil-level 
contact between the two countries and this is playing a positive role in 
improving the bilateral relations since the cut-off of diplomatic ties (Cho Han, 
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2003). Hanryu, as a political or diplomatic as well as economic phenomenon, 
has definitely been a boon to South Korea. 
Along with changing tourism flows and growing interest in Korean language, a 
third factor indicating changing attitudes to Korean culture has been the 
increased recognition for the Korean film industry at international film award 
ceremonies and the constant success of Korean products in the domestic market. 
At the same time, the international, award-winning reputation of Korean cultural 
products tends, in turn, to boost Hanryu, so these trends have been mutually 
reinforcing and result in a kind of synergistic effect or virtual circulation. One of 
the most important trends in boosting Hanryu was when Korean film directors 
started to get international attention at world film festivals. The domestic film 
world has been pleasantly surprised by the amount of success it has had at 
international film festivals, especially in 2002. 
Furthermore, winning international awards provided a golden opportunity for 
exposing Korean cultural products to other countries. For example, Im Gweon- 
Taek's Chihwaseon was given the Best Director Award at the 55th Cannes 
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International Film Festival in 2002, a first in Korean film history. Thanks to this 
prize, Chihwaseon played in around 60 screens in France and ranked as high as 
ninth place in the French box office, seen by about 87,000 viewers in the first 
two weeks after opening in 2002, according to the French daily Le Monde (May, 
30,2002). The paper reported that it was the first time that a Korean film had 
attracted more than 50,000 moviegoers in France. 
In the same year, Lee Chang-dong also won Best Movie Director at the Venice 
Film Festival for Oasis. Indeed, all over the world, new mavericks like Kim Ki- 
Duk (The Isle, Bad Guy) and Hong Sang-Soo (Virgin Stripped Bare by Her 
Bachelors, Turning Gate) have received critical praise and festival accolades. 
Min Boung-hun's Let's Not Cry received special jury and Fipresci prizes at the 
2002 Karlovy Vary Film Festival (MCT, 2003). And more recently, Chan-wook 
Park won the Grand Jury Prize at Cannes 2004 for Old Boy, also a first in 
Korean history. With Hanryu, Korean films have recently started to be 
spotlighted at international markets, such as Mifed and AFMA, where 
traditionally Korean film companies used to rush, not to sell their films, but 
rather to buy foreign imports (Screendaily, Oct. 31,2003). 
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The fourth indicator of changing attitudes has been the success of Korean 
entertainment stars in other Asian countries. Backed by Hanryu, a variety of 
Korean artists have crossed over to feature in the cultural products of other Asian 
countries, facilitating intercultural exchanges. Many talented Koreans, including 
actors, actresses, singers and directors, have started making debuts in other 
countries, including even the USA, which can be said to be central or 
mainstream in the core-periphery structure of media flow (Chosunilbo, Nov. 30, 
2003). 
In Asian countries, a great number of Korean TV and film stars also owe their 
current popularity to the success of TV dramas. On account of acting in Korean 
TV dramas and films, Korean stars are now so popular that they have been 
receiving offers for commercial advertisements, feature films, and even local TV 
dramas in other countries such as China and Japan. For example, actress Kim 
Yun Jin who starred in `Swiri' was seen on the cover of the Asian edition of 
Newsweek along with the special report on Asian films (Newsweek Asia, May 21, 
2001). Based on these favourable circumstances, she signed a contract with U. S. 
television network ABC to join a US TV drama Lost. Recently, popular 
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actors/actresses and directors have received Hollywood love calls, which had 
never happened before (Korea Herald, Jan. 3,2003). So, increased exchanges of 
cultural products have also resulted in increased exchanges of people involved in 
this area. 
Moreover, it is no exaggeration to say that many Korean actors and actresses, 
such as Bae Yong Jun and Choi Ji-woo, are now no longer just Korean stars. 
Starring in the Korean soap opera Winter Sonata, they became pop culture 
heroes in many Asian countries, including Japan, because the drama series 
gained such an amazing level of international popularity. NHK, the Japanese 
broadcasting company even made and broadcast a documentary about Choi 
(Korea Times, March 11,2004). Meanwhile, Bae Yong Joon has been mobbed 
by fans all over Asia. It has been reported that the number of fans who showed 
up to see him in Singapore airport was larger than the number that turned out to 
see Hollywood star Tom Cruise. 
Similarly, in Japan, it seems that Bae's stardom beat even that of Hollywood star 
Brad Pitt if we compare their reception by fans at the airport there (USA Today, 
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Dec. 10,2004; Variety, Dec. 6,2004; Korea Herald, Nov. 30,2004). His 
popularity originated from the TV drama series Winter Sonata, which is an Asia- 
wide hit. In Japan, the drama was first shown on NHK satellite TV. As it became 
increasingly popular, it was rerun several times and broadcast on NHK with 
great success. This was dubbed `Winter Sonata Syndrome' by the Japanese press 
because of the popularity of the drama series, as well the accompanying books, 
music CDs and travel packages. 
Backed by this, the release of his first movie, Untold Scandal, and even some re- 
released dramas he had starred in, have become very popular (Newsweek 
International, May 3,2004). To summarise, the cultural impacts of Hanryu are 
various: the increased flow of tourists; interest in Korean culture and languages; 
international critical acclaim for Korean cultural products; success of Korean 
talents in foreign markets. These trends have both resulted from and contributed 
to Hanryu. 
Finally, a fifth cultural impact of Hanryu has been its influence in increasing the 
brand awareness of Korean goods, achieved in association with star marketing. 
The Korean fever sweeping across China also serves as a boon to Korean 
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exporters. Local companies seeking to make inroads into Asian markets are all 
out to take full advantage of Hanryu in their marketing campaigns, as Korean 
cultural products have become a means of informing and creating an image of 
Korea. 
Now, companies are making the most of star marketing, hiring top Korean 
entertainers for the marketing and advertisement of their products in China, 
Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia (Korea Times, Sep. 9,2005). As a result, it is 
common to see Korean stars in Chinese or Japanese advertising. Cho, C. H, 
director of the cultural industry division of the Korean Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism says that `name recognition is a factor when exporters take advantage of 
Hanryu for marketing. Hanryu will give a boost to such products as cell phones, 
PDAs and DVDs, which are targeted at young people' (Interviewed in Oct. 
2004). He observes that `Hanryu lets our exporters make easier inroads into 
China with a star-marketing strategy. Cover girl of LG's cosmetics brand DeBon, 
Kim Nam-ju, is called the "Asian pearl" in Vietnamese TV commercials. In just 
five years after doing business in the Southeast Asian country, DeBon has 
become the number one brand in Vietnam. An advertisement starring Ahn Jae- 
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wook helped lure the Chinese to Samsung computer monitors and widened 
Samsung Electronics' market share beyond that of their competitors' (ibid. ). 
Likewise, the widespread Korean fever is likely to present new business 
opportunities for many Korean firms across Asia, including China, at a time 
when Korean exports are in the doldrums. Hanryu improves Korea's image in 
foreign countries, which in turn creates a purchasing boom for Korean products. 
Interchanges between Korea and other Asian countries have been propelled by 
Hanryu. For example, the trade volume between Korea and Vietnam reached 
$1.5 billion as of July 2002, already exceeding the total volume for 1998 and a 
fourfold increase on a decade ago. South Korea is the fourth largest investor in 
Vietnam. 
As seen above, the Korean wave has had a marked impact in various ways 
regarding interchange with other countries. Although the tendency of the Korean 
Wave is still to rely on a few areas, such as a few films, soap operas and firms in 
the cultural industry in Korea, the ripple effects from that wave extend much 
further across the Korean economy. All of this adds up to good news for the 
domestic cultural industry, which only a few years ago was suffering from a 
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serious drop in sales and production due to a flood of imported foreign cultural 
products. Such a rapid change in the economic and cultural status of Korean 
cultural products raises important questions regarding the Korean wave and its 
implications with regard to media flow under globalisation. How can we explain 
this Korean wave in the context of global media flow and, depending on the 
answer to this question, is this related to government policy and what are its 
implications? These are the questions I intend to address through the remainder 
of this thesis. 
1.3 Methodology of Research 
It has proved extremely difficult to find any trail of academic research on the 
Korean cultural industry, even internationally. This thesis deals with issues 
surrounding very recent Korean cultural industries and discusses implications 
including the benefits and drawbacks of the current situation. In this introductory 
part of the thesis, I have explored some critical theories related to the 
international flow of cultural products. Throughout the whole study, these 
theories will serve both as literature review and provide an analytical tool. On 
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this basis, this thesis examines the theoretical and practical issues related to the 
impact of globalisation on cultural policy in peripheral countries through a 
particular focus on the Korean experience. 
This study does not offer a general explanation for all trades and cultural policy 
outcomes, or for the preferences of all states and societal actors in relation to 
globalisation. Rather, it will focus on the consequences of globalisation over 
time and across different sectors (film and TV) in Korea mainly since late 1990. 
What has made this unsustainable local industry survive and develop in the 
international market and what are the implications of this trend in relation to 
cultural policy under globalisation? This essay will tackle some critical questions 
that have resulted from these issues. 
Ever since Korea officially opened its market to Hollywood distributors in the 
late 1980s, it has become a cultural battlefield revealing conflicts or tensions or 
rare cooperation between state policy and the private sector and between local 
actors, including policy makers, and foreign actors, which throws into light 
critical implications for cultural policy in periphery countries under globalisation. 
In order to address these policy questions, this thesis is going to focus on Korean 
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film and TV policy in the period of the 1990s, a time of rapid change in Korean 
cultural policy. In this way I hope to determine if there is any relationship 
between the current Korean Wave and the evolution of Korean cultural industry 
policy since 1990. 
Turning this around, the production and trade of cultural products may speak to 
us equally well about the efficiency of cultural policy and the politics of cultural 
exchanges under globalisation. From the perspective of economists, in order for 
government intervention to be valid, the results of the intervention must show 
either improvement of efficiency in resource allocation or the promotion of the 
welfare of most citizens. However, from a cultural perspective, the efficiency of 
cultural policy should be focused on the protection of cultural diversity against 
economic effects. 
As for methodology, this research was produced by eliciting detailed 
quantitative data from the sector and qualitative face-to-face and telephone 
interviews. With regard to the interviewees, they can be divided into two groups. 
The first is made up of Koreans who are involved in the Korean cultural industry, 
and who can put forward practical and professional viewpoints on the Korean 
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wave. The second group consists of foreigners, and is made up of both 
professionals and experts on cultural field and non-professionals (including 
consumers). Foreign professionals in the cultural industry can provide analytical 
opinions or data, while non-professional foreigners can share their experiences 
of and comments on the Korean wave. 
As a journalist, I was able to access and conduct interviews with professionals. 
The non-professional foreign interviewees were selected randomly. Some are 
my friends or people in the streets whom I met on business trips or people living 
in Korea whom Korean cultural organizations such as MCT, KOFACE and other 
experts had introduced to me for the purpose of the interviews. Within these 
constraints I attempted to ensure a broad demographic range in terms of age, 
gender, nationality and occupation. Their profiles, including information such as 
name, nationality, occupation and title will be listed in the appendix (see 
appendices for more information). 
Because the thesis is aiming to examine policy, it was important to compare 
policy intentions with actual outcomes, measured in terms of hard statistical data 
and interviews with experts and consumers. This research indicated a strong 
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correlation between the recent success of Korean cultural products and Korean 
cultural industry. This research aims to address the main factors behind the 
success of Korean cultural products through a combination of fieldwork in 
Korean Broadcasting Institute and in-depth interviews with around 60 people 
mainly in Chapter 5 and 6. Then I will return to focus on the impact of 
government policy. By examining both the effects of policy and the other 
success factors which lie behind Hanryu, this thesis, I believe, ensures that 
Hanryu and Korean way in cultural policy made Hanryu possible could be 
generalized or sustainable. 
The fieldwork was conducted in three phases. Firstly, the preliminary phase 
between May and June 2003 was intended for an initial study and the design of 
fieldwork strategies, including drawing up an interviewee list and identifying the 
data I would need to collect in the film and TV sector in Korea. First contact and 
data research were completed over the period of July to August 2003. Secondly, 
the data collection phase was focused on collecting and studying articles, papers 
and books on the Korean cultural industry and policy. During this phase, the first 
interviews with leading industry figures were carried out between August and 
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September in 2003. Based on preliminary input from interviewees, further in- 
depth interviews took place from September to November 2003. 
In total, 60 persons (for the full list, see appendices) working in the sector or 
media organisations or who were experts in the field contributed to these 
interviews. All interviewees were asked to suggest the reason for the rising 
popularity of Korean cultural products and the advantages and disadvantages of 
this through specific questions which varied according to the interviewee's 
position in a particular sector. I have consulted other additional sources of 
information, such as policy documents, archives and other institutions' research 
papers. The third phase of fieldwork was done from the second half of 2004 to 
the beginning of 2005 and involved carrying out complementary interviews and 
compiling further data. 
Without a geo-linguistic market based on diasporic communities, Korean 
cultural products have become popular in Asian countries and even the Middle 
East, Europe and America since the end of 1990s. My thesis starts from the 
assumption that Hanryu as a counter-flow is an outcome of the rare experience 
of Korean cultural policy's response to globalisation. Therefore, throughout this 
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thesis, we are going to examine how it was possible and what it implies. Most of 
all, several market openings since the end of 1980s have brought to light major 
implications regarding cultural policy in periphery and globalisation. Korea has 
provided a radical model of rapid transition from a wholly protectionist policy 
towards cultural opening in the few years since the late 1990s. Thus, this thesis 
will explore an alternative model of cultural flow with regard to the Korean case. 
Additionally, this thesis uses the Korean case to challenge the assumption that 
market opening in periphery leads to global homogenisation driven by global 
companies equipped with global capital and networks. 
By studying the peculiar characteristics of the Korean experience of cultural 
globalisation, I believe this thesis presents a distinctive and challenging 
perspective regarding cultural flow under globalisation. Furthermore, this thesis 
will contribute to the literature on recent cultural exchanges in Asia, which rarely 
receive much attention, while expanding the scope of debate about the many 
faces of globalisation. In this respect, focusing on the real complexity of the 
Korean case will give us greater insight into what is happening in the world than 
does the hollow rhetoric of media flow under globalisation. However, this thesis 
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tries neither to exaggerate nor to simplify Korea's recent experience, and it 
would be risky to make assumptions regarding the emergence or extent of new 
patterns of media flow in periphery. In this way, this thesis attempts to provide 
an account of the impact of globalisation but in an empirically grounded manner. 
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CHAPTER 2. Globalisation and Media Flow Theory 
This chapter reviews some of the literature on globalisation and cultural trade in 
periphery. First, it seeks to explain the existing concepts of globalisation and other 
related ideological positions. Second, it will sketch out the political/ economic and 
conceptual context of key concepts and trace the origins of the terms/ definitions I 
will be using in my argument such as neo-liberalism, cultural discount theory and 
Wallerstein's definition of core-periphery structure in the world economy. Then 
finally, this chapter will raise three issues related to the cultural flow theory under 
globalisation, which I believe are relevant to the Korean situation. Examining these 
issues will highlight three dilemmas in cultural policy upon which this thesis is 
going to focus: firstly, the tension between protectionism and free trade (open 
market): secondly; the economy/ culture dichotomy; thirdly the opposition between 
cultural globalisation and national identity. 
2.1 Theories on the Flow of Cultural Products 
Undoubtedly, globalisation is likely to be a prevailing axiom of the twenty-first 
century. Nevertheless, the term globalisation is inherently problematic. What is 
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globalisation? According to the International Monetary Fund in the latest World 
Economic Outlook (Waters, 2000: 9), globalisation means `the growing economic 
interdependence of countries worldwide through massive cross-border transactions 
in goods, services, human resources and international capital flows. ' In a similar 
context, Robins (1991: 25) puts it that `globalisation is about the organisation of 
production and the exploitation of markets on a world scale. ' Here, economy and 
trade have become keywords in defining the term and a driving force behind global 
changes by way of globalisation (Lechner and Boli, 1999). 
In reality, globalisation is a new level of capitalism which trans-controls countries 
via a network of multi-national corporations. From this perspective, globalisation is 
a process and movement that means that all belong to the power of market. These 
trends are backed up by deregulation, liberalisation and neo-liberalism. Its 
principles are to scrap all barriers to the free activity of capital and maximise its 
efficiency. 
The effects of globalisation are expanding not only into the economic dimension but 
also into social, political and cultural dimensions. Globalising economies are 
increasingly complex and fast changing, with the instantaneous exchange of data, 
voices, images, sounds and other messages (Giddens, 2002; Cowen, 2002; 
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Appadurai, 2001, Held, 1999; Higson and Maltby, 1999). Owing to the 
development of Internet technology, the globalisation of culture which is circulated 
by audio-visual messages has grown faster than the exchange of any other types of 
product. As the cultural industry, which encompasses audio-visual services, has 
been deemed one of the most promising sectors of the 21st century, trade 
organisations seem to be pushing the cultural industry landscape in particular even 
further in the direction of domination by large conglomerates operating on a global 
scale (Hanahoe 2003). 
As seen above, though each scholar has his or her own definition of globalisation, 
we can find a common interconnection on a global scale. Thus, ideologically, 
globalisation is a concept that has something to do with the idea of the compression 
of the world and the re-conception of the world as a single entity (McLuhan, 2001). 
When it comes to the exchange of products, services, capital and human resources 
under globalisation, trade bloc models among countries have been developed. 
Roughly speaking, we can say these models are based upon a division between 
centre and periphery. The bloc actually originated from Wallerstein's `World 
System' model (Wallerstein 1990; Giddens 1991; Boyne 1990). The `World 
System' model in his terms means the capitalist world economic order, which has 
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resulted from the emergence and development of capitalism over the past three or 
four centuries. 
As for the structure of the modem World System model, it is broadly divided into 
three components: the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery (Wallerstein 
1974). This division is mainly based on an economic perspective, like the divisions 
between developed, lately developed and developing countries, or the `First, Second 
and Third world' model. These various terms share a similar meaning, based on a 
hierarchical concept of the global economy. In the early twenty first century, the 
world capitalist economy can still be related to massive imbalances between the 
core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery which media flow theory and 
globalisation of culture are also based on. 
With regard to this, Hannerz (1989: 66-75) agrees with Wallerstein and elaborates 
on the nature of centre-periphery relationships in cultural terms. The globalising 
tendency tends to be related to an asymmetrical model of the relationship between 
centre and periphery. However, he points out that the centre-periphery relationship 
is not just one of economic and political asymmetry, but also dynamic cultural 
symmetry and moreover there can be seen to exist a `global ecumene', introducing 
Kopytoff's term `ecumene', defined as a `region of persistent cultural interaction 
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and exchange' (1987: 10). Thus, the globalisation of trade and markets, coupled 
with the new communications technologies, are creating, in principle, a more `open 
society' where money, people, ideas and culture move freely across national borders, 
bringing about global ecumenes all over the world. 
However, some people might disagree that globalisation leads to a more open 
society because `the globalisation of products' tends to destroy each country's 
unique cultural products as just a few products dominate the world. Therefore, 
states whose main aim has been to produce a common culture within the state 
boundaries since its formation have been opposed to the globalisation of culture 
(Bauman, 1990). As institutions such as GATT and the WTO have increasingly 
fuelled business internationalisation of all kinds by encouraging trade between 
countries, some people in the Third World have claimed that free trade in fact 
favours the wealthier countries and more powerful companies in the global system 
of nation states (Hannerz 1991). 
In this context, Guy Sorman (1998: 7-9) argues that, from a cultural perspective, 
globalisation is westernisation and westernisation is Americanisation, which means 
the generalisation of American principles and values. According to his views, we 
must cope not just with certain globalisation but `American globalization'. As far as 
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the world film market is concerned, this argument seems very convincing. In terms 
of resources such as technology, facility, capital and human resource, no country 
can compete with the US. In 1995, American film companies spent an average 50 
million dollars on films in production costs alone, an amount which could have 
been used to make around 20 Korean blockbusters at that time (Gong, 1995: 
193-215). Even in terms of human resources, Hollywood has the best talent pool 
because the most successful and promising talents are selected to work there. Here, 
therefore, we should say that Hollywood is not the name of an American film city 
but a world film city. 
Sorman emphasises this trend of the global expansion of the American model as 
`MeWorld', a phrase introduced in Barber's book `Jihad versus Mc World' (1995). 
His argument is in line with the notion of cultural imperialism. Hollywood films 
have been playing the role of successful `evangelist' to disseminate American 
culture across the world (Boyd-Barrett 1977; Tomlinson, 1997; Grant & Wood, 
2004). Moreover, during trade negotiations at GATT, the United States demanded 
easier access for American film exports to other countries in return for guaranteeing 
that the US government would not block the import of other GATT members' 
products into the United States. This position of the U. S. asking for the opening of 
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markets for its entertainment industry with the threat of retaliation continues still. 
Having discussed the intellectual context for this thesis, it is clear that the issues we 
have mentioned have a particular resonance for the Korean situation. Like most 
other countries, Korea has been worrying about the intensifying pressure to 
harmonise Korea's domestic economic, social, and cultural policies with those of its 
largest trading partner, the Unites States. In the context of the globalisation theory, 
however, the Korean government did not acknowledge that the essence of the 
globalisation is the internationalisation of capital activity. In the middle of the 1990s, 
when the Kim Young-sam administration adopted globalisation as a national 
strategy, it simply perceived the element involving the internationalisation of trade, 
which is to `enter into foreign markets, open the domestic market, produce first 
class goods and become a first class nation' (Son Ho-chull, 1996: 65-67). 
Korea, which by and large has maintained protectionist policies, has recently been 
moving towards liberalisation and has established itself successfully in the Asian 
cultural market. Korea's current cultural policies and measures for responding to 
globalisation lead us to some challenging suppositions: on the one hand government 
intervention does not work well under globalisation, on the other market opening by 
small countries in periphery will weaken their cultural identity and result in cultural 
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homogenisation. In this chapter, I am going to address some theories on the flow of 
cultural products, such as economy of scale and cultural discount, which cause or 
influence forms of cultural flow. These theories will be used as critical tools to 
facilitate the research of various trends of media flow under globalisation. 
2.1.1 Economy of Scale 
As previously mentioned, the neo-liberal economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s 
resulted in the removal of protective measures for national industries. In some cases, 
a weak government itself has tried to adopt policies and strategies favoured by the 
market. Cultural policy was no exception to this trend. Market-favoured policy 
influenced the cultural industry and its policy making. At the same time, almost 
every country in the world is concerned with the question of how to maintain its 
cultural identity when global culture is prevailing. Now, based on such impacts of 
globalisation, we are going to examine the theories relating to the flow of cultural 
products and how they work in this global context. These theories are key elements 
to understanding the trade of Korean cultural products and how the Korean cultural 
industries and Korean cultural policy have been working in response to 
globalisation. 
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According to the glossary of key business words, `economy of scale' means `the 
gain experienced by firms that can spread their costs over a large volume of output. 
Other advantages, such as more efficient buying, can accrue to big producers. It is 
one of the barriers to entry, inhibiting new firms from entering certain markets 
successfully. However, achieving economies of scale carries some penalties. For 
example, it makes such businesses relatively inflexible and less responsive to 
change than their smaller cousins (Barrow 1995: 388). 
The basic characteristic of cultural products such as films, records and TV dramas is 
that they have a high production cost and a low reproduction cost (Hesmondhalgh, 
2002: 18; Garnham, 1990: 160). Because of this characteristic, beyond the 
break-even point, the sales profits of extra units can be enormous. This leads 
cultural industries to desperately seek access to more audiences by strong 
distribution in both domestic and overseas markets. The economics of recouping 
investment and generating further capital in the media industry demands that the 
appeal of the local is widened to include surrounding regions, and if possible, fused 
to achieve global status. 
Eventually, to cope with this mechanism, media companies must inevitably seek 
economies of scale. Merger-Acquisition booms among media moguls aimed toward 
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vertical and horizontal integration could also be understood in this context. Cultural 
entrepreneurs with shoestring budgets in a cottage industry cannot access big 
audiences and survive the attack of trans-national conglomerates under 
globalisation. It is because of this that the British government loosened the 
regulations of cross-media ownership in the Communications Bill 2000 and big film 
companies such as Working Title and DNA Films merged with major Hollywood 
distributors (The Guardian, Nov. 13,2003). 
While sounds, images and information may be moving across cultural borders more 
rapidly than in the past, the ability to transmit and receive these messages is 
dependent upon access to means of information production and telecommunication 
and the distribution of technologies of reception. Therefore, as mentioned above, 
Robins (1991: 25) put it, "globalization is about the organization of production and 
the exploitation of markets on a world scale. " To maximise profits, companies seek 
to operate in all markets simultaneously, rather than sequentially, targeting and 
actively constructing consumers in multiple regions on the basis of demographics 
and lifestyles, rather than national identities. Thus, high sunk costs and the search 
for scale economies have a direct correlation to the globalisation of markets. 
Recently, this has been easy to see in the strategies of major Hollywood distributors. 
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Releasing a film simultaneously not sequentially has become a global phenomenon. 
A similar strategy operates in other industries. For example, as Negus (1993) points 
out, when it comes to the music industry, over the years, most record labels have 
sought to release a vast number of recordings in different countries in order to get 
their own material distributed in other territories. With a goal of maximising the 
commercialisation of commodities, companies seek to make their commodities 
mega-hits by recourse to big advertising campaigns and exposure all over the world. 
In this context, the frenzied vertical and horizontal integration in the media over the 
past decade was mainly an effort to make the best of the economy of scale. In 
pursuit of economies of scale, US media companies have exploited both domestic 
and international markets. As Hoskins and McFadyen (1991: 211-212) point out, 
the most critical factor in the comparative advantages the USA has in cultural 
exchanges is a `unique access to the largest market' which allow it to achieve 
economies of scale. 
The huge size of the US domestic market, the largest English language market in 
the world, allow economies of scale and scope, resulting in the traditional 
dominance of the USA in the international trade of the cultural industries. In order 
to raise the funds to make a film, many non-US companies are forced to pre-sell the 
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film to the U. S. majors. These sales must be factored into the budget and marketing 
strategy of non-US film companies, while the U. S. is in the fortunate position of 
being able to break even at the domestic box-office alone. This situation reinforces 
one-way media flow from the US. Conversely, the US practice of combining 
domestic and overseas markets is experienced in reverse by most other countries. 
2.1.2 Cultural Discount 
Whereas the theory of economy of scale is based on a perspective of supplier's side 
in the international flow of cultural products, cultural discount theory is related to 
reception of cultural products on the consumer's side. Initially, the term cultural 
discount was put forward by Hoskins and Mirus. In their article (1988: 499-515), 
Hoskins and Mirus argue that the USA and other English-speaking markets reveal 
resistance against imported programmes in foreign languages and conceptualise this 
as a `cultural discount'. Most importantly, the global culture speaks English. In an 
article, The Emergent World Language System, Abram de Swaan (1993: 219) writes 
that `in the midst of this galaxy there is one language that is spoken by more 
multilingual speakers in the supranational language groups than any other and that 
is therefore central to all central languages. This super central language is, of course, 
English. ' 
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Daitin (1993: 226) goes further, stating that `the logic of globalization suggests that 
world languages such as English will begin to challenge national vernaculars in 
such a way as to threaten their existence as living languages. ' Linguistic and 
cultural differences, in spite of the different media and promotion systems, continue 
to form distinct invisible boundaries between audiences. Based on the cultural 
discount theory, Asian-produced programmes are apparently considerably limited in 
terms of audience identification and do not travel too well beyond their national 
territories or their language area. 
In this context, it is understandable that imported TV programmes or movies that 
succeed anywhere in the world usually resonate harmoniously with local cultural 
orientations or represent universal genres such as melodrama and action. As Lull 
indicates, cultural discount theory extends beyond linguistic difference to include 
other factors, all of which influence the context of reception. 
The point is that the availability of particular audiovisual texts does not define 
what is made of them in the context of reception, especially when they are absorbed 
through different cultural and linguistic frameworks. It is because though 
geo-cultural markets are unified by language, they go beyond language to include 
history, religion, ethnicity, and culture in several senses: shared identity, gestures 
and non-verbal communication; what is considered funny or serious or even 
sacred; clothing styles; living patterns; climate influences and other relationships 
with the environment (Lull, 2000: 252-253). 
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The processes of globalisation are clearly operating unevenly in the cultural 
industries as well as in other economic sectors. It is not surprising that satellite 
operators have moved from pan-European aspirations to distributing television 
either in national markets or on the basis of homogeneous language areas, notably 
the English, German, and Scandinavian languages (Richeri, 1992: 77-121). Owing 
to this trend, the conditions for the easy passage of European films and television 
programmes from one European country to another have not yet been attained. 
Sometimes, some cultural products become very popular in certain parts of the 
world, but are simply rejected in other parts. Studies of the effects of television 
reception emphasize the importance of national differences in reading and decoding 
messages (Wildman 1994: 115-141). This is because the messages coded into 
television programmes only make sense to those socialised into those codes, so that 
it is possible for people of different nationalities and social classes to view 
internationally popular television programmes through inappropriate codes. In this 
context, Silj (1988: 40) concluded that `viewer reception is a dynamic process 
influenced by the cultural identities of audiences and the sedimentation of other 
social practices'. 
This is consistent with Sinclair's argument (1996: 18) that `the industrial and 
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institutional conditions obtaining prior to any audience seeing any foreign 
programme may be seen as one of the other factors'. For example, one of the most 
popular TV dramas, Dallas, was not successful in every country. As SiIj (1988: 36) 
demonstrated, Peruvians much preferred their own local comedy programme. This 
implies that successful local programming tends to relegate U. S. programmes to 
second or lower place. Of course, if local programmes are of low quality, the 
situation is different. There is a paradox here owing to cultural familiarisation. 
Although Koreans tend to prefer domestic cultural products like Korean soap operas 
to their U. S. counterparts, when they must choose among foreign programmes, they 
prefer the U. S. ones because they are used to U. S. cultural products which seem to 
be standardised and which therefore become more familiar. The important point 
here is that cultural discount operates in two ways - firstly it can work to reinforce 
cultural distinctiveness and local preferences. On the other hand, because US 
products in particular become more familiar because of standardisation, the cultural 
discount for US products is often lower than for other regional competitors. This is 
very significant to the case of Korea. 
As Tunstall indicates, cultural discount extends beyond national context to 
encompass a regional dimension. `Audiences will tend to prefer that programming 
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which is closest or proximate to their own culture: national programming if it can 
be supported by the local economy, regional programming in genres that small 
countries cannot afford. Furthermore, the Brazilian audience definitely prefer 
Brazilian programmes over imported television shows' (1992: 14-15). This is the 
case in other Latin American countries too (Straubhaar 1989; Sinclair 1996). 
Thus, cultural forms tend to circulate better regionally than globally because 
cultural and linguistic similarities promote greater understanding and appreciation 
than less resonating forms can inspire. This is because there are some particular 
elements in local cultural products such as humour, music, costume, and narrative 
modes which are all elements in what Straubhaar (1991: 14) calls `cultural 
proximity', the opposite of cultural discount. For example, the biggest hit Korean 
film of 2001, Friend, released at the Pusan international film festival had lesser 
international appeal than expected because it contained local dialects and a specific 
ethos in a time setting which can not be fully understood by foreigners. As for the 
film Shiri, when it was released in the U. S., it was understood as an art film 
although it is categorised as a blockbuster in Korea. 
Thus, the theory of cultural discounts is based on a two-way relationship which is 
very much paradoxical because it can of course work against the incoming / alien 
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culture while it can also work `unevenly', favouring some more familiar imports 
over others and so works in favour of English language culture in other cultures / 
countries. Translating this to the box office, it means that Korean audiences will 
probably prefer Korean films thereby creating a barrier against cultural 
homogenisation in the domestic market - but it will also make it harder for Korean 
films to sell in other countries, including the U. S., thereby prohibiting cultural 
heterogenisation or cultural diversity to a great extent. And it will also give 
American films an advantage over other film imports in third party countries. 
2.2 Forms of Media Flow 
As examined earlier in this chapter, economy of scale has led to the homogenisation 
of culture in both direct and indirect ways. This is based on its characteristics of 
expansion and maximisation of efficiency. On the contrary, cultural discount has 
resulted in both homogenisation and heterogenisation of culture. The 
homogenisation or heterogenisation of culture is related to forms of media flow. 
There are several forms of media flow in the world market: one-way flows, 
two-way flows and multi-flows. Each form of flows represents different 
perspectives on the flows of cultural products. These basic perspectives on 
international media flow are worth further noting in order to understand the 
63 
PART. I Chapter 2. Globalisation and Media Flow Theory 
centre-periphery trade mechanism of cultural products under globalisation. 
2.2.1 One Way Flow: Cultural Imperialism 
One perspective on globalisation argues that the world is becoming a single world 
society. Thus Pieterse (1995: 45) argues that the world is becoming `more uniform 
and standardized, through a technological, commercial and cultural synchronization 
emanating from the West, and that globalization is tied up with modernity. ' 
Tomlinson (1991: 89-90) extends this argument, suggesting that much of what was 
labelled cultural imperialism is in fact a broader spread of a globalised pattern of 
modernity. Therefore, in his view, Americanisation or Westernisation was just 
another name for a more general and deeper globalisation of capitalism. Tomlinson 
refers here to Herman and McChesney and their perspective on globalisation as 
cultural imperialism. 
We can make a distinction between two possible discourses of cultural 
imperialism as they have emerged... The first [.. ] is the familiar discourse 
of cultural imperialism as the attack on national/cultural identity, a 
discourse conducted around the binary opposition 'us' and `them' and on 
the 'synchronic-spatial' plane. It is the discourse of 'Americanization' 
and so on. [.. ] But underlying this is the broader discourse of cultural 
imperialism as the spread of the culture of modernity itself. This is a 
discourse of historical change, of 'development, of a global movement 
towards, among other things, an everyday life governed by the habitual 
routine of commodity capitalism. One reason for calling this discourse a 
broader one is that the `imaginary' discourse of cultural identity only 
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arises within the context of modernity (Cited in Tomlinson, 1991: 89-90). 
In this vein, Hannerz (1989: 12-16) also argues that `to a degree the present cultural 
influence of Britain and France reflects the fact that the old-style colonial powers 
could more or less monopolize the centre-periphery cultural flow to their domains. ' 
He explains that in old settler colonies, historical ties are yet closer, as links of 
kinship and ancestry also connect the periphery to a specific centre. This one-way 
cultural flow from the centre to periphery can be explained as cultural imperialism. 
The argument assumes that the flow of content from the Western markets will erode 
the cultural identity of Asian populations (Moran and Keane, 2004: 12). As Japan 
occupied the East Asian region for several decades, these Asian countries, including 
Korea, are still sensitive to the influence of Japanese culture owing to cultural 
imperialism in the past. 
There have been some theorists (Nordenstreng, 1974; Schiller 1992; Tunstall 1977; 
Mattelart, 1979; Hamelink, 1983; Bauman, 1990; Tomlinson, 1991) who would 
wish to present the tendency on the global level as one of cultural integration and 
homogenisation. In particular, Nordenstreng and Varis (1974) and Schiller (1992) 
are representative scholars who align their position with the `one-way street' 
metaphor of the 1970s. They argue that the global pattern of media flow reflects the 
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system of domination in the economic and political world order. Echoing them, 
Hamelink (1983: 3) agrees that `the impressive variety of the world's cultural 
systems is waning due to a process of cultural synchronization that is without 
historical precedent. ' 
In reality, evidence for the monopolisation of the flow at a global level by a few 
producers seems to be everywhere visible. According to some commentators, the 
local musical tradition of many Third World countries is rapidly disappearing under 
the domination of American pop music. Such homogenisation is most of all evident 
in film, where the U. S. dominates over 80% of world markets. More and more 
people around the world watch films that are less and less varied. This trend is 
described as an `American monoculture'. The U. S. produces the moving images 
that most easily traverse any national barriers. Consequently, changes resulting 
from globalisation have curtailed local exports and rendered industries in some 
countries nearly unviable, as shrinking market share has reduced profits and 
depleted the amount of investment capital available for continued production. 
As mentioned above, the US has an advantage in terms of language and genres and 
in terms of its large domestic market. In contrast even some large Third World 
countries are often unable to afford to produce such cultural products as feature 
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films, cartoons, and action adventure series. Meanwhile, the U. S. is also the most 
resistant to foreign programming, particularly in the commercial broadcast sector, in 
which the U. S. has by far the biggest market in the world. Cunningham and Jacka 
(1996) argue that about 98 per cent of commercial broadcast television in the U. S. is 
American, while Australian programming ranks with Mexican, Latin American and 
Canadian imports on a second tier behind British imports in the U. S. market, 
representing an extremely marginal fraction of total overall programme content. 
How this has happened is revealed when we take into account the vertical 
integration frenzy in the information sector designed to pursue economy of scale. 
This is done in the name of free choice and free markets but in reality it more often 
results in a monopoly. Schiller (1996) and Friedman (1994) argue that this trend of 
homogenisation originated mainly from multinational corporations, which use 
modern communications media to assert and intensify global economic and cultural 
domination. According to this view, the world has become one big market driven by 
the dominating forces of global capitalism. As phone companies, cable carriers, 
broadcast media, and software producers tend to mix and merge in the name of 
technological conversion, and even though this is mainly for the maximisation of 
profit through economy of scale, monoculture is enhanced, diversity and 
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competition giving way to monopoly. 
Chapter 2. Globalisation and Media Flow Theory 
Arguments about the impact of the trans-national cultural flow should, of course, 
say something about how people respond to it. Hannerz (1989: 66-75) questions the 
issue of cultural diffusion: `When the centre speaks, the periphery listens, and the 
world does not talk back. ' Here, however, we should perhaps ask whether 
influences of cultural flow must necessarily be seen as deleterious. Current 
conceptions of cultural imperialism exemplify on the largest imaginable scale the 
curious fact that according to the economics of culture, to receive may be to lose. 
The flow of cultural products means more than the export of products because they 
are symbolic experience goods and so influence our lives, thoughts and even our 
values. 
The global transmission of culture inherently entails the transmission of values. 
Those who celebrate the globalization of popular culture unfortunately overlook how 
such cultural material contributes to corporate dominance, and to the subsequent 
role of corporations in the destruction of the very life systems we all require. In effect, 
popular culture serves the same function for large corporate interests today as early 
missionaries served for their religious institutions and government. Pop culture's 
idolized icons are the new global missionaries. They not only sell their own products, 
they also sell Western economies' values of materialism, over-consumption, and 
waste. (Cited in Lull, 2000: 226-228) 
As seen up until now, the idea that the centre-periphery flow of culture will lead to 
the disappearance of cultural differences in the world still seems to be unanimously 
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shared. Those notions of multinational capitalism, Americanisation, media 
imperialism and consumer culture assume that local differences are being 
obliterated via a one-way flow of products, resources and culture under 
globalisation. Thus, this perspective on media flow is pessimistic, and so quite far 
from the optimistic perspective of the `ideal' global village with a global culture 
where the world becomes united to the extent that it is regarded as one place 
(McLuhan 1989). Rather, it seems more related to a post-colonial theory according 
to which a few power states dominate culture and ideology as well as the economies 
of colonised countries. Therefore, this theory is much more focused on the negative 
perspective of `double-edged' globalisation, to use Tomlinson's term (1997: 30). 
2.2.2 Two or Multi-Way Flows 
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, from the perspective of one-way media flow, 
globalisation is conceptualised as the worldwide homogenisation and the erosion of 
cultural differences. However, a closer examination allows us to see the situation 
quite differently. For example, MTV, which has been criticised for being a prime 
mover in the homogenisation of world music (Banks: 1996), recently attempted to 
localise its contents. Managing Director Bill Roedy emphasized, `our mission is not 
to make music homogeneous but to take advantage of local music. We expose 
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music to audiences who would not previously have been able to see it, so audiences 
in Greece, for example, can see French music (Davis, 1991: 27)'. That means they 
try to regionalise local repertoire and at the same time try, in a sense, to globalise 
local repertoire (Dalton, 1992: 15). 
In a critique of the one-way media flow theory, Arjun Appadurai (1997: 17), 
Ferguson (1992: 69-93) and Laing (1986: 331-41) has argued that globalisation 
does not entail the cultural homogenisation of the world. Global pop culture is not 
really American, not really a monoculture at all, that it has been internationalised 
thanks to Spanish Flamenco, African Hip-hop, Jamaican Reggae and so on. In the 
case of Brazilian popular music, increased exposure to musical products and 
cultural styles from abroad has generated an ever-expanding panoply of hybrids 
without necessarily effacing more traditional styles, perhaps even encouraging them. 
Lull (2000) and Cunningham and Jacka (1996) also give insightful observation in 
so far as they draw more attention to the two-way relationship between media 
effects and audience behaviour and choices. 
In particular, Negus (1993: 295-361) points out two main reasons that 
Anglo-American dominance in the music industry cannot be seen as cultural 
imperialism. Firstly, Anglo-American pop is not composed only of pure 
70 
PART. I Chapter 2. Globalisation and Media Flow Theory 
Anglo-American influences. As there are many `polycentric corporations' owned 
and financed through an alliance of Japanese, European and North American 
interests (Robins, 1991), it becomes increasingly difficult to consider this dominant 
culture as Anglo-American. Secondly, the cultural imperialism model tends to 
propose a direct correspondence between a culture and the territory associated with 
it. 
Based on all these arguments, I would like to summarise the main arguments 
against the claim that our global culture is a monoculture or homogenised by a 
one-way flow. These arguments include: active audiences, the geo-cultural market 
and the circulation of global media products as a catalyst for local production. 
Firstly, as for active audiences, this idea is based on reception theory arguing that 
the audience itself is not contained by national borders nor just passively receives 
media products from the centre. According to the perspective of media imperialism, 
it is assumed that programmes from the USA had an inevitable and self-sufficient 
ideological effect upon their passive audiences in the periphery. Tunstall (1977: 
38-40), for example, assumed that the heavy import of U. S. programmes into Latin 
America in the 1960s would be a permanent state rather than a transitional phase in 
the development of television in these regions. 
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However, as a result of the growth in `active audience' theory studies (Varis, 1984; 
Fiske 1987; Liebes and Katz, 1990; Ang, 1995) this perspective cannot be 
considered to respond properly to the reality of the situation. In this vein, Lull 
(2000) argues that the mere fact that Third World television stations buy a lot of 
imported programmes often has more to do with the fact that they are cheap than 
that audiences are necessarily enthralled with them. The waning supremacy of U. S. 
brands through market fragmentation and the growing challenges to U. S. 
dominance from other countries represents an alternative trend of globalisation. 
Active audience theory and audience theory suggests that there are different 
responses based on various kinds of consumer segments. This is much more the 
case with cultural products which reflect specific lifestyles and degrees of 
embeddedness. According to Lull (2000,242-3), there exist `Interpretive 
Communities' (Fish, 1980) who `interpret particular mediated materials with shared 
enthusiasm or a common viewpoint. ' They are audiences defined more by shared 
identities and discourses than by demographic similarities or differences, which 
could lead to a market segmentation based on geo-cultural factors rather than 
demographics. 
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Secondly, theories of the `geo-cultural market', which originated from the rise of 
newly industrialised countries (NICs), has made the cultural imperialism theory 
somewhat outdated. Active audience theory and audience theory suggests that there 
are different responses based on various kinds of consumer segments. This is much 
more the case with cultural products which reflect specific lifestyles and degrees of 
embeddedness. According to Lull (2000,242-3), there exist `Interpretative 
Communities' who `interpret particular mediated materials with shared enthusiasm 
or a common viewpoint. ' They are audiences defined more by shared identities and 
discourses than by demographic similarities or differences, which could lead to a 
market segmentation based on geo-cultural factors rather than demographics. 
The concept of `geo-cultural markets' was developed in research on media flows to 
explain the significant phenomenon of the regionalisation of television into 
multi-country markets linked by geography, language and culture. As a matter of 
fact, this trend has been based more on language and culture than on regional 
proximity, since not all these linked populations, markets and cultures are 
geographically contiguous (Straubhaar 1991; Robertson 1995; Ferguson 1992; Chan 
1994). Around the late 1980s, Tracey (1988: 23) observed that the `very general 
picture of TV flows... is not a one-way street; rather there are a number of main 
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thoroughfares, with a series of not unimportant smaller roads'. Varis (1984: 143-52) 
also stated that despite a few countries' dominance of media flow, there was `a trend 
toward greater regional exchanges. ' In this vein, some middle range theories have 
tried to explain the emergent peripheral nations' media export markets. These 
non-Western systems of regional exchange and the implications of these systems for 
global media flows cannot be accounted for according to the media imperialism 
theory (Naficy 1993: 127; Mowlana and Rad 1992: 51-68). 
Most of all, Sinclair argues that `with its dichotomised view of `the West' versus the 
`Third World', the cultural imperialism theory was unable to give an adequate 
account of semi-peripheral settler societies such as Australia and Canada, where the 
experience of colonialism and post-colonialism has been quite distinct from that of 
nations in other former colonised zones, a distinctiveness manifest in the television 
systems which they developed' (Sinclair, 1996: 9). Consequently, Americanisation 
and commodification in terms of cultural homogenisation have failed to account for 
the dynamics of semi-peripheral markets. There is a pattern of certain producers 
tending to dominate their geo-cultural markets, such as Australian within the 
English-speaking world, Hong Kong within the extended Chinese market, Egypt in 
the Arab world, and Mexico within the Spanish-speaking communities. 
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Thus, many local audiences would like to see audio-visual products in their own 
languages, addressing their own cultures or similar ones. Geo-cultural market trends 
elaborated by a regional perspective have resulted in the rise of the regional 
entrepreneurs, and the re-stratification of audiences into `imagined communities' 
beyond national boundaries. In this sense, I think, the geo-cultural market is much 
related to both the theory of active audiences and the theory of cultural discount. 
On the other hand, language and cultural cues, where they are shared 
across borders, can help build cross-national markets. [.. ] The cultural 
proximity of Latin American Spanish speaking nations to each other makes 
slang, jokes and references easier to understand. These cultural 
similarities and common histories come together to define cultural 
markets to which television responds. Populations defined by these kinds 
of characteristics tend to seek out cultural products, like television 
programs or music, which are most similar or proximate to them. [.. ] The 
cultures reflected in these geo-cultural markets are not static, they reflect 
the adaptation of European languages and cultures to colonialized 
populations, as well as an ongoing cultural hybridization between multiple 
elements (Tomlinson, 1991). 
What I would like to emphasise here is that these newly rising powerhouses in 
periphery are based on a `diasporic market', united by a common language (Sinclair 
et al., 1996: 75). Taking the example of Mexico, in the beginning, a large quantity 
of programmes were exported from Mexico to the USA because of the immigrant 
and exiled Mexican communities living there which formed diasporic market. 
Mexico became the strongest media television economy of Latin America, 
exploiting the Spanish-speaking population in the U. S. by way of exporting its 
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programmes to the USA and owning the major Spanish-speaking network in U. S. 
(Sinclair, 1996: 34-36; 1990: 343-60). 
Thus, we see the emergence of new, multi-country markets in which audiences may 
be geographically distant from one another and yet remain linked as markets 
through linguistic or other cultural ties (Straubhaar, 1991: 39-59). What is more, 
these diasporic cultures can be formed and maintained much more easily today than 
ever before due to the globalisation of technologies and media channels which cross 
national borders. 
The third set of theories to challenge the idea of one-way media flow, along with 
active audiences and geo-cultural markets, is the notion of global media products 
and technologies acting as a catalyst for local production. This argument is quite 
controversial. Schiller argues that `the role of television in the global arena of 
cultural domination has not diminished in the 1990s. Rather - reinforced by new 
delivery systems-communication satellites and cable networks - the image flow is 
heavier than ever (1991: 15). ' However, as Sinclair points out, `television is still a 
hybrid medium, with a plethora of programming of an essentially local, 
untranslatable nature (1996: 10). ' Therefore, according to figures from 1989, the 
volume of purely domestic TV material in national markets is twenty-nine times 
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higher than what is traded (O'Regan, 1992; 74-98). 
Satellite services could not have relied solely on cheap imported programming to 
attract local audiences during this period because of cultural discount. Staubhaar 
(1991: 39-59) also highlights that the vast demand opened up by regulatory 
liberalisation, commercialisation, privatisation and new technologies in many 
national communication systems has not only increased the circulation of Western 
media products but also opened up more distribution channels for local, national 
and regional media productions. According to his explanation, by means of this 
trend of development of technology and liberalisation, some countries in periphery 
have in the last 15 to 20 years substantially increased the quantity of domestic and 
regional productions within their geo-cultural market and even the world market. 
Here, Chan's empirical study (1994) is worth reference. He gives the example of 
Malaysia, where the Malaysian Chinese first imported Chinese programmes along 
with Chinese VCRs, following which DBS and now particularly Star TV have 
attracted huge audiences. In this case, global media technologies intensify national 
the regional trade in cultural products and support the emergence of geo-cultural 
markets. Lull cites a similar example: 
The transnational flow of communications technology and cultural materials helps 
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make Mexicans feel more Mexican in Mexico too. For instance, when famous 
Mexican popular music group like Los Trgres del Norte, Bronco, or Los Tucanes de 
Ti] uana play their hits in outdoors stadiums in Mexico, they depend on Japanese, 
German and American audio technology to amplify the music with minimal distortion. 
The effect is loud, pure sound that drives Mexican emotions, feelings, 
language-Mexican culture-deep into the bones of concert-goers. Far from destroying 
Mexican culture, the imported technology enhances the pure Mexican cultural 
experience (Lull 2000.261). 
2.3 Issues on the World Trade of Cultural Products 
As seen above, as globalisation expands, theories regarding the flows of cultural 
products often conflict with each other in reality. Thus, this obviously has some 
critical implications for the world trade in cultural products. In the three sections 
that follow, based on the theories outlined above, I will examine the debates 
surrounding the world trade of cultural products, highlighting responses to 
globalisation which influence the international flows of cultural products and bring 
to light implications for media flows in periphery. 
2.3.1 Issue One: Culture vs. Economy Dichotomy 
As we have already examined, the critical point leading to controversy in world 
trades of cultural products was the difference of perception of cultural products 
among nations. Thus, we need to think about what culture means and what cultural 
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products are. What do we mean by culture and cultural goods? Culture is a term 
with many different definitions and connotations. In cultural and media studies, the 
term typically refers to the whole complex of ideas, symbols and artefacts produced 
by human groups in the course of their adaptation to their natural and social 
environments. This common definition of culture as shared or learned behaviour 
(Graves and Kinsely, 1982) or a whole way of life (Williams, 1981: 11) is vague 
and always debatable. Canadian scholar Rabinovitch (1998: 21) summarises the 
culturalists' view: 
Culture is much more than a commodity over the counter. Cultural products and 
services, such as feature films, broadcasting programs, sound recordings, books, live 
performances, visual art and heritage collections, are unique amalgams of content, 
distributing methods, and exhibition. Taken together, cultural production and 
consumption have a strong impact on the quality of life. Cultural products and 
services communicate ideas and information. Experiencing these products brings 
Canadians together as audiences and as communities of active, reflective citizens. 
Likewise, cultural identity gives meaning to who we are and sets the context for 
communication by creating shared understandings through the languages, values, 
traditions, experiences and works of art across the generations. However, in the age 
of neo-liberal globalisation, culture has been industrialised and commodified 
because neo- liberalisation accelerates the process of turning everything we can 
name into a commodity. Barber (1995: 59) explains that `cultural products are 
increasingly associated with or defined by symbolic interactions that belong to the 
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service sector in its post-modern, virtual economy manifestation such as 
information, entertainment, and lifestyle, and these products are blurring the line 
between goods and services. ' 
Accordingly, the cultural industries have never universally accepted any one 
definition of culture. In its broadest sense, a cultural industry includes carriage 
infrastructure (equipment and networks), human resources (artists, performers, 
musicians), and cultural content (Foote 1998). The U. K. defines cultural industry as 
the creative and expressive artistic activities generally referred to as the performing, 
visual and creative arts and those functions related to their preservation and 
dissemination (Hesmondhalgh 2002; DCMS 2001: 4-51). This definition is broad 
enough to encompass museums, archives, libraries, and archaeological and historic 
sites whose functions include the preservation and dissemination of cultural 
heritage. 
Back to the culture and market controversy, as the cultural industry is neither 
simple commerce nor pure art, the production and trade of cultural products 
encompass both sides of the debate and may speak to us equally well about the 
1 Those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which 
have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and 
exploitation of intellectual property. 
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efficiency of cultural policy and the politics of cultural exchanges under 
globalisation. Dorland (1996: 29) has noted that we need to understand that `there 
are two realities implied in the term cultural industries. One is economic, which 
refers to industries that produce cultural commodities (films, books, TV programs 
and so on), and the other one is cultural -a concept deployed in the discussion of 
specific policy problems. ' Here, I do not wish to try to provide a comprehensive 
review of the meaning of culture because what we are concerned with is rather 
identifying the reasons for and implications of the culture/economy dichotomy. 
In this context, Bernier (1998) details the way cultural goods and services have 
been treated in international trade agreements. His survey shows that there is still a 
great deal of ambivalence and the fundamental question behind this ambivalence is 
the specificity of cultural products as outlined above. For the United States, cultural 
goods do not differ from other goods. That is why they do not call the industry 
involved in culture the cultural industry but rather the entertainment industry. 
Contrary to this, many other countries consider that cultural products are 
fundamentally different in certain respects, and so believe that they should not be 
treated as other goods. 
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Under such circumstances, negotiations to bring about a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments (MAI), an agreement that OECD members had attempted to conclude 
since 1995, were cancelled in 1998. The main reason for the collapse of 
negotiations was the inability of the concerned parties to come to an agreement on 
the issue of culture-related service sectors. The first action that countries concerned 
with cultural values and identities undertook was to make sure that the principle of 
cultural exception was accepted. Cultural exception (`1'exception culturelle') is 
based on the French and Canadian view that culture is not a commodity like any 
other and should therefore be treated as an exception to the normal terms of trade. 
According to this principle, no requests related to the opening of culture related 
sectors made during trade negotiations should be forced upon any country. 
In a concession by GATT, some exemptions from the general agreement were 
introduced in order to protect industries through setting quotas on how much 
content can be exported, to limit concentration and so on. The cultural industries 
represented one of these exemptions, the aim behind this being to protect cultural 
diversity by limiting U. S. cultural exports. Under this regulation, France could 
preserve its quotas for audio-visual products and its state film subsidies of $350 
million a year. 
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When it comes to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA, Nov. 14,2001) of WTO 
which is the successor of GATT, these two different perspectives have divided 
countries into two groups regarding the issue of cultural opening. On the one hand, 
countries such as France, Canada and Korea, which view their own and other 
countries' national cultural values as being vitally important, have argued that they 
will not push for any opening of culture-related sectors during international trade 
negotiations until a new international organisation designed to protect individual 
cultural values is established (Shao, 1995). Moreover, these countries have made it 
clear that they oppose any efforts in the name of free trade to meddle with a 
country's right to support its cultural diversity. On the other hand, the U. S. has 
asserted that within the present trade regulations, the cultural aspects of the 
audiovisual sector should be treated in a transparent, more predictable, and open 
manner like other commodities. 
In response to these arguments, UNESCO has adopted the Universal Declaration on 
Cultural Diversity agreed upon by the representatives of the 186 UNESCO 
members during the 31" General Conference in 2001. Basically, the declaration 
stressed in Article 4, Human rights as guarantees of cultural diversity, that the 
defence of cultural diversity is ethical, imperative and inseparable from respect for 
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human dignity. In Article 8, Cultural goods and services: commodities of a unique 
kind, it is designated that culture should not be treated as a mere commodity or as a 
consumer good and in Article 9, Cultural policies as catalysts of creativity, that 
each state should define its cultural policy and implement it using the means it 
considers fit, whether that be through operational support or appropriate 
regulations. 
However, unlike GATT, this declaration was non-binding and did not provide for 
any countermeasures that should be taken against the threat emanating from global 
free trade. Thus, in reality, the culture-economy dichotomy is still an ongoing issue. 
Although countries are roughly divided into two groups on cultural opening, the 
different states have responded to cultural flow in highly varied ways. One of the 
strongest dimensions of this variation is the extent to which states are open or 
closed to exports from other countries, mainly the United States. Even states with a 
liberal policy have various kinds of protectionist measures at the same time. 
Likewise, policies regarding cultural flow have not been implemented uniformly 
throughout the world in response to American-led global competition. This begs the 
question, then, of whether there is any possibility of compromise in the dichotomy 
between culture and economy. How has Korean cultural policy coped with this 
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2.3.2 Issue Two: Hybridisation of Culture and Cultural Identity 
As seen above, as culture has become just another subject to be dealt with as part of 
free trade issues, individual countries' cultural identities and the cultural diversity 
existing in the global community are now faced with a serious crisis. The most 
representative example of this is the monopoly enjoyed by Hollywood films. 
Presently, Hollywood films account for more than 80% of the global film market. 
TV programmes and songs made in the U. S. are also dominant, though their world 
market share is not as high as that of films. 
Meanwhile, other countries' film industries are faced with a serious crisis as they 
struggle to distinguish themselves from the mass cultural products of the U. S. Thus, 
countries faced with this crisis have searched for measures to preserve their own 
cultural identities and to increase the cultural diversity of the global film market in 
general. At the same time, they have accepted local adaptation of the American 
commercial model and American television programme formats (Appadurai, 1996; 
Oliveira, 1990). 
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In order to counter the threat to cultural diversity, these countries have developed 
substitute products, first by imitating and then indigenising American products in 
order to adapt them to the local culture. This dynamic process aims at reducing 
cultural discount and exploits the hybridisation of global and local products. This is 
most true when it comes to formats or genres, such as comedy or the sitcom, in 
which languages form a natural barrier to the straightforward importation of 
programmes. Producers adapt global formats to develop indigenised products. 
Consumers also adapt products according to local values and interpretations. 
In this regard, Gidden's term, `collective appropriation' (Giddens 1991: 175), can 
be also be understood as a kind of hybridisation of cultural flow in a context where 
`some aspects of popular culture respond to logics other than the logic of 
domination' (Martin-Barbero, 1993: 76). That is to say, when cultural content such 
as a film or song is interpreted by audiences, this tends to be done against the flow 
of the mainstream ideology or message. People creatively appropriate the messages 
to fit their own ways of thinking and living (Lull, 2000: 64). 
Adopting Robertson's (1995: 30) term, these two forms of local adaptation, firstly 
by producers and secondly by consumers, can be called glocalisation, described as 
the often times deliberate adaptation of a foreign or global model to fit national 
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circumstances. The local adaptation of an increasingly global form of television, 
such as Big Brother, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire and Survivor, illustrates that 
while cultural forms, particularly those related to consumption within capitalist 
societies, diffuse globally, they tend to be adapted locally. Such hybridity is not a 
simple `impregnating of one culture with the contents of another' but `involves an 
ambivalence about both of the original cultures', creating a sense of `freedom, 
nomadism... even opportunism' (Naficy, 1993: 127). 
As a very important and fundamental form of hybridisation, Lull (2000: 240) 
contemplates the migration of Third World peoples into more developed countries, 
which causes major cultural disruptions and adaptations. Immigrants bring imported 
traditions to the new territory and create local versions of distant cultures, which 
can be called diasporic culture. Lull argues that these diasporic cultures can be 
formed and maintained much more easily today than ever before with development 
of transportation and technology, and so it has become a big modern growth 
industry. 
For immigrants who are in the process of `reterritorialization' which means `a 
process of active cultural selection and synthesis drawing from the familiar' and the 
new, popular culture products in the native language reflecting core cultural values 
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from the homeland are crucial for creating peace of mind and ethnic solidarity (Lull 
2000: 253; Du Gay, 1997: 33). Through this process of hybridisation, languages 
also change. Hall argues that languages are themselves a result of linguistic 
hybridity and cultural borrowing stressing `English as it has been invaded, and as it 
has hegemonized a variety of other languages without being able to exclude them 
, 
from it '(1991: 28). Moreover, with the development of local adaptations and 
hybridisation, the phenomenon of `contra-flow' (Boyd-Barrett and Kishan Thussu, 
1992) can even occur. It could be the case that, as Tunstall (1977: 62) argues, 
`countries once thought of as major `clients' of media imperialism, such as Mexico, 
Canada and Australia, have successfully exported their programmes and personnel 
into the metropolis-the empire strikes back. ' Not long ago, these regional centres 
were the very heavy importers of U. S. media products. 
In this context, Robertson (1995) asserts that, with some logic and evidence, most 
of the cultures we now think of as national or local have been touched and often 
partially shaped over the centuries by contact with other cultures at national, 
regional and global levels. As seen above, media flow under globalisation has been 
much more complicated. Thus, Tracey (1988: 24) describes the multiple trends of 
media flow as a `patch-work quilt'. That is to say, in practice, media flow overlaps 
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and interacts in a multi-faceted way resulting in various kinds of cultural effects. 
Supporting the idea that culture in our world is heterogeneous, Barber (1995: 155) 
points out: 
`Mc World cannot then do without Jihad: it needs cultural parochialism to feed 
its endless appetites. Yet neither can Jihad do without McWorld. " for where 
would culture be without the commercial producers who market it and the 
information and communication systems that make it known. Religion and 
culture alike need Mc Worlds technologies and Mc Worlds markets. So to speak, 
Jihad is both fostered and contradicted by Mc Worlds postmodernity. ' 
According to these arguments, even if one could reasonably delineate a particular 
culture at a given time, much of its content would not be purely indigenous in origin. 
For example, part of the Louvre was designed by a Chinese American; American 
films are often produced by, or cast by, various nationalities. Thus, as national 
boundaries do not necessarily correspond to cultural boundaries, the idea of 
nationality is being questioned in an increasingly global cultural landscape. 
In Brazil, for example, by claiming links with other trans-national identities formed 
in the African diaspora, young people who consume hip-hop and reggae have 
rejected the official cultural identity offered by the nation and have found, in music, 
a way of articulating the specificity of their own social experience (Yüdice, 2004: 
202-203). These developments challenge the ideology of a unitary national identity 
that is thought to be based on culture, language and ethnicity. 
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Unlike the drastically political perception of Mead and Ortega regarding the 
definition of the nation, Anderson (1991: 3-7,37-46) proposes that it is an imagined 
political community - and that this imaginary quality is both inherently limited and 
sovereign. He recognises that communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity or genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. As we can see, 
in general, we have been driven to the conclusion that no `scientific definition' of 
the nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and continues to exist. 
Thus, the question of identity has become increasingly central to the research 
agenda of cultural studies, with more attention being paid to the role that the media 
might play in the cultural constitution of collectivities, most especially nations 
(Schlesinger, 1991; Tomlinson, 1991). 
Moreover, in our post-modern society, this ethno-national surge coincides ironically 
with postmodernist thinking about identity. Postmodernist propositions can be 
summarised into two types: first, as social coercion and central state power are 
replaced by individual enactments of collective cultural identity, we can choose 
lifestyles, which supposedly endow us with flexible, easily reshaped identities; 
second, as with the obsolescence of classical culture, the sovereign nation-state 
ceases to offer a relevant framework for collective identity. Late capitalism is no 
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longer based on straightforward competition between products. Image is everything. 
Products are replaced by the images and ideology of products: wealth, money, love, 
fantasy, etc., and emotions are identified and manipulated into images which forge 
new wants. The audience itself is not a concept contained by national borders. 
There are no `workers', only consumers, no class interests, only a global pop 
culture that flattens economic contours and levels the spiritual playing field (Ang 
1995; Garcia Canclini, 2001). The shift towards a postmodern, post-material 
economy reflects the emergence of new patterns of consumption and new, 
hybridised forms of cultural identity. 
Therefore, people may be said to share a cultural identity to the extent that they 
orient towards common beliefs, values, norms, technologies, practices and forms of 
artistic expression. Put another way, a cultural identity consists in the members of a 
given collectivity's sense of themselves, in a body of shared collective 
representations which express a shared understanding of their past, present and 
future, and which enable them to give common answers to questions like: who are 
we? what distinguishes us from others? to what kind of life do we esteem? what 
kind of goals do we set for ourselves and mobilise our resources to achieve? The 
answers to these questions need not always remain the same; cultures are not 
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immutable. Nevertheless, it is through their capacities to give common answers to 
these questions, and to others like them, that people come to develop and maintain 
that sense of belonging together as conscious sharers of a cultural identity. Does 
Hanryu, as a counter flow, contribute to the hybridisation of culture? If so, how 
does it represent Korean cultural identity? Does Hanryu prevent cultural 
homogenisation? 
2.3.3 Issue Three: Government Intervention 
Much of the debate on the cultural industries in multilateral trade negotiations is 
concentrated on government involvement. The point of departure is whether and to 
what extent governments should intervene to support these industries. I shall 
compile two different views on government involvement regarding cultural 
industries. In so doing, I will classify them into two categories: the culturalist group 
and the economist group. Neo-classical economists who believe in the `invisible 
hand' and the `free market' have called culturalists asking for government 
intervention `protectionists', and `lobbyists seeking rent in the name of nationalism'. 
These economists accuse them of having `unclear meritocracy', `antipathy towards 
the U. S. ' and `emotionally charged rhetorical' arguments (Kim, J. D. 2002). 
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Economists insist that government policies designed to reallocate resources toward 
the production and consumption of Korean culture and away from other cultural 
goods and services must be scrutinised in order to safeguard the best interests of the 
Korean people. Such policies assume that free trade, as opposed to 
protectionist-oriented cultural policy, tends to lead to the homogenisation of culture, 
destroying cultural diversity or cultural values and identity through a one-way flow 
from centre to periphery. On the contrary, economists suggest that cultural products 
can be viewed in economic terms as public or social goods and that cultural policies 
operate in the same context as are other public policies. The function of cultural 
policy then becomes to regulate the market. If this is the case, can culture as a 
public good be best supported through quantitative or qualitative regulation? 
In the case of Korean cultural policy, Kim, J. D. (2002: 2) argues that it is necessary 
to convert the current quantitative regulations into a policy that regulates 
anti-competitive practices. He gives two main reasons for this. First, according to 
the experiences of the United Kingdom, quantitative regulations on foreign contents 
such as screen quotas and broadcasting programming quotas failed to work properly. 
Second, as technological progress increases the distribution channels of 
audio-visual services, quantitative regulations on contents will lose their 
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effectiveness. The basis for this argument is economic. Kim emphasises that `in 
order to maximize the benefits of external liberalization of the aforementioned 
services sectors, the government needs to pursue deregulation. If external 
liberalization is delayed due to concerns about difficulties arising from such 
deregulation, the growth potential of the Korean economy will be diminished. 
External liberalization should be viewed as an opportunity to promote internal 
deregulation which so far has been difficult for Korea to implement on its own. ' 
Whether his arguments, which I will examine further in later chapters, can be 
upheld, we can easily find through them that a regional, rather than a global, 
perspective elucidates the connections between trade and culture, particularly in the 
potential impact which the formation of regional free-trade zones might have upon 
programme exchange, and in the clash of free-trade rhetoric with national cultural 
objectives. 
Conclusion 
In summation, economists argue that it is not clear whether governments can create 
a national consciousness or sense of identity through cultural intervention. Even if 
they could, it would provide a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
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government intervention into cultural activities. The market system would provide 
an insufficient quantity and a non-optimal quality of cultural output. What these 
arguments fail to address is the basic debate regarding cultural trade, between 
cultural diversity and free trade, as described in the previous section. 
So far, I have traced the impacts of globalisation in the cultural industry and 
challenged the assumptions related to them. In a nutshell, neo-liberalism under 
globalisation has pursued free market ideals, which has led to a weakening of the 
nation-state and the rise of trans-national corporations. With this trend, the 
globalisation of cultural consumption has been accelerating more quickly than ever. 
As people consume TNCs' cultural products across national or cultural borders, 
they are exposed to other cultures and construct hybrid identities through the 
process of consuming other cultures. 
As mentioned above, TNCs in the- cultural industry, such as Hollywood majors, 
have dominated global markets, pursuing economies of scale based on competitive 
advantages which include a large domestic market and the dominant language, and 
have to some extent homogenised the world market. However, with cultural 
discount theory, there have been counter-flows from sub-centres based on diasporic 
markets and these trends have resisted the homogenous culture resulting from 
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Chapter 2. Globalisation and Media Flow Theory 
Based on this review of the literature reviews regarding media flow, the following 
chapters will introduce the possibility of a new media flow which is not based on 
diasporic markets, looking directly at the recent Korean experience and examining 
what makes this possible in the global context. Therefore, we can conclude here that 
global culture under globalisation is formed and developed through `the twofold 
endless process of the particularization of the universal and the universalisation of 
the particular', as Robertson puts it (1995: 177-178). Here, it seems that cultural 
policy might help change the collision between culture and trade into some kind of 
reconciliation between them in a global environment. 
In this chapter I have looked at an absolute opposition between two ways of 
viewing the consequences of globalisation and global free trade in cultural products. 
This is reflected in some fundamental divisions and oppositions in cultural policy. 
The challenge for the thesis, and the challenge being taken up by Korea, is to try to 
reconcile these extremes. Therefore, this thesis will examine how this counter-flow 
of Korean cultural products is possible from the perspective of cultural flow 
theories and how this may, in turn, provide us with an instrument for the 
reconciliation of cultural diversity (protectionism) and free trade (economism). 
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CHAPTER 3. The Past and Present of the Korean TV 
and Film Industries 
The distinctive feature of Korean policy over the last twenty years is a tradition of 
strong government intervention; economic pragmatism outweighing idealism and 
ideology. Following Part I (chapters one and two), which reviewed the literature 
on media flows as a research tool of this thesis and challenged the existing theory, 
Part II (chapters three and four) will provide a brief historical overview of the 
Korean TV and film industries. This part will reveal how the current Korean TV 
and film industries originated, formed and developed in line with changes in 
Korean government policy under globalisation. It can be said that, for many 
decades, Korea was a state strictly controlled by its government. This was 
especially the case during the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s and up 
until the mid 1990s when the change of government regime greatly influenced 
government policy on each industry based on the contemporary economic and 
political climates. 
In order to understand the Korean Wave as a new counter wave in a global 
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context and to find out how this occurred, we need in particular to know how the 
Korean TV and film industries have evolved. In chapter 3, we will focus on these 
two industries, from the time they were completely controlled by the government 
up to the end of 1980s, when Korean cultural policy was changed in line with 
foreign pressure. This historical context casts light on the current policies of 
Korean government in response to globalisation. 
As mentioned earlier, the Korean government's response to globalisation naively 
under the Kim Young-sam regime was initially passive, but soon after the 
government pushed a more progressive approach in the face of unprecedented 
economic challenges represented by Korea's bail-out from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). With the aim of establishing global standards, the market 
opening and socioeconomic restructuring demanded by globalisation brought 
about radical changes to the whole society of Korea. However, in spite of the 
contention that globalisation causes a gradual weakening of state power, the 
power of the Korean government became stronger through the process (Park, Kim 
and Sohn 2000: 122). 
Throughout several changes in policy, globalisation of Korea's economy has been 
implemented under the strong leadership of the government. The case is the same 
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with Korea's cultural industry. The general globalisation theory does not apply to 
the Korean situation as Ferguson (1992) pinpointed. Furthermore, though the 
Korean cultural industry has had a long history of a one-way cultural flow from 
overseas due to protectionist policies, market opening in line with the ideology of 
neo-liberalism unexpectedly brought about two-way flows of cultural products. In 
chapter 4, we are going to examine the development of two way flows in detail 
through the history of the Korean TV and film industries and their policies. For 
reference, I summarize the main changes in both Korean cultural industry and 
relevant policies as below: 
1910 Korea - Japan Annexation Treaty after colonization 
1923 First silent film, Plighted Love under the Moon produced as Japanese 
propaganda by Japanese ruler 
1926 First Korean Film Arirang by Un-Kyu Na for resisting Japanese 
colonialism 
1935 First sound film, Chunhyang-jon directed by Lee Myung-woo. 
1945 Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces 
1945-1948 U. S. military government in Korea 
1948 Korean Independence 
1949 Korea's first color film, The Women's Diary by Hong Seong-gi 
1950 Korean War 
1950 AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) Radio signed on 
1953 Cease-fire agreement between South and North Korea 
1956 First TV frequency (HLKI) 
1959 National Security Act for defending South Korea against North Korea 
1961 5.16 Revolution (Park Chung-hee led a bloodless military coup) 
1962- 1966 First Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
1963 Park Chung Hee Administration inaugurated 
1957 AFKN (American Forces Korea Network) TV signed on 
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1961 Launch of Korean Broadcasting Service (KBS) as state broadcaster 
1964 Launch of independent broadcaster TBC 
1969 Launch of independent broadcaster MBC 
1967 -71 Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
1972-1979 `Yusin Constitution' (the Revitalizing Reforms) 
1972 National Security Act includes penalties for any media criticism of the 
government. 
1973 Establishment of Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation 
(KMPPC) 
1972 -76 Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
1977 -81 Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
1979 Coup d'etat and President Park assassinated 
1980 Gwangju massacre 
1980 Color TV launched in Korea 
1980 The Basic Press Act absorbs two independent broadcasting companies, 
TBC and MBC into the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) 
1981 Chun, Doo-hwan elected president under a revised constitution 
1987 Roh, Tae-woo's eight-point declaration provided for "a free press"; 
MBC television network resumes independent broadcasting. 
1988 Seoul Olympic Games 
1988 The International Broadcast Center is established serving some 10,000 
broadcasters for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. 
1988 First Hollywood studio (UIP) allowed to open branch office in Korea. 
1989 Cultural industry division established in Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism 
1991 Launch of SBS, independent commercial broadcasting company. 
1992 Marriage Story, the first film financed by Samsung is released. 
1997 Opening of Namyangju Cinema Complex outside of Seoul 
1995 Cable TV (27 Channels) service starts. 
1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and support of International Monetary Fund 
1998 Kim, Dae-jung Administration started. 
1998 Korean market opening to Japanese pop culture 
1999 Swiri signals beginning of Korean film renaissance 
1998 - 2001 Domestic market share of Korean films tops 50% and overseas sales 
increase rapidly 
2001 Government development strategy of cutting-edge industries revealed. 
2002 Satellite broadcasting TV Skylife is launched. 
2003-04 Silmido and TaeGukgi become the first films to sell 10 million tickets 
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3.1 Korean TV Industry 
3.1.1 Historical Background and Changes of Regulations 
The Japanese colonialists first introduced broadcasting to Korea in the 1920s as a 
tool for the manipulation of the Korean people (Kang Dae-in, 1998). The first 
broadcaster was the state-run radio-only Joong-ang Broadcasting Station (later the 
Korean Broadcasting System), while the first private-run radio-only broadcaster, 
the Christian Broadcasting System, started its regular services in 1954. Television 
was introduced in 1956 by an entrepreneur who was keen to sell RCA television 
monitors (Lee D. H., 2004). Under the partition of Korea and U. S. hegemony in 
the South after the Korean War, Korea's wariness of foreigners became more 
pronounced. 
Following the armistice in 1953, the American Forces Network (AFN) Korea 
settled into fixed locations. The network added black and white television in 1959 
and colour television in 1976. Although AFN* Korea provides information and 
entertainment for United States Forces Korea (USFK), it has been also a big hit 
with the Korean civilian population, many of whom tune in daily to AFN for their 
sports, news and other entertainment updates, and even for educational purposes 
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such as learning English. Shows like Sesame Street, Friends and General 
Hospital are favourites with many language learners. 
An undemocratic military dictatorship came into power in 1961, and effectively 
remained in place until 1988, though leaders were changed as a result of an 
assassination and a coup d'etat. It was in 1961 that TV station KBS was 
established in Korea. Two years later, for the first time, the Broadcasting Act was 
brought into being, with the Ministry of Information (MOI) taking charge of 
licensing and establishing broadcasting policies. Under the military regime, the 
TV station was founded as one of the measures used to modernize the country and 
enlighten and control the people at the same time. Therefore, its aim was quite 
similar to the BBC's `Reithism', namely to inform, educate and entertain people. 
At the same time, it also aimed to inform an image of the renewing nation (Jung 
1991: 135). 
Like most under-developed former colonies, during 1960s, TV programmers in 
Korea used to be heavily dependent on foreign, mostly American programmes 
(Choe and Kang 2001: 183-184). In 1964, the commercial broadcaster Tonyang 
Broadcasting Company (TBC) was set up and the Munwha Broadcasting 
Corporation (MBC) joined the ratings competition in 1969. At first, the one 
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national and two commercial stations competed with each other in scheduling 
prime time foreign programmes (KBA, 1997: 435-436). The despotic government 
tried to make itself appear democratic and pluralistic, and so strategically decided 
to grant licences to commercial stations TBC and MBC (ibid). 
However, as competition intensified among them, they started to develop local 
genres, mainly daily soap operas, which appealed to local audiences' `structures 
of feeling' (Williams, 1977). Moreover, the continuous development of industry 
infrastructure, such as the augmentation of local relay stations and the domestic 
production of television sets, resulted in larger TV audiences, which led to 
increased advertising. Thus, the Korean broadcasting industry developed rapidly 
during the 1970s and 1980s and sought cost-effective indigenous programme 
forms. It was also around this time that Korean broadcasters began to actively 
emulate Japanese network programmes. It is ironic that the Korean people, a good 
deal of whom can be said to harbour deep-rooted anti-Japanese feelings, 
nevertheless are fond (consciously or subconsciously) of consuming Japanese 
products, including cultural products. 
Japanese television programming and scheduling practices were seen as a 
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successful model for the adaptation of American broadcasting know-how and 
nurturing local traditions. Furthermore, the golden age of Korean film production 
in the 1960s provided a catalyst for the rapid ascendancy of the television industry. 
This contrasts with developments in other countries, where television's rise was 
accompanied by the decline of the film industry in favour of the TV industry 
(Puttnam, 1997: 240-247). Although at one time, the Korean TV industry was a 
combination of government and privately-owned commercial channels, in the 
1980s under the coup regime of General Jeon, the Framework Act on Journalism 
was constructed to take a tight grip on the media in order to curb its anti- 
government stance (this censorship also extended to the film industry). 
According to the law, many broadcasters and newspapers were forced to close or 
reduce their subsidiaries. In these circumstances, the state-run Korean 
Broadcasting System (KBS) took control of the rival private stations, TBC and 
MBC. TBC was integrated into KBS becoming KBS2; MBC remained but the 
ownership was transferred to the government (Kang Dae-in, 1998). It was a 
ruthless scheme to bring the broadcasting stations and all of the media under 
direct government control. Eventually all radio and television stations in Korea 
became public-owned and public-operated media under pressure. However, while 
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the Korean film industry was devastated as a result of direct distribution from 
Hollywood, the development of the Korean TV industry received fresh 
momentum as a result of broadcasting the Seoul Olympics in 1988. 
Both public broadcasting TV and commercial TV had a big opportunity to capture 
massive audiences with class and consumption profiles attractive to advertisers 
and sponsors during the world event. In this vein, Larson and Park, H. S. ' (1993) 
studies lay stress on the Olympic event's role in the rapid economic 
modernisation of Korea in the 1980s. Although it was not specifically planned as 
a cultural event, the 1988 Olympics influenced the Korean cultural industry 
heavily. The television and film industries were among the most heavily 
influenced as a result of the 1988 Olympics. At the end of the 1980s, as the new 
government took measures to soften the forced policies of the military regime, the 
1980 Act was nullified. Since then, the domestic legislation concerning 
broadcasting policies and regulations has been revised five times. Its influence on 
broadcasting has been slowly reduced under the neo-liberal trend while film 
industry opened Hollywood direct distribution. 
Consistent with these policy trends, MBC ceased to be owned by the government 
and ownership passed to a non-governmental public organisation which can be 
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said to be semi-commercialised. Moreover, in 1991, the privately owned 
commercial broadcaster SBS was introduced, further weakening the public 
service monopoly. Since then, terrestrial broadcasters have coped with more 
tremendous competition than ever before. In 1992, the Composite Cable 
Broadcasting Act was adopted in order to regulate the newly introduced cable 
television service and established the Korean Cable Communications Commission. 
The Integrated Broadcasting Act, which had the objective of responding to the 
fast-changing media landscape was revised in 2000 and came into effect in 2001. 
It focused on the deregulation and independence of broadcasting and intended to 
act as a catalyst for the transformation of the country's entire broadcasting policy 
and regulatory framework in order to meet the demands of a digital and 
converging world. Thus, the Korean Broadcasting Commission (KBC) replaced 
the four existing laws concerning broadcasting, such as the previous Broadcasting 
Act, the Composite Cable Broadcasting Act, the Management of Cable 
Broadcasting Act and the Korean Broadcasting System Act. Eventually, under the 
integrated law, four terrestrial broadcasters were granted terrestrial digital 
television service licences in 2001. 
Transferring its broadcasting-related administrative powers to the KBC has 
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reduced government control on the broadcasting industry. However, as the 
government nominates most of the commissioners, it still indirectly exercises a 
certain degree of influence over the KBC and broadcasting policy. In addition, its 
funding comes from the general government budget and the Broadcasting 
Development Fund (BDF). The BDF was founded and is managed by the KBC to 
promote broadcasting-related industries and is mainly paid for by tariffs related to 
the advertising revenues of the terrestrial broadcasters, contributions from 
licensees, cable operators' franchise fees, and so on. 
Meanwhile, satellite broadcasting started in late 2001 and offers a choice of more 
than 100 channels. The new broadcasting law allows business conglomerates and 
existing mass media companies to take part in satellite and cable broadcasting, but 
they are limited to not more than 33 percent of the total shares of a company. 
After several decades of military rule, South Korea's emergence as a fledging 
democracy placed it in a position similar to that of many countries experiencing 
political change. While it proclaimed freedom of speech and the press, the 
government has maintained strong influence over content on the grounds of 
strengthening the nation's unity and stability. All stations, in conjunction with a 
government-established committee, must review programme content both before 
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and after transmission. 
With the domestic TV industry now more firmly established, the number of 
foreign programmes on terrestrial TV has continuously decreased and they are not 
as popular as before. They are now broadcast at marginal times, such as weekdays 
at l lpm or on weekends at loam or 2pm (KBC, 2004). The Korean Broadcasting 
Commission established limits on the grounds of protecting the quality and 
integrity of programming; most imports consisted of dramas, documentaries, and 
features from the United States and the United Kingdom. As the table below 
indicates, the total amount of programmes imported by network broadcasters 
decreased a little in the early 2000s, mainly as a result of a foreign currency crisis 
in Korea. 
However, since 2000, the emergence of strong local contents has resulted in the 
decrease or only moderate increase of programme imports, even though there has 
been plenty of demand for contents with the increased number and types of media. 
The key point here is surely that declining imports since 2000 are the result not of 
import quotas or currency fluctuations, but reflect the growing strength of the 
domestic industry. In 2002, the number of programmes exported surpassed that of 
programmes imported and in 2004 the number of programmes exported was twice 
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that of those imported. In 2004. the amount spent on the import of programmes 
increased by 10.8% on the previous year to $31.096,000 while earnings from the 
export of programmes increased dramatically by 69.6% to $71,461,000. 
As the export data suggests, the key factor in Korea's changing TV industry was 
not policy, but the growing strength of the domestic industry. Exports continue to 
increase while imports have stayed more or less stable. This suggests that the 
quota policy was successful in developing the competitive strengths of the 
domestic TV industry. The quota system resulted in an increasingly stable 
domestic industry and this further reinforced the trend. Now, the strong domestic 
industry has become a crucial point to the country's healthy export market as it 
has developed strongly since 2002. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, terrestrial channels as well as cable channels in 
South and East Asia have been broadcasting programmes imported from Korea in 
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prime time slots, which differs to imports from Hong Kong or Japan whose 
programmes broadcast in non-prime time. The key factor here was the improving 
performance of the domestic TV production industry. This can be attributed in 
part to strong government intervention. While the recent trend has been towards a 
loosening of import controls, this is possible as a result of stronger domestic 
industry which in turn has been made possible by strong government 
interventions. 
3.1.2 Oligopoly under Government Protection 
The terrestrial broadcasters have occupied the domestic broadcast-related market 
since the 1960s under government control. There are four terrestrial broadcasters: 
the state-run Korea Broadcasting System (KBS), the semi-state Munwha 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), the state-run Education Broadcasting System 
(EBS) and the commercial Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS). The Ministry of 
Information and Communications (MIC) grants the licences on the basis of the 
KBC's recommendation, and terrestrial broadcasters have to submit licence 
renewal applications to the KBC every three years. 
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The public broadcaster, the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), has been 
positioned as the nation's key broadcaster, operating two free-to-air television 
channels, six radio stations and twenty-five local stations nationwide. It is 
financed by licence fees (40%) and advertising revenues (60%). The current 
licence fee is 2.500 Korean Won (about $ 2.5) per month per household. A 
specialised public broadcaster for educational programmes, the Educational 
Broadcasting System (EBS), is financed by the Broadcasting Development Fund 
and advertising revenues. It is also subsidised by KBS, receiving an amount 
equivalent to three percent of KBS's yearly licence fee revenues. 
The Munwha Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) is legally a private-run 
corporation funded by advertising revenues but also has the status of public 
broadcaster whose controlling stockholder is the Foundation for Broadcast 
Culture (FBC). FBC is a public, independent body that was established under the 
Foundation for Broadcast Culture Act to serve the public interest. Meanwhile, the 
private broadcasting system SBS is fully funded by advertising revenues. Under 
the ideology of neo-liberalism and intention to boost market, government started 
to deregulate although it has been in slow pace. As programming channels 
(known as Programme Provider: PP) were introduced in 1993 under the 
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Composite Cable Broadcasting Act, a unilateral government policy that allowed 
cable companies that were ill-prepared to do so to broadcast resulted in low 
profits and high debt for the fledgling cable operators and programme providers. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis that started in late 1997 made this bad situation 
even worse, with many companies having to close their broadcasting business. 
Consequently, the government had to boost the cable industry by relaxing 
restrictions in the cable business. This development of `light touch' regulation was 
very similar to what happened to the UK cable industry in the 1980s/1990s 
(Barker, 1997: 44). The cable operators also have been working on system 
upgrades and digitalisation to develop future revenue resources such as 
interactivity and other add-on services. Now, Korea is one of the most heavily 
cabled markets in the world. Roughly seventy percent of all households currently 
subscribe to cable (KBC, 2004). The number of PPs has grown from 29 channels 
in 1995 to 206 audio-visual channels and 116 audio-only channels as of 1St March 
2003 (ibid. ). Meanwhile, the satellite TV business is expected to have a big effect 
on related industries, including TV manufacturing, infrastructure, and the content 
service provider industries. In 2001, Skylife (the former Korea Digital Satellite 
Broadcasting) launched the first commercial digital TV broadcasting service in 
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Korea and around one year later started regular service. Dozens of companies 
including Korea Telecom, KBS and other terrestrial broadcasters participated in 
the Skylife consortium as major shareholders. 
Under the KBC guidelines on satellite broadcasting channel services, the number 
of television channel services run by major terrestrial broadcasters was limited in 
order to ensure fair competition because it is broadly conceived that digital direct 
broadcast satellite (DBS) broadcasters should be developed to co-exist with other 
industry sectors such as cable service providers, local broadcasters, and network 
broadcasters. In August 2001, four broadcasters, KBS, EBS, MBC and SBS, were 
granted licences for five digital TV channels of which state-run KBS owns two. 
The convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications due to digital 
telecommunications technology has become a global issue. With the onset of the 
so-called digital era, the convergence of digital contents has brought about far- 
reaching changes in the international media environment, and the whole 
broadcasting system, including Webcasting, satellite and mobile broadcasting is 
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moving towards convergence to create high-quality contents to satisfy 
international viewers' needs. 
Digital convergence is the process by which separate media, like books, 
photographs, movies, telephones and televisions, are digitised and can be 
delivered to consumers via the global networks. In Korea, digital convergence is 
understood by entrepreneurs as the collapse of business borders. Likewise, the 
Korean broadcasting industry is also coping with new challenges related to 
digitalisation, like all other media industries in the world. Digitalisation blurs the 
traditional distinctions between broadcasting and telecommunications and new 
kinds of services are frequently being introduced into the market. 
Using high-speed telecommunications lines, the broadcasting industry in Korea 
can provide individual customers with numerous contents typically regarded as 
broadcasting services. The number of amateur and commercial Internet 
broadcasting stations in Korea in 2000 was estimated to reach about 300, up from 
200 in late 1999 and 50 in 1998 (MCT, 2002). Companies are desperate to take 
the initiative in the integrated business climate, making the best of Korea's cell 
phone penetration and broadband Internet infrastructure, which is the highest in 
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the world. 
At the end of May 2003, Korea's mobile phone subscriber base stood at 32 
million with 11 million broadband Internet users, accounting for 71.5 percent of 
all households (NSO, 2003). People are embracing these new media at an 
unprecedented rate as Internet infrastructure proliferates. With this base of strong 
Internet and mobile phone use, digital multimedia broadcasting such as mobile 
phone broadcasting is gaining momentum as the high-speed connection 
infrastructure steadily spreads across the nation and fuels content demands. 
Online start-ups and media firms are eager to take their place in the next- 
generation broadcasting market. Likewise as multimedia expand, the need of 
media contents increases rapidly and the competition of production companies are 
also intensified tremendously. 
Heating up the market further is the competition being staged by major 
broadcasting firms such as MBC, KBS and SBS. In 1999, SBS outpaced its 
competitors by spinning off its Internet subsidiary as a strategic platform to push 
into e-commerce and video-on-demand services. KBS is also operating an 
Internet channel in concert with Korea Telecom, the state-run telecom giant that 
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has a monopolistic control over the telecommunications infrastructure of the 
country, including high-speed networks, a precondition for smooth webcasts. 
MBC, on the other hand, jointly run an Internet shopping mall in a strategic 
alliance with SK Global, extending their marketing scope to the Internet 
broadcasting sector. 
Likewise, to be at the forefront of the Internet broadcasting business and dominate 
the market, merger and acquisitions (M&A) as well as competition among 
broadcasters, conglomerates and IT venture firms in the service sector, have been 
intensifying. Conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai and SK have also been 
rushing to enter this new market. The main feature of the business lies in creating 
an online profit model combining such e-commerce businesses as shopping malls 
with Internet broadcasts, unlike existing companies that concentrate on the 
entertainment business. In the hope of reaping profits when Internet broadcasting 
takes off, the telecommunication companies are also rushing to get involved in 
Internet broadcasting by setting up their own studios and teaming up with content 
providers. 
However, digital television sets and distribution networks are useless without 
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broadcasting companies sending their programming, information and other 
contents digitally. In response to the nibbling away of the market by the world's 
big content providers, it has been stressed that developing content for households 
in line with the expansion of the home-entertainment market is a critical and 
urgent point. As for contents which are essential for generalisation of digital 
television, however, providers appear to be still largely unprepared for the 
projected increase in demand once digital broadcasting begins. 
In particular, the retransmission of other network terrestrial channels via cable and 
satellite systems has caused severe conflicts and arguments among all the 
broadcasting business operators on the verge of beginning satellite digital 
broadcasting services. In fact, the satellite channel policies brought into effect in 
2001 allowed extensive retransmission by Skylife of programmes created by 
terrestrial TV networks, causing a good deal of confusion and resistance from 
network broadcasters. Besides, the local broadcast stations insisted that the 
retransmission of giant network terrestrial channels via satellite would devastate 
their own markets. 
Consequently, the revision of the act in April 2002 was intended to solve the 
ongoing conflicts and pursue balanced growth among the relevant broadcast 
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business operators, designating KBS TV! and EBS as mandatory carriage 
channels for the cable and satellite operators. This meant that these two free-to-air 
television channels would have to be retransmitted simultaneously via cable, 
relay-cable and satellite. 
Along with advent of new media and bitter competition, there has been a long- 
running political controversy over the current broadcasting policy. Most 
controversial of all has been the monopolistic nature of the broadcasting 
landscape under government control. As a result, the privatisation of MBC and 
KBS-2 TVs and the adoption of a free-market competitive system over the 
monopolistic Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation (KOBACO) also 
became an ongoing controversial issue. Broadcasting has been the largest 
advertising market in the four major media outlets of broadcasting, newspapers, 
radio and magazines for the last several decades. However, three major firms, 
KBS, MBC and SBS, occupy almost 82 percent of the market, enjoying a 
monopolistic situation in which they dominate most commercial advertising 
contracts (MCT, 2003). 
Under the new broadcasting law of 2002, many government restrictions on 
broadcasting advertisements have also been lifted. The new act also provided the 
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legal basis for the establishment of a new commercial broadcasts marketing 
agency besides KOBACO. KOBACO has monopolised the broadcasting 
advertisement market since it was established in 1981 under the Korean 
Broadcasting Advertising Corporation Act. 
However, as the local advertising market grew faster in the 1990s, advertisers 
such as the Korea Advertisers Association (KAA) complained about KOBACO's 
monopoly arguing that it does not make sense that a company has exclusive rights 
to price broadcasting advertisement and sell to advertisers. As a result of these 
complaints, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (FTC) announced in April 2001 
that the state-run KOBACO should end its monopoly on TV and radio 
advertisements (Korea Times, April 20,2001). 
To summarise, the Korean broadcasting industry had been under strict 
government control until late 1990. However, direct political censorship was 
relaxed initially due to a perception that outdated government regulations lowered 
the quality and competitiveness of TV programmes. Further deregulation 
followed as a result of growing competition, following unprecedented economic, 
technological and political changes, but deregulation was never simply a matter of 
`neo-liberalisation'. Deregulation is directed against monopoly by government, 
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and re-regulation is directed against monopoly by a few big companies. The 
government's control focuses on a few big companies' monopoly. 
As with the film industry, big companies like Samsung have started to occupy the 
industry and accelerate the industrialisation of the industry at the same time. In 
sum, the development of multimedia has, first of all, encouraged increased M&A 
activity and growing involvement from transnational media and entertainment 
conglomerates able to take advantage of the new cross-media synergies and to 
sink investment into emerging technologies and new media. 
Secondly, the government in Korea has had to adopt a `light touch' to regulation 
in order to allow cable and satellite companies to recoup their investments and 
to make the new digital broadcasting opportunities more attractive to new 
entrants. But deregulation has been pragmatic rather than ideological; the 
government has not seen neo-liberalisation as the unique solution to 
globalisation and has continued to intervene where necessary in order to support 
the economic competitiveness of the Korean broadcasting industry. 
3.2 Korean Film Industry 
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In this section, I will consider the history of the Korean film industry, 
particularly after 1980s, the period which is directly related to the current 
situation under globalisation. The aim of this section, therefore, is to provide 
background information in order to help the reader understand the Korean film 
industry as this will be necessary in order to analyse the present context of the 
industry. Korea has a long film history that is over 100 years old (Lent, 1990). 
However, film industry could not be developed but devastated by its colonial 
experience by Japan for 35 years and Korean War in 1950 (ibid; Kim Ji-suk., 
1997). 
3.2.1 Historical Background and Changes of Regulations 
Four years after the armistice agreement in 1953, President Rhee Syng-man 
declared that cinema was to be exempted from all taxes in the hope of reviving 
the industry. In addition, foreign aid programmes provided South Korea with 
film technology and equipment. This was the case in the 1960s in particular, 
when American forces stationed in Korea opened the doors for individual 
Korean filmmakers and production companies to obtain advanced foreign 
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filmmaking equipment. 
Thanks to this, the local film industry grew gradually and enjoyed a golden age 
for about a decade. The number of domestic productions increased sharply from 8 
in 1954 to 108 in 1959, as did the number of production companies and cinemas. 
In the decade that followed, the Korean film industry maintained high production 
figures with over 100 feature films being produced annually. Around that time, 
approximately 100 million tickets were purchased at cinemas every year. In the 
1969-1972 period, when cinema attendance was at its peak, 70 to 73 per cent of 
all attendance was to see domestic films in Seoul. 
According to Ji-suk Kim (1997: 130) at that time Korea had one of the liveliest 
movie industries in Asia, with 16 movie studios, 402 theatres and huge audiences. 
In 1962, for instance, a colour feature film, Inmokdaebi, was produced with 
processing equipment manufactured independently in Korea. Korea played a 
leadership role in Asia during the Golden Era of Korean cinema of the 1960s: 
major works were exported to Southeast Asian countries, and the production 
styles of Korean directors were mimicked by their counterparts in Southeast Asia 
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(ibid: 130-135). Korean directors such as Sang-ok Shin and Chang-hwa Jung were 
invited to Hong Kong to produce movies there. At that time, the Korean movie 
industry had what seemed like a superior position over Hong Kong cinema. In 
1962, the government instituted for the first time a Motion Picture Law, which 
stated that all production companies must produce at least 15 films per year, and 
that the films should be commercial in nature. 
However, the two decades following the 1970s saw a long and deep slump for 
the industry mainly because of the rapid growth of television. The public largely 
deserted the cinema for television, while government intervention and strict 
censorship reached a peak. After the military coup of the 16th May 1961, and 
with the backing of the military government, anti-socialist propaganda movies 
became one of the principal genres together with teenage melodramas, which 
were irrelevant to the social atmosphere of the time. Limitations on freedom of 
expression as a part of comprehensive censorship were imposed by the so-called 
Yushin ('revitalising reform' in Korea) regime. 
In 1970,231 films were made, the highest in Korea's film history, and since then, 
the number has been steadily decreasing. The Korean film industry had the same 
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experience as most other countries whereby foreign films (mainly from the U. S. ) 
were continually brought in and gained an increasing share of the market. Besides, 
many of the independent production companies were financed by speculators 
interested only in achieving high profits in the short term because producers 
supplemented their insufficient budgets through selling their films in advance to 
these speculators at very cheap rates. Therefore, though films made big returns at 
the box office, the money was often invested in real estate properties rather than 
reinvested in other films or the film industry. 
Moreover, the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s quashed the 
imagination out of Korean films, and the transition to democracy in the early 
1990s did little to revive it. In the days of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, 
the prosecutors used to wield the National Security Laws as a disciplinary weapon. 
Control over thought was deemed of utmost importance in maintaining social 
stability. Even under censorship, it is possible for great works of art to be 
conceived, such as the films by Chinese fifth generation directors. 
However, this is not the general case but in fact a very rare occurrence. Since the 
end of the 1990s, more and more cultural works have been deemed inappropriate, 
not because of ideologies but because of obscenities. While censorship continues, 
it has become less concerned with government ideological objectives. In 1973, the 
Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation was formed in an effort to revive 
the industry but the film industry was not recovered. 
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Despite the protectionist policy, attendances at domestic films continued to shrink 
in the 1970s and 1980s. Cinemas have closed regularly since 1971, when the 
number in operation stood at 717. Moreover, the quality of films could not be 
improved because of the lack of proper equipment, competent writers and 
technical know-how, not to mention the appeal of foreign films that could offer 
strong storylines, competitive talents and superior techniques with huge capital. 
Thus, in these circumstances, the crisis of Korean film industry and audiences' 
neglect of domestic films were inevitable. 
Until the mid 1980s, the import of foreign films into Korea had only been 
possible under strict government control. Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, 
import and export quotas for films had been closely related to domestic 
production because they were used to encourage domestic film production 
although the objective didn't come true. However, at the end of the 1980s, changes 
were made to government regulations on domestic production. These changes 
were related to the import and export of films and so merit further examination. 
Following the advent of the Park Jung-hee junta in 1961, the government began to 
intervene in the TV and film industry, passing the Motion Picture Law in 1962. 
The aim of the law was to contribute to the promotion of national art through the 
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promotion and development of the film industry. It rationalised that high-quality 
movies would give the world a good image of Korea. 
However, at the same time, there was another important reason, which was to earn 
much-needed foreign currency after the economic devastation that followed the 
Korean War. The government thus desperately encouraged the export of domestic 
films. Article 19 in particular stipulated that the `government may aid the film 
industry in order to promote the production of quality films as well as 
development of film culture and international exchange of films. ' 
In this context, the government made a number of moves to improve the 
professional standards of Korean film personnel. In 1962, for example, the Grand 
Bell Award was established to encourage producers to make quality films, 
assigning foreign film import quotas to producers of the most excellent films. 
Assigning the import licence to the film-maker not a third party makes a direct 
connection between imports and domestic production which is an indication of 
the `strong intervention' by Korean government. In addition, production- 
encouraging money was provided to industry workers who produced high quality 
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pictures (MPPC 1981: 109). However, this resulted not so much in the desired 
effect but rather in many side effects which I will consider in more detail later. 
In 1963, when the first amendment to the law was completed, the main change 
was that production companies should be equipped with studios and other 
facilities if they wanted to register with the government and import foreign films. 
Moreover, the government limited the number of imported films by placing 
quotas and import duties on them (Kuroda 1980: 41). Thanks to this legislation, 
which tightened licensing criteria for production, 65 shoestring film companies 
were consolidated into 17 large companies. That is to say, the government 
encouraged the film industry to form conglomerates and transform foreign 
currency proceeds into production capital. 
However, the policy of forming conglomerates caused a production monopoly in 
the Korean film industry through such acts as the merger and abolition of film 
companies and the film licensing system. Moreover, through the incitement of the 
proceeds from the foreign currency market to form production capital, it was 
expected that the financial situation of the production companies would be 
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stabilised and that they would form major firms, but with the situation beyond 
proper regulation and validation, this was in fact impossible to guarantee. 
As many of these regulations were not as effective as originally intended, the 
second amendment was passed in 1966. The law relaxed the conditions necessary 
for the registration of production companies, and lowered from fifteen to two 
films the minimum annual production of each company for maintaining 
registration. In addition, in a move obligating the government to assist the film 
industry, it established the Film Credit Union and a quota system for theatres 
showing imported films. Worked out on a monthly basis, the screen quota system 
required that on 121 days a year, a Korean film had to be shown in each cinema. 
After this amendment, the Korean film industry showed signs of prosperity from 
the late 1960s to early 1970s. According to statistics from the Motion Picture 
Promotion Corporation (MPPC), 1969 was the golden year; each Korean watched 
5.6 films that year, total film attendance reached more than 173 million and 229 
films were produced (MPPC 1981: 110). 
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However, this boom did not last long. As mentioned above, the advent of the TV 
age, the economic downturn that resulted from the oil shock, strict censorship and 
so on, led quickly to the stagnation of the film industry, which in turn led the 
government to pass the third amendment to the Motion Picture Law in 1970. The 
main points of this law were to require exporters and importers to be registered 
with the Ministry of Culture and Information and to produce five films a year. 
Moreover, the Motion Picture Promotion Union, with government backing, set 
down a specific policy on exports and imports to promote domestic films overseas 
as follows: first, a producer should export a minimum of four domestic films and 
earn from them at least U. S. $20,000 to qualify to import a foreign film. Second, 
the Union would provide cash rewards to domestic films that showed for at least 
60 days in a foreign market (Article 16 of the Motion Picture Law). Third, the 
number of films imported should not exceed a third of the domestic films 
produced each year. 
Other important stipulations were that applicants had to obtain the permission of 
the Union before they could be recommended for an import licence by the 
government, and the films of communist countries, or those that had message 
considered anti-government or harmful to the social order, could not be imported. 
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Restricted from exportation were films which did not pass government censorship 
or were barred from public showing and those which pirated or copied foreign 
films or presented a threat to Korean interests or images (MPPC, 1972; 1975; 
1976). To sum up, this law was established in order to push the private sector 
towards the production of domestic films and to limit the import of foreign films 
by means of direct government intervention. When the Yushin Constitution, 
which emphasised self-awareness and Korean identity, was enacted in 1972, the 
Motion Picture Law was amended again in accordance with the constitution. The 
main objectives of the revisions were to support national and traditional cultures. 
To do this, it was necessary to improve the quality of domestic films, to export 
them as propaganda vehicles for Korean culture and to import foreign films that 
would encourage the revitalising reform movement. 
After the fourth amendment of 1973, the Motion Picture Promotion Union was 
dissolved and the Motion Picture Promotion Corporation of Korea (MPPC) was 
established in its place. The non-profit entity took charge of the promotion of the 
Korean film industry on behalf of the government. Under the fourth Motion 
Picture Law, the Korean Motion Picture Distributors Association was set up in 
1974, consisting mainly of cinema owners, and all Korean films were distributed 
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through it. Kuroda (1980: 47) has pointed out that the association was so powerful 
that `no theatre can obtain a performance licence without the permission of the 
mayor in a big city or the head man of the wards. Theatres, or other organizations 
and private individuals who want to have a public showing of a motion picture, 
must submit an application accompanied with a distribution schedule issued by 
the association. ' 
The government also took the exhibition sector seriously as a means of boosting 
production, and it was strictly controlled under the Performance Law. Admission 
and cultural promotion taxes of 10 per cent each are added to ticket price. These 
taxed were used to pay $3 hundred thousand per year to the 20 selected producers. 
When theatre owners complained they had not received any of this tax, the 
government allocated $2 hundred thousand to the National Film Theatres 
Association for the improvement of cinema facilities. 
Finally, in a fourth amendment, the criteria for production companies were 
tightened up in order to intensify output in the production sector. Production 
companies needed to provide prescribed production facilities along with at least $ 
1 hundred thousand in production funds (Kuroda 1980: 44). As a result, by the 
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early 1980s, 20 companies were allowed to operate in Korea, making between 80 
and 100 feature films a year. When it came to the import of films, a film company 
with an import licence had to contribute $ 40,000 per film within one month to 
the National Film Promotion Fund, which is the principal source of funding for 
the Motion Picture Promotion Corporation (Article 10 of the Motion Picture Law). 
An earlier policy that allotted import quotas on the basis of the number of local 
productions caused filmmakers to crank out `quickies'. Thus, the market was 
distorted with lower-quality domestic films and foreign movies. Later, the 
compensation system, which meant that import licences were given to producers 
who exported Korean pictures, was also a big flop. Though it worked well for 
enabling the government to limit the import of foreign films, it failed completely 
in its aim of boosting the production and export of good quality domestic films. 
In 1970,253 Korean films were exported under these conditions but most of them 
were sold extremely cheaply in order only to obtain import licences for foreign 
films; the Korean films were never released overseas. In view of the continuing 
decline of the industry throughout the 1970s, the quota system was considered to 
be ineffective. The lifting of film import quotas in 1987 meant bad times for 
Korean producers. With very limited possibilities for selling their films abroad, 
132 
PART. II Chapter 3. The Past and Present of the Korean TV and Film Policy 
they had to expand the domestic market while competing with foreign films. This 
was nearly an insurmountable task; for instance, more than 70 per cent of the box 
office receipts in 1987 emanated from screenings of U. S. movies (Asiaweek, Feb. 
19,1988). 
South Korean features had not been popular abroad, despite the efforts of the 
MPPC. In the early 1980s, most of the films exported were sold to Southeast 
Asian countries and a few to Europe. Taiwan and Hong Kong were the major 
customers for years, importing some Korean movies for as little as $ 200 (Lent, 
1992). In 1976, when Korea earned US $138,601 from exporting 83 features, 
Hong Kong took 59, the continent of Africa imported seven, Guam six and other 
parts of Asia five (AMCB 1977: 16). A small number of films were shipped to the 
U. S. and Japan for overseas Korean communities. 
By 1980, all signals in the film industry were showing record lows, as seen in the 
number of feature film produced (91), the number of cinema screens (447) and 
total attendance (about 54.4 million viewers). Most of all, the number of domestic 
films had decreased consistently over the previous decade, falling from the high 
of 231 films in 1970 to 91 in 1980. During the 1980s, the average continued to 
drop to below 90 films per year. Moreover, the average rate of yearly cinema 
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attendance dropped to two per a person by 1976. In 1978, alongside this downturn 
in the Korean film industry and government intervention, imports of foreign films 
also decreased to 31, the lowest number of imported films up to that time. 
In the early 1980s, only production companies were permitted to import films and 
the quotas were awarded to winners of the Presidential Award in the Grand Bell 
Award, winners of the Prime Minister's Award, international film prize winners 
and those selected by the Ministry of Culture and Information under the Quality 
Film Examination System. Thus, before the advent of direct distribution in the 
late 1980s, around 22 or 23 foreign movies were permitted each year, and these 
had to be top quality works. The majority of them were made in United States. 
The rest were from France, Italy, England, West Germany, Hong Kong and, to 
lesser degrees, numerous other Asian countries (Kim, Ji-suk, 1997: 130-135). 
As seen above, incentives to produce and export films were built into government 
policy in various ways throughout the years. However, the bleak status of the 
Korean film industry did not change much. The reasons can be summed up as 
follows: first, directors gave up too easily and business people did not reinvest 
film profits into the industry. The industry was plagued with a lack of modem 
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equipment, a shortage of scriptwriters and a village mentality that could not 
comprehend many of the films. 
That is to say, government policy was far from helping build up the infrastructure 
of the film industry and the private sectors were simply not interested in doing so. 
Second, quotas governing import licences for lucrative foreign films linked to the 
number of domestic films completed by each company led to the production of 
cheap quota quickies just to get more import licences. This experience was the 
same as that of the U. K. (Moran, 1996). Eventually, the result of this policy did 
not boost but rather weaken domestic production. 
Third, television and home video with advanced technology became increasingly 
accessible and attractive to audiences. Cinemas, meanwhile, became old- 
fashioned and outdated, making more viewers disinclined to go to the cinema. 
Fourth, harsh censorship killed the imagination and creativity of producers by 
restricting various kinds of story sources. As one critic put it, `since the motion 
picture is a genre of art that can flourish with free ideas and new concepts, it is 
feared that this rigid government regulation might degrade the quality of film' 
(Kuroda 1980: 46). After the assassination of President Park Jeong-hee in 1979, 
domestic events were more tightly prohibited from source of story than usual and 
135 
PART. II Chapter 3. The Past and Present of the Korean TV and Film Policy 
this stifled freedom of expression in film. Producers churned out low quality 
melodramas that had nothing to do with social issues and consequently resulted in 
audiences' disinterest. 
3.2.2 Wrongly Controlled Policy 
In this section, I will review the current state of the Korean film industry. To do 
this, first the recent changes in market share will be examined, and then each of 
the industry's sectors, such as production, distribution and exhibition, will be 
discussed. This review of the status quo of the Korean film industry will be in 
extreme contrast to what we overviewed in the section above, highlighting the 
recent success of the Korean film industry. Before considering market share, it is 
necessary to examine the scale of the box office in order to measure the scale of 
the market. In 2000, the 61.69 million cinema attendances, an increase of 12.7% 
on the year 1999, has surged to more than 70 million attendances in 2001 the 
largest ever attendance record since 1980. 
What is more, in 2002, the Korean domestic market was at its zenith, with figures 
for the year revealing that national admissions went over approximately 105 
million for the first time since 1973 with a total box office profit of $500 million 
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and up 20.8 percent compared with 2001. The average Korean saw 2.27 films in 
2002, the most since 1975. According to KOFIC Annual Report (2003), it is 
thought that the 105 million admissions in 2002, a 16% rise on the previous year, 
can be attributed to continued multiplex growth, a move to Friday openings and a 
strong line-up of domestic titles as well as imported films. The market share of 
Korean films at the beginning of the decade was 19.3%, falling to as low as 
15.4% in 1993 (Variety, Jan. 10,2000). 
However, the late 1990s showed a steady rise and the slices of the pie were being 
quickly rearranged: Korean films were up 20% while the market share of foreign 
films was down by the same amount. By the end of 1999, domestic films took 
35% of an estimated $232 million in total box office earning (ibid). As a matter of 
fact, recent Korean movies recorded one of the highest shares of any local movie 
market in the world. In 1999, Korea's domestic film industry was buoyed by its 
best performance since foreign films came to dominate the market in the late 
1980s. 
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Thus, when it comes to market share, the Korean film industry has never been as 
successful as it is nowadays. Summarily, nationwide figures of market share for 
domestic films since 2000 have increased from 35.1% in 2000 to 60.3% in 2004 
(KOFIC, 2004). According to KOFIC, the Korean film market, which stood at 
$632 m in 2002, grew by 3.6 percent in 2003 (KOFIC, 2004). In the first quarter 
of 2004 in particular, the market share of local films surged up to 70% with two 
Korean films consecutively attracting over 10 million moviegoers each. This 
means that nearly one in three of the nation's population over 15 went to see one 
of these films in the cinema. 
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One of the films, Taegukgi, set a new record as it attracted 10 million viewers in 
39 days, breaking the 58-day record of Sihnido. the only other film in South 
Korean history to attract more than 10 million moviegoers. 7aeguk ri also became 
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South Korea's first ever film to reach 2 million admissions in five days. As such, 
the recent market share of Korean films is astounding. Silmido and Taegugki each 
sold more than 11 million tickets in Korea, a country of 48 million people. 
What is more encouraging for domestic films is that Silmido contended with a 
world mega hit, `The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King', as a rival on 
release and unexpectedly grabbed a larger audience than the latter (Newsweek 
International, May 3,2004). It has been said among industry experts that this kind 
of smash-hit film in a local area could occur only once every ten years or so. In 
fact, in 2001 when Korea celebrated unprecedented domestic successes, it was 
said that this kind of record could never happen again. However, 2003 and 2004 
brought Korea much bigger successes for local films at the box office. 
Furthermore, Korean films accounted for eight of the top ten grossing films of the 
year 2003, with Bong Joon-ho's acclaimed Memories of Murder earning the top 
spot. 
Taking a closer look at annual market share in order to analyse the interrelation 
between domestic films and American imports, it seems that the two counteract 
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each other almost perfectly. This means when Korean films are successful, the 
market share of Hollywood films decreases by almost the same amount that the 
domestic films obtain. While Korean film recorded a 53% nation-wide (49% in 
Seoul) market share in 2003, the market share of Hollywood films decreased, 
accounting for 43.2% of the Seoul market, followed by Japanese (3.0%), 
Chinese/HK (2.5%), French (0.7%), and other films (0.8%). 
According to Seoul figures, which are more accurate thanks to electronic ticketing 
systems, in 2002 Korean films took in 45.2 percent of the Seoul market with over 
40 million admissions, compared to 46.1 percent in 2001. Meanwhile, U. S. films 
took 48.8 percent of the market share, up 2.4 percent on the preceding year. It is 
worth noting here is that the attendance of ten top-grossing Korean films in Seoul 
(6.72 million people in 2000) overtook that of foreign films by 570,000 viewers. 
What is more, the average number of Korean films per person per year is 1.2 
higher than that of Hollywood films and twice as high as that of all foreign films. 
Over the course of the 1990s, the number of Korean films produced each year fell 
dramatically. In 1991, the total number of domestic production was 121, which 
fell to a low of 43 in 1998. Since then it has been increasing slightly from 59 in 
140 
PART. II Chapter 3. The Past and Present of the Korean TV and Film Policy 
2000 to 65 in 2001,78 in 2002 and 80 in 2003. Industry experts attributed the 
drastic fall in the import of foreign movies to the growing popularity of Korean 
films among domestic moviegoers. Reflecting the increasing market share of 
Korean films, domestic films shown on television accounted for 34 percent of the 
total number of films registered with the rating board in 2002, up 14.6 percentage 
points from the 19.4 percent recorded in 2001 (Yonhap News Agency, Jan. 5, 
2003). 
Since 1998, the number of screens has increased as state-of-the-art multiplexes 
replace old cinemas and demand blockbusters to fill the seats. With the larger 
number of screens, the films which are being produced are also doing more 
business - not only an increase in production but also in productivity. Such facts 
represent solid ground upon which to base the claim that the Korean film market 
has entered into a process of industrialisation. Experts in the film industry such as 
Jeon Jay (interviewed in May 2005) and Kim Hyoo-jong (interviewed in April 
2005) describe the Korean industry as going through an adjustment phase, as film 
investment returns to more normal levels after 2001. 
When it comes to the distribution sector, local companies have been dominating 
the market since 2000. CJ Entertainment and Cinema Service have been the top 
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two companies in distribution market for the past few years, outstripping 
competition even from Hollywood direct distributors such as Buena Vista, 
Colombia, UIP and Warner Bros with their strong line-up of Hollywood 
blockbusters. For example, in 2003, distributor rankings based on KOFIC data 
revealed that the major local distributors, CJ Entertainment and Cinema Service, 
occupied 40.8% of the market, with 22.3% and 18.5% respectively. Following 
behind were Warner Bros (8.1%), Chungeorahm (7.5%), BVI (6.7%), Columbia 
Tristar (5.1%), Korea Pictures (4.8%), Showbox (4.8%), UIP (4.8%), and 20th 
Century Fox (4.3%). 
The overall market for film in Korea has been expanding steadily since the 
nation's first multiplex opened in 1998. Most of all, a recent boom in the 
construction of new venues has been matched by a rise in admissions from 54.7m 
in 1999 to 107m in 2002 and 119m in 2003. With their films shown on around 
1000 screens in 2002, CGV, Megabox Cineplex and Lotte Cinema accounted for 
45m admissions, a 42% share of the nation's total 107m admissions. 
The competitive nature of the business led to an increase in the construction of 
screens by large corporations, beginning with CJ Entertainment's 1998 
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construction of an 11-screen multiplex, DongYang Group's establishment of 17- 
screen Megabox and Lotte Group's expansion of its cinema chain (with backup 
from their largest profit-maker, Lotte Department Stores). This trend is being seen 
as a positive sign of growth in the entire movie-going area. Alongside such 
increases, the size of the film market has also been growing. 
Based on data from KOFIC Annual Report (2001), there were 720 screens for 
commercial screening purposes in Korea in 2000, excluding drive-ins and cultural 
centres. Considering that there were 497 screening venues in 1997, this shows an 
increase of approximately 45% within three years. With about 180 more screens 
added in 2002, the total number of screens nationwide reached over 1500 by the 
end of 2004. as seen in the table above. 
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CJ Entertainment in particular has been revolutionising Korea's exhibition scene. 
Since CJ's exhibition subsidiary, CGV which is the nation's largest cinema circuit 
opened its first venue in 1998, it has operated 252 screens in 32 venues 
accounting for 16% of the nation's total. CJ Entertainment shares the ownership 
of CGV with Australia's Village Roadshow. It passed the 20 million admissions 
mark in 2002, up from 14 million in 2001. Total revenues for that year amounted 
to $117m, a 47% rise on 2001. 
Conclusion 
As the state-controlled model in broadcasting and film industry is common in 
Asia, Korea is, in this sense, no exception. Government regulations and policies 
for the film and TV industries can be summed up as aiming to promote domestic 
production and limit the import of foreign materials. However, the effects, 
especially in the film industry before Kim Dae-jung's regime, were completely 
different from what had been intended. It could be said to be a `government 
failure' as opposed to a market failure. In broadcasting, the military regime's 
control on the TV industry was severe, imposed through censorship, licensing 
requirements and government ownership. Therefore, for quite a long time, the 
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Korean TV industry was run in the context of a government-controlled, 
oligopolistic system. 
With the advent of the 1970s, television became more and more popular, while 
the film industry grew uncompetitive under excessive censorship and the relative 
technological and artistic backwardness of the industry, and it began losing 
audiences to TV. In the late 1980s, free market forces under globalisation have 
started to have some influence but had yet to be fully unleashed in the broadcast 
and film sector. Since the early 1990s, however, in the new globalised multimedia 
age, the TV and film industries in Korea have changed radically. They have been 
deregulated and liberalised though the objective was not for the diversity. 
At the same time, they are converging and commercialising under unlimited 
competition domestically and internationally. Given the fact that Korea is way 
ahead of other nations in terms of broadband service penetration rates and IT 
technologies, it has been suggested that local content providers in the cultural 
industry are developing a strategic approach to the arrival of global competition. 
Recently, along with the continuous success of Korean cultural products, the 
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Korean TV and film industries have been systemising their infrastructures from 
production to consumption, as will be analysed and highlighted in later chapters. 
As seen above, Korean cultural policy has been implemented to protect the 
country's cultural industries from one-way flow from other countries (especially 
the USA and Japan), although this never worked as intended until the end of 
1990s. Up to that time, owing to the absence of an effective cultural policy, 
cultural products from Korea, a country in periphery without geolinguistic and 
diasporic markets, seemed not to travel well and this was explained by theories of 
cultural discounts. Also, the fact that the country's small market meant that it was 
unable to achieve economy of scale was another barrier to forming two-way flows. 
However, since the Kim Dae-jung regime, the experience of the Korean cultural 
industry has changed greatly. In the following chapters, I will elaborate in detail 
on how it has changed and developed. 
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CHAPTER 4. Globalisation and Korean TV and Film 
Policy 
This chapter is devoted to highlighting globalisation-related policy changes in 
the Korean TV and film industries since the end of the 1980s. This follows the 
discussion on the history of Korean TV and film industry until the middle of 
1980s in chapter three. It was the late 1980s when the Korean cultural industry 
began to confront the more complex cultural and economic effects of 
globalisation. Korean cultural policy in particular has had to cope with 
globalisation, raising several historical issues over the past two decades. 
Thus, this chapter will focus on some historical issues related to globalisation 
which have had a huge influence on the current Korean TV and Film 
industries and their policies. Specifically, it is of prime importance to analyse 
the recent renaissance of Korean cultural products in order to understand the 
global issues with which the Korean cultural industry has had to cope. 
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Accordingly, this chapter will examine TV and film policy since the 1980s, 
when globalisation along with liberalisation and deregulation began to prevail 
in Korea. As mentioned above, the recent experience of the Korean cultural 
industry resists trends associated with globalisation elsewhere. Thus, in this 
chapter I will explore how official TV and film policies have responded to the 
challenge of globalisation and what the rationales behind these policies were. 
In this way, we can discover the role played by government cultural policy in 
the rising Korean wave. 
Broadly, the period after the end of the 1980s can be divided into `before' and 
`after' the regime of President Kim Dae-jung. Kim Dae-jung regime may be 
considered a watershed as the characteristics of Korean cultural policy during 
his regime were much different from those of the previous regimes in terms of 
its progressive and even aggressive strategy regarding the globalisation of 
Korean culture. A significant paradigm shift thus took place during Kim Dae- 
jung regime. Therefore, this chapter will be composed of three sections. First, 
the two periods before and after Kim's regime will be elaborated, highlighting 
the changes between these two periods; the impacts of changes in cultural 
policy under Kim Dae-jung regime will be analysed later. 
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4.1 Before Kim Dae-Jung Regime (1988-1997) 
From the end of the 1980s to 1997, there were several historical issues that 
changed cultural policy in response to globalisation and led to changes in the 
cultural industry such as Hollywood majors' direct distribution to Korea in 
1988, a softening of censorship and the intensification of the screen quota 
system. Before the Kim Dae-jung regime, political objectives and interests 
had priority in deciding cultural policy. In 1980, under the military regime of 
President Jeon Doo-hwan, the commercial broadcaster TBC was forced to 
surrender its licence and stop broadcasting as seen in previous chapter. 
In the film industry, strict censorship was implemented and the government 
strictly controlled foreign imports. Thus, the ownership of the industries as 
well as the contents of the nation's cultural products was tightly controlled by 
the government. However government's strict control on cultural policy is 
challenged coping with globalisation. In this context, before Kim Dae-jung 
regime, there were some critical events which influenced and changed Korean 
cultural policy such as the Seoul Olympics, direct distribution of U. S films to 
Korea and Loosening Censorship. 
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4.1.1 The Seoul Olympics and Globalisation 
One of big challenges for the Korean cultural industry in the context of 
globalisation was the 1988 Olympics, held in Seoul. The Korean government 
considered diplomatically large-scale events such as the Olympics, the World 
Cup and EXPO as its main PR strategy with regard to promoting Korea in the 
international community. Like Roche's notion (2000: 6) that the development 
of international mega-events parallels the growth and spread of modernity and 
nation-state consciousness, playing an important role in cultural inclusion 
which made Koreans feel a sense of social inclusion and feel part of the 
national project. 
Korea also began to construct and present its image for recognition in relation 
to other nations and in the eyes of the world. The government tried to make 
most of international events to achieve cultural inclusion through these 
sharable experiences in a common space and time (Whannel 1992; Scannell 
1996) that provide a common and recurrent national and international public 
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culture in an increasingly fragmented and changing world (Roche and Arundel, 
1998). 
During the 1980s and 2000s, two international events, the 24th Summer 
Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988 and the Korea-Japan World Cup in 2002 
contributed to the globalisation of Korea. At a national level, the Seoul 
Olympics in 1988 and the World Cup 2002 were turning points for Korean 
policy toward international relations, contributing towards a paradigm shift in 
domestic policy including cultural policy. In particular, the Seoul Olympics 
was not just an isolated two-week event but rather an eight-year project 
connected with economic and political processes. As Houlihan (1994: 208- 
210) observes, hosts of the Olympic Games can come to be seen as 
`significant actors in the international system. ' Korea was a case in point. 
Korea was able to use the Seoul Olympics to project a relatively positive 
national image and to play an internationally significant political and 
diplomatic role that extends beyond sport. 
During the event, Korea's Olympic project was very popular with the huge 
international audience who watched the Games on global TV; the opening 
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ceremony was watched by an estimated 1 billion people worldwide, double 
the predicted audience and a new record for Olympic TV (Roche 2000: 185). 
Therefore, mega-events have been heavily promoted and subsidized by the 
government. In this respect, Roche pinpoints that `the nineteenth-century expo 
movement in general was a product of nation building and economy-building 
in modernising Western societies. They offered elites a form of popular 
cultural policy-making which could be used to promote among the mass of 
ordinary people an acceptance of, incorporation in, and positive attraction and 
loyalty to, the new political economic formations being constructed around 
them (ibid.: 71,73). ' 
He emphasises that this has particularly been the case for authoritarian elites, 
as we saw with the Nazis' use of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, and also the 1968 
Mexico City Olympics, the 1980 Moscow Olympics and the 1988 Seoul 
Olympics (ibid.: 187). As he accentuated, preparing for the Seoul Olympics in 
1988, the government began to seriously consider the national image, as 
mentioned earlier. Military leader Rho Tae-Woo had an Achilles heel in that 
he was a successor of the military dictator Jeon Doo-hwan, and so tried to 
152 
PART. 11 Chapter 4. Globalisation and Korean TV & Film Policy 
make sure his government was not seen as a dictatorship (Larson and Park 
1993). 
As the impact of the event on the Korean public was tremendous, the 
preliminary measures taken to prepare for the event also had significant 
effects afterwards, particularly in terms of television and film policies. 
Moreover, in 1994, there was a globalisation programme initiative, the 
Segyehwa (globalisation in Korean), including the globalisation of culture 
under the Kim Young-sam regime (Gills and Gills, 1999: 201; Hsiung, 2001: 
139). 
The objective of globalisation in Korea at that time was to make the country 
more receptive to all things foreign, to harmonise the domestic systems and 
practices with global standards and to sharpen its international competitive 
edge. The parameters of the campaign were very broad, encompassing every 
aspect of a variety of systems and practices in the nation such as politics, 
administration, diplomacy, economy, quality of life and education, as well as 
culture. Representatively, the implementation of the financial transaction 
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system under real name2 and entry into the OECD were part of the nation's 
globalisation initiative. However, the movement was unable to gain broad 
support among the people because the subjects and agendas were put on the 
table by a few advisors to President Kim Young-sam and not through public 
consensus (Son, 1996). 
Here what I would like to emphasize is that in political and diplomatic terms, 
these two international events provided critical motivation for changing the 
paradigm of government policy for the film and TV industries. The 1988 
Olympic Games played a key role in the government's decisions to allow 
Hollywood direct distribution to Korea and to loosen censorship, while 2002 
Korea-Japan World Cup acted as a catalyst for opening up the Korean market 
to Japanese culture. 
4.1.2 Direct Distribution of U. S. Films to Korea 
Until the end of the 1980s, Korean cultural policy had been focused on 
protecting Korean culture from Western culture (Kim and Yang 1998). This 
2 The real-name financial transaction system; the real-name accounting system. Before this 
system was introduced, transaction of money in Korea was able to do under the assumed 
name which had resulted in big black economy. 
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was because there had long been a perception that Western popular culture 
would ruin the traditional Korean culture. This notion stemmed largely from 
the country's colonial experience, in particular the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Throughout its long history of around five thousand years, Korea was 
frequently invaded by neighbouring countries, the latest being Japan. 
Moreover, the Korean War and the consequent division of the country as a 
result of the superpower conflict between the USA and USSR led to an 
antipathy or fear of foreigners among Koreans. However, in advance of the 
1988 Seoul Olympics, government opened up the Korean film market to 
Hollywood distributors under pressure of the U. S. and economic and 
diplomatic interests. 
Following the U. S. government's complaints about Korean film policies 
which was backed up by the Motion Picture Exporters Association of America 
(MPEAA) representing the eight largest producers and distributors, six 
months of talks were held in 1987 and then U. S. majors were allowed to open 
offices in Korea, distribute films themselves and collect the profits. Eventually, 
in 1987, UIP (United International Pictures) began distributing its films 
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directly from the U. S., though there was a fierce boycotting campaign against 
Fatal Attraction, the first film distributed directly by UIP, such as the closing 
for a day of thirty theatres in Seoul and the threat that baskets of snakes would 
be released in theatres at screening time (Lent, 1990; Moran, 1996). 
Within a few months, the upheavals quickly spread; however, at that time, no 
one could have expected that two decades later, the protests would have 
subsided. U. S. majors had earmarked Korea as their second largest Asian 
market and over the next decade domestic films gradually lost their market 
share, reaching a low point in 1993 when Korean films made up only 15% of 
overall attendance figures (MCT, 2000). Likewise, opening the film market 
under American pressure, without any preparation, caused the devastation of 
the film industry. On the other hand, the broadcasting industry, which was 
considered as part of the national infrastructure, was developing stably under a 
government control and support. The reason Korean conglomerates entered 
into the film business was not to make a profit by producing films but to 
obtain stable video contents for the video-players they produced. This means 
the transition was not planned and the influx of corporate investment is further 
evidence of the haphazard development. 
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4.1.3 Loosening Censorship 
The 1988 Olympics was a chance to showcase Korea as a rapidly developing 
democratic country and consequently led President Rho Tae-woo to deregulate 
various restrictions, including censorship. The softening of censorship in 
Korea on moving images was mainly a reflection of the political changes that 
have transformed Korea over the past decades from a military dictatorship to a 
democracy. Previously, the specific situation of Korea, which is a divided 
country, was used by the government to ban political freedom of expression. 
In the mid-1980s, with competition from television, greater leniency was 
shown over the handling of sexual themes in films. Foreign films too were 
permitted more explicit portrayals of sexual scenes, but they were still 
censored (Doherty 1984: 844-845). As for obscenity, censorship was not just 
confined to government bodies; on some occasions, public pressures have 
stopped film screenings (ibid.: 844). Political censorship, however, remained 
stricter than that concerning sexual matters. 
The demand for deregulation was based on a notion that a control-oriented 
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policy would only end up stunting artists' creativity and imagination. Since 
the end of the 1980s when was a turning point of Korean cultural policy, there 
has been a big transformation in Korean censorship. A new constitution, 
which allowed for the gradual easing of political censorship laws, was enacted. 
The Korean Public Performance Ethics Committee (KPPEC) was created as 
an autonomous civilian body for censorship, though it was subsidised by the 
government. The Motion Picture Censorship Committee (MPCP) under the 
KPPEC censored all films including foreign films. 
Then, in 1995, public claims and the trend of neo-liberalisation led to 
government censorship of films to be ruled unconstitutional. As a result, the 
governmental censorship board was disbanded and replaced by the Media 
Ratings Board, which is made up of film critics, directors, lawyers, and others. 
Since then, the appointment of new board members has, to some extent, been 
made independent of the government, although this was still done in 
consultation with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The Korea Media 
Ratings Board (KMRB) has responsibility for assigning classifications to 
films, videos, computer games, and other media released for public viewing 
while the KBC does the same for TV contents. As seen above, government's 
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scale-down of restrictions had allowed more variety in themes of film than 
those of television, and the `more liberal and more thrilling scenes' attracted 
more people to the cinema in the long term. 
4.2 New Cultural Policy under Kim Dae-Jung Regime (1998- 
2002) 
Since the Kim Dae-jung regime, a big paradigm shift has occurred. President 
Kim pledged to build up key visions for the Korean cultural industry during 
his election campaign. Under his administration, the policies that directly 
affected cultural activities shifted from decades-old state control to greater 
autonomy. The key aspect of the government's cultural policy can be summed 
up as `intervening in cultural affairs as little as possible and supporting them 
as much as possible. ' 
Most of all, the state rating system has long been blamed for violating the 
freedom of creation that the Constitution guarantees the public. Kim Dae-jung 
believed the value of cultural products should be judged not by the legal 
authorities or the government but by the market mechanism, the people's tacit 
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agreement or the social atmosphere (Korea Herald, Feb. 26,1998). Thus, a set 
of policies expected to impart momentum into the nation's cultural industries, 
which had previously been subject to strict state control, was implemented. A 
move was also made to privatise many state mechanisms that deliberate 
cultural contents such as movies, videos and comics. Consequently, a private 
autonomous organisation replaced the Korea Performance Art Promotion 
Association (KPAPA), which determined the classification of all films before 
they were shown to the public. 
Likewise, along with the economic reform, President Kim Dae-Jung tried to 
end government control over the cultural sector. When it came to supporting 
the cultural industry, the government put into effect its first five-year plan in 
1998 to build up its own culture industry. It increased the amount of the film 
promotion fund from $13 million to $50 million and offered full support to the 
animation industry and independent moviemakers. 
Moreover, at the end of 1998, as film production moved from being 
categorised as a service industry to a manufacturing industry under standard 
industry classifications, it was possible for film producers to qualify for tax 
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breaks (MBN, Dec. 24,1998). In addition, the government aided specific 
cultural areas by providing scholarships and equipment to many schools. The 
number of college departments dealing with careers in the area of culture has 
risen from almost none to 300 in 2004 (MCT, 2005). The second five-year 
plan (2002-2006) focuses on raising exports and building cross-cultural ties, 
including with Japan and China. 
As for the TV industry, in line with fast growing high-speed Internet 
penetration and increased demand for cultural contents, the government also 
started to beef up the Internet broadcasting (webcasting) industry, which is an 
interactive communication platform with the advantages of being able to 
provide both broadcasting and telecommunication services. In April 2001, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication unveiled a five-year plan to 
boost webcasting with an investment of $50 million aiming to develop 
efficient use of the Internet infrastructure as the next-generation information 
technology industry begins to emerge (Korea Herald, Dec. 3,1999; April 10, 
2001; March 1,2001). 
Moreover, aiming to transfer analogue TV to 100% digital over the country by 
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2010, the government promoted infrastructure investment among broadcasters 
by providing various financial support measures by 2005, pushing in 
particular for the early adoption of digital television. According to the plan, a 
favourable tax rate is adopted when importing foreign broadcasting equipment. 
In 2001, the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) eased import 
tariffs on digital television equipment to help broadcasters cope with high 
initial investment costs. The move came in conjunction with the commercial 
launch of land-based digital television. 
4.2.1 Korean Media Policy in the Context of Other Areas of Policy 
How Korean cultural policy was formed and developed since the end of 1990s 
can be fully understood by placing media policy in the context of other areas 
of policy that have a direct bearing on the cultural industries. In the context of 
other areas of policy, there have been two specific policies which are involved 
in and have influenced Korean cultural industry, firstly, a policy to develop 
information technology (IT) as a new engine for Korean economic growth and 
secondly an export-driven economic policy. 
Regarding the policy for IT, the Korean government began implementing 
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structural reforms in the mid-1990s. The Ministry of Information and 
Communications (MIC) has pursued a policy of building a high-speed 
telecommunication infrastructure as a foundation to build a "knowledge-based 
society". The Korea Information Infrastructure (KII) was established and the 
Framework Act on Information Promotion was enacted in order to advance 
the nation's IT infrastructure. Such reforms were driven by an economic and 
industrial shift from heavy industries such as automobile and ship production, 
which had dominated the economy in the 1970s and 1980s, to soft industries 
on basis of IT, BT (Biotechnology) and CT (Culture Technology). 
The government injected $ 10 billion into developing cutting-edge industries, 
such as information technology (IT), environment technology (ET) and 
cultural technology (CT) by 2005 (Chosunilbo, Nov. 29,2001). Most of all, 
investment in IT has increased 25 times from US$ 480 million in 1980 to 
US$ 12.2 billion in 2000. More specifically, through the Cyber Korea 21 in 
1999, a programme which was intended to accelerate IT development, the 
government provided US$77 million in loans with preferential rates to 
facilities service providers (FSP). In 2000, an additional US$77 million was 
provided in loans for suburban areas and another US$926 million for the 
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rural areas was provided until 2005 in order to supply them with broadband 
connections. 
Along with its investment funding, the government implemented various 
policies designed to increase internet use among the general population. 
The government implemented what was known as the `Ten Million People 
Internet Education' project, the purpose of which was to provide internet 
education to ten million people including workforce in IT industry 
(Ministry of Information and Technology, 2006). It provided internet 
literacy lessons to housewives, the elderly, military personnel, and farmers. 
Perhaps as a reflection of such initiatives, Korea has the highest proportion 
of the population in number of broadband users in the world as of 2006. 
In this context, the cultural industry has been aggressively brought up to 
speed in order to provide contents for this developing and improving 
Internet infrastructure. That is to say, in order to develop and take 
advantage of IT infrastructure, it was necessary to develop an effective 
contents industry. Thus the content-creating capacity of the cultural 
industries had to be expanded and developed. Consequently, the cultural 
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industry has been developed in coordination with the IT industry and the 
telecommunication industry. 
When it comes to economic policy, Korean policies towards the cultural 
industries were linked to the government's desire for an export-driven 
economy, as noted in previous chapters. Historically, much of Korean 
growth has derived from external trade, and this trend appears set to 
continue. Korea ranks the 12th in world trade. Exports in 2004 came to 
$254 billion, representing 61.6 percent of the nation's gross domestic 
product. To boost Korea to a leading position among Asia's developed 
economies, Korea relies largely upon exports to fuel the impressive 
growth of its economy. The development of the cultural industries as a 
strategic core sector in the nation's pursuit of export-driven economy has 
thus been in accordance with and closely related to economic policy. 
Following the Asian financial crisis, this export-driven policy was pushed 
forward more aggressively. The Kim Dae-jung government restructured 
industrial production by reviewing the potential of the products for export, 
stimulating competition and opening markets to attract foreign capital. 
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Under the popular catchphrase `Buying Korean', these policies led to a 
restructuring of Korean conglomerates (chaebols), privatizing banks, and 
creating a more liberalized economy with a mechanism for bankrupt firms 
to exit the market. The Korean cultural market opening to Japanese pop 
culture can also be understood as part of this trend. 
Accordingly, government policy towards the cultural industries has 
changed from the one of prohibition and control to one of opening and 
support. Such a policy reflects a belief that the cultural industries as 
integrally linked to the national economy. Thus cultural policy became an 
essential part of economic policy. Most of all, overseas export of popular 
TV dramas and films were encouraged because they were seen to have an 
uplifting effect on the national image and thereby also on the economic 
prospects of the entertainment industry and the tourism industry. The box- 
office success of a drama such as Daejanggeum demonstrated how the 
tourism industry and the entertainment industry could benefit each other. 
The steady growth of the Korean cultural industries has developed 
alongside the burgeoning IT industry and the export-driven economic 
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policy since the end of 1990s. These have been the key elements in 
Korea's economic growth. 
The change from heavy industry to soft industry in industrial structure was 
expected rapidly to reduce the demand for unskilled workers while 
simultaneously increasing the demand for professional and technical 
manpower and creative workforce in soft industry including cultural 
industry. Industrial policymakers tried to facilitate this necessary 
upgrading by developing and coordinating cross-sectoral programs in the 
six key areas of education, R&D (Research and Development), labour, 
venture development, intellectual property protection and foreign direct 
investments. In tandem with the focused efforts to develop emerging 
technologies, government has continued to strengthen its industrial 
competitiveness by linking leading-edge information technology to the 
cultural industries. 
In order to promote cultural industries by nurturing a creative labour 
market, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT) supported financial 
investment and training programs to provide the workforce with practical 
education. At the same time the government's Research and Development 
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(R&D) expenditures on IT rose from 3.6% (US$ 3 billion) of its total 
budget in 1998 to 4.7% (US$ 3.8 billion) in 2002. The number of 
researchers in science and technology has grown from 18,500 to 160,000 
over the past two decades. The cultural industries have also increased 
investments in R&D and numbers of researchers. 
With reflecting these efforts, according to National Statistics, the number 
of people employed in service industries such as entertainment, culture 
and leisure increased by 37.3% from 3.6 million in 2000 to 5 million in 
2005. Meanwhile, for the same period, the number of people employed in 
the telecommunications industry increased by 45.3% while the numbers 
employed in manufacturing decreased by 1.4%. 
One of the measures used to increase the creative workforce was a special 
MCT program designed for talented students, and delivered through 
institutions designated by the Ministry, such as Cultural Industry Academy 
and the Korean Academy of Film Arts. The Korean Academy of Film Arts 
is part of the Korean Film Commission and has as its objective the 
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cultivation of the human resources needed for the film industry and the 
provision of training programs for those engaged in the film industry. 
Table 1. Graduates and Employees in Institutions of Animation, Character 
and Cartoons (Unit=Person, Source=MCT) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
College 265 904 1,584 2,451 3,787 
Graduate School 0 0 0 0 0 
Graduates 265 904 2,349 3,768 6,432 
High School 0 0 0 0 726 
Increase rate of New Employees - 70.5% 61.7% 37.6% 39.4% 
Number of New Employees 217 735 1,919 3,078 5,079 
University 0 0 765 1317 1919 
As above, through the MCT program, the 2001 government committed to 
train forty thousands experts in cultural industries such as game, animation, 
broadcasting and film by 2006. In 2005, the MCT created a graduate 
school in association with existing colleges to provide specialized 
programs in cultural technology (CT) and to develop skills and expertise 
in the export of cultural contents. These measures have been accompanied 
by rapid quantitative increases in human resources such as employees in 
cultural industry and cultural industry training programs. 
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Aside from the government's measures, various courses on Korean 
popular culture and on-the-job training for students in culture-related 
fields have been increasing in schools and institutions in the private and 
independent sectors. For example, as of the end of 2004, film-related 
department in Universities increased up to 35 across the nation. The 
increasing interest in the cultural industries among young students may 
reflect the positive change in the social and economic status of people 
working in the cultural industries in Korea. Moreover, in 2002 the cultural 
industries in Korea employed 102,000 people and were expected to 
employ 190,000 people in 2008 representing an annual growth rate of 
10.9% (KDI Economic Outlook). 
Table 2. The Comparison of Expected Employees in Cultural Industry and 
Other Industries (Unit=Thousand, Source=KDI) 
Expected Employees Year 2002- Year 2008 
2002 2008 Increase Increase Rate 
Service 14,092 16,066 1,974 2.6% 
Cultural Contents 102 190 88 10.9% 
IT Manufacture 466 671 205 5.1% 
Manufacture 4,241 4,208 -33 0% 
Telecommunication 498 665 167 6.4% 
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4.2.2 Open Door Policy to Japanese Pop Culture 
Due to Japan's past colonisation of Korea (1910-1945) and the brutal 
oppression of Korean culture at that time, Japanese pop culture was banned in 
Korea since 1945. Japanese films could only be screened at festivals such as 
the Pusan International Film Festival (PIFF). Such a longstanding ban reflects 
lingering resentment of Japanese colonial aggression and a consequent fear of 
Japanese influence on the Korean peninsula. However, this situation resulted 
in an extensive black market, which is believed by government and industry 
experts to distort the market for culture and exert a bad influence on the 
Korean youth. Thus, it took a long time for Koreans to be able to purchase 
copies of Japanese movies, animations, comic books, music, or computer 
games before a longstanding global trend of free trade agreements propelled 
the easing of this ban. Most of all, Korean cultural openness to Japanese mass 
culture was also, to some extent, intended to encourage a friendly mood 
towards Japan before holding the 2002 World Cup together. 
Under this context, President Kim Dae-jung said in his inauguration speech of 
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1998, `now that more than 50 years has passed since Korea's liberation from 
Japanese colonial rule, I think it would be possible to permit the introduction 
of Japanese culture. The ban has resulted in a flood of illegal substandard 
Japanese culture into Korea, which has had a negative impact on the nation's 
adolescents (Korea Herald, Feb. 26,1998). ' Kim's regime suggested a gradual 
lifting of the long-standing ban on Japanese culture, arguing that if the 
existing, strict restrictions were maintained, it would still infiltrate Korea, but 
through illicit and illegal channels. Thus, by adopting an open-door approach 
towards Japanese culture, Korean cultural policy made yet another big shift 
towards cultural globalisation. The process and issues of each measure of this 
market opening are as follows: 
A. FIRST-STAGE OPENING (OCT. 28,1998) 
TABLE 3. Products Included in the First Stage Opening to Japanese Culture 
" Grand prize winners from Cannes, Venice, Berlin or the Academy Awards 
Foreign Language Film Category 
" Korean-Japanese co-productions (with the Korean side contributing at least 
10%) 
" Japanese actors and actresses permitted to act in Korean films 
" Video releases permitted for all Japanese films which received a theatrical 
release 
Following The Japanese Government expressed remorse for its history of 
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imperialism and apologised in an official document to Korea for the great pain 
and damage it had inflicted on Korea, President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese 
Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi made a joint declaration that would gradually 
dissolve Korean barriers to Japanese popular culture, ending a restriction that 
endured for more for than 50 years after the Japanese occupation had ended. 
The first stage of opening allowed for a very limited range of films; only those 
that had been awarded the grand prize at three major film festivals or were 
winners of the Academy Awards' Best Foreign Language Film competition 
could be released. In the initial-stage opening, four Japanese feature films 
were released in Korea, but in business terms the strategy was a flop because 
these award-winning films were not commercial, and so had limited appeal 
(KOFIC 1999; Korea Herald, Oct. 22,1998). 
B. SECOND-STAGE OPENING (SEPTEMBER 10,1999) 
TABLE 4. Products Included in the Second Stage Opening to Japanese Culture 
" Prize winners from one of 70 selected film festivals 
" Films rated for general audiences by Korea's Media Ratings Board 
" TV programmes, animation, pop music records and computer games 
remain prohibited. 
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The enlarged category in the second stage covered films rated appropriate for 
family viewing and those that won awards in some 70 international film 
festivals registered with the Federation Internationale des Associations de 
Produceurs de Films. Thanks to these new criteria, 124 Japanese films at that 
time qualified to be shown in Korea after being reviewed by The Korea 
Council for Performing Arts Promotion. 
Japanese pop musicians and entertainers were allowed to perform at indoor 
venues with no more than 2,000 seats, which are still quite restricted, 
representing a small-scale performance. The opening sectors, which were not 
dealt in the second stage, included television programmes, pop music records 
and computer software games. Animated films, which had drawn a particular 
interest among Korean youth, were also banned, mainly in order to protect the 
local industry. 
By the beginning of the year 2000, a considerable number of Japanese films 
were being shown in Korean theatres. All in all, in 2000,25 Japanese features 
were released and captured an impressive 7.4% share of the local market 
(MCT, 2001). Some began to voice concern at this point about the burgeoning 
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popularity of Japanese features, although by this time Korean features were 
also performing well at the local box-office. 
C. THIRD-STAGE OPENING (JUNE 27,2000) 
The major new area covered was TV programmes, although the importable 
programmes were limited to sports, documentaries, and news. Meanwhile, 
cable TV and satellite networks could broadcast films awarded at international 
festivals or released in local theatres. Regarding films, as all films apart from 
adult-only films could be screened in local theatres, along with animations 
that had won prizes at renowned international film festivals. The initial 
expectation that the government would at least defend Korea against the 
highly competitive Japanese animation industry was overturned. 
TABLE 5. Products Included in the Third Stage Opening to Japanese Culture 
" Films rated by Korea's Media Ratings Board as 12+ or 15+ 
" Animated films awarded prizes at selected film festivals 
" Films already granted theatrical release or those awarded prizes at selected 
film festivals or rated for general audiences granted access to cable and 
satellite TV 
"TV programmes such as news, documentaries and sports on cable & satellite TV 
" Cultural performances and publishing 
The third stage opening was more abrupt and much wider in scale than many 
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observers had expected owing to the government's confidence on Korean 
cultural market. However, such confidence did not appear to be shared by 
many from the local industry, who were expressing anxiety over the relatively 
successful performances of Japanese products since 2000. To counter the 
damaging effect on the local industry and relieve such worries among the 
relevant local industries, the government decided to undertake a five-year plan 
devoted to strengthening the local entertainment industry and cultural 
infrastructure, thereby minimising the impacts of the market opening. 
Likewise, with the third phase of market opening to Japanese culture, the new 
changes were putting the local industries concerned on alert, although songs in 
Japanese, TV dramas and entertainment programmes were still prohibited. 
Japanese films had yet to deal a serious blow to the local business because the 
choice of distributors of Japanese films used to be very narrow since only G 
rated (General audience) movies were allowed at local theatres. 
However, with the third step, Japanese films, home videos, publications and 
games began filtering into Korea, so the pressure has been steadily increasing 
with a series of blockbusters opening one after another. Further liberalisation 
was postponed in 2001 following a diplomatic row over Japanese school 
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textbooks that distorted history with an inaccurate portrayal of the colonial 
period, seen as an attempt to cover up past injustices. Moreover, the visit of 
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to a shrine in which war criminals 
had been buried also caused anger in Korea. These political events led the 
Korean government to threaten indefinite suspension of the opening up of 
Korea's market to Japanese pop culture and the lifting of the ban was nearly 
derailed. 
D. FOURTH-STAGE OPENING (JANUARY 1,2004 
In January 2004, almost all restrictions on the import of Japanese culture were 
lifted as newly elected Korean President Roh Moo-hyun pledged to open the 
country's market wider to Japanese popular culture in the summit talk on June 
7,2003. Actually, by early 2002, there had been a conscious effort at 
developing better relations before the co-hosting of the Korea-Japan World 
Cup and the exchange in popular culture had risen sharply. 
TABLE 6. Products Included in the Fourth Stage Opening to Japanese 
Culture 
" TV programmes such as news, documentaries and sports on network TV and 
all programmes including soap operas on cable TV 
" Full opening for music including songs in Japanese lyrics and for games in 
original Japanese version 
" All films including films rated as 18+ by Korea's Media Ratings Board 
" Animated films awarded prizes at selected film festivals 
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With the fourth phase market-opening to Japanese culture, Japanese products 
were expected to flood the local market. The most affected sectors were pop 
music, films and animation, where Japanese products have already secured a 
large fan base among young people in Korea. As the ban on films for adults 
and songs with Japanese lyrics were lifted, all Japanese films and songs can 
now be legally released in Korea. However, the ban on TV programmes and 
animated films was only partly lifted, as their potential influence on the local 
industry was thought to be too great and harmful to domestic competition. 
Although it was political and diplomatic motives that led to the opening up of 
the Korean market to Japanese culture, through this process, the Korean 
government changed its attitude to not only to Japan but also to the role of 
cultural policy. It made a plan to open its market throwing away a 
protectionism-only policy. In advance of its market opening, it supported and 
restructured each sector to prepare for Japanese competition at the same time. 
4.2.3 BIT vs. Quota 
As previously mentioned the screen quota system has been controversial for 
some decades and is still an ongoing issue. Actually, the screen quota system 
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was first introduced in Korea in 1967 but existed in name only with many 
theatres ignoring it and opting to pay the inconsequential fines instead. In fact, 
it was a dead letter up until the establishment of the coalition in 1993, when 
thanks to the so-called Screen Quota Watchers, and their lobbying efforts, the 
screen quota policy began to be enforced. Before around 2000, when the 
Korean film industry was in the doldrums, it was deemed necessary to protect 
the screen quota system. However these days with the renaissance of Korean 
films, the question as to whether this mechanism is actually needed has 
become even more controversial (Korea Herald, July 1,2004). 
With local market share for 2003 at 49.4% (KOFIC, 2003), many theatres 
regularly exceed their quota requirements. Thus, the need to protect them 
through a quota system has diminished. In this context, as President Roh Moo- 
hyun hinted at with his comments during a visit to APEC in October 2003, the 
debate over the screen quota system has arisen again. He termed the situation 
a crisis and tried to persuade people in the cultural industry to come to an 
agreement. The change of the Roh regime's position regarding screen quotas 
is mainly due to economic interests, in relation in particular to the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) with the U. S., which, according to some experts, may 
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bring some $4 billion in foreign investment to Korea. The BIT, which is 
expected to attract more foreign capital and boost the economy, was initially 
discussed in 1998 right after the economic crisis in Korea. However, as the 
U. S. demanded the scrapping of the quota system as a prerequisite for any 
deal at the urging of the Motion Picture Association, a lobby group of 
American film companies, the BIT could not be ratified. 
Korea has an export-driven economy. The auto industry, which accounted for 
some 12 percent of total exports in 2003, has been a major driving force 
behind Korea's export market for long time. The United States' auto market 
has been Korea's largest car export market, accounting for 48 percent of 
Korea's auto exports in 2003 (Korea Times, Feb. 16,2004). It was well- 
known that the reason the government changed its strict position from strong 
protection to market opening to U. S. film distributors in 1987 was mainly 
because it could not risk Korean car exports to the U. S. auto market. 
Consequently, for the nation's economic interest and regardless of cultural 
sovereignty or cultural diversity, the film industry was suddenly opened up 
without any preparation despite the fact that an open-door policy represents an 
irreversible trend. Now around two decades later, the situation is the same but 
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this time Korean government prepared to boost cultural industry with cultural 
policy. 
As seen above, this whole situation is quite similar to that of the skirmish 
between the Korean film industry and the U. S. in 1988 regarding the direct 
distribution of U. S. films to Korea. One difference now is that Korean film 
industry is experiencing a boom, which could in fact work against the Korean 
film industry in the current dispute. Korean filmmakers and actors have been 
strongly opposed to reducing or scrapping the quota, as they believe it has 
been instrumental in the domestic cinema renaissance and any reduction in the 
system will provide a serious blow to film investment and the long-term 
health of the industry (Kim, Hyoungjun interviewed in Nov. 2004, Kim Sohee 
interviewed in Oct. 2004 and Lee Jae-Jin interviewed in Dec. 2004). 
We need, therefore, to take a closer look at the agenda of each side 
(protectionism vs. free trade) in the discussions on screen quotas. First, one 
rationale against the quota system implies that the domestic film market, 
worth an estimated $500 million annually (MCT, 2002), should make 
concessions for a treaty that may boost the economy by eight times that 
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amount. Kwon Tae-shin, deputy finance minister, pushed to remove the 
country's remaining barriers to foreign goods and services as part of efforts to 
liberalise Asia's third-largest economy. He stresses the fact that the Doha 
round of international trade negotiations provided an opportunity for Korea to 
take further steps towards liberalisation. 
During an interview with the Financial Times, Mr Kwon argued that Korea 
has no option but to open its markets and do business with foreign companies. 
Korea has opened most of its markets to foreign goods since the country's 
1997 financial crisis but foreign access to Korea's service and agricultural 
markets remains limited. Mr Kwon pointed to the U. K. as an example of a 
country that had prospered by opening its economy. Drawing a parallel with 
the Wimbledon Tennis Championship, he put emphasis on the fact that `most 
foreign banks in London were foreign-owned but the UK enjoyed the benefit 
of their investment in the city. The UK hosts Wimbledon but the champion is 
always from overseas. You never see a British champion of Wimbledon but 
Britain gets the benefit from hosting the tournament' (Financial Times, Aug. 
12,2003). 
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However, on the other side of the discussion, it is worth noting the argument 
for protectionism. As Chomsky pointed out `the effect of state intervention in 
the economy are much underestimated in standard accounts, which focus 
narrowly on such special cases as protectionism. Even in history of American 
economy, which stands for free market doctrine, government intervention has 
existed and is still going on' (1999: 362). He took an example for this that 
when American economy turned to Great Depression, `business leaders were 
aware that advanced industry cannot satisfactorily exist in a pure, competitive, 
unsubsidized, `free enterprise' economy and that the government is their only 
possible saviour' (Ibid., 364). 
Second, it has been suggested by others, such as the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC), that, as the current screen quota system is a regulation 
that impedes fair market competition, the film market should adopt the 
principle of free market competition. In a study of the Korean Institute for 
Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), economist Oh Jung-il argues that the 
screen quota system is not benefiting the Korean movie industry significantly 
and the recent boom in Korean films is not related to screen quotas (Oh, Jung-il, 
2003). 
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Rather, he claims that the free trade of foreign films and a competitive 
production and distribution system are the reasons behind the success of the 
local film industry. According to the KIET, Spain is one of the few remaining 
countries with a strict screen quota system in Europe, but Spanish films only 
take 13.7 percent of the Spanish market. Japanese films, which are not 
affected by screen quotas, capture 27 percent of Japanese market. Oh also 
added that Mexico's failure to protect its movie industry was not because it 
repealed the screen quota system but because the financial crisis of 1994 
weakened its film industry (ibid. ). 
Third, it is claimed that the competitiveness of Korean films has improved 
significantly and that the industry is viable without such legal protective 
measures, citing the fact that Korean films' domestic market share has been 
hovering above 40 percent level for three consecutive years since 2001. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) said it would not represent a 
major problem to reduce the compulsory Korean movie showing days from 
the current 146 days to 73 per year, a move that U. S. trade officials are 
pushing for in the final stages of negotiations on a South Korea-U. S. bilateral 
investment treaty. 
184 
PART. II Chapter 4. Globalisation and Korean TV & Film Policy 
On the contrary, the reasons that supporters of the quota system believe it 
should be preserved are as follows. First, the screen quota system acts as a 
Maginot line, protecting cultural diversity. As all other aspects of domestic 
filmmaking, including production, import, distribution and screening, are 
completely open, the reduction or abolition of screen quotas would lead to the 
dominance of U. S. films in the local market causing Korean moviegoers to see 
a less diverse range of films. 
Moreover, the evidence to suggest that a BIT will lead to an investment of $4 
billion (Oh, Jung-il 2003) is not definite. Even if the deal was worth as much 
as some experts predict, the country should not sacrifice its domestic film 
industry, which is Korea's industry of the future. Pierre Rissient, a film 
director who is an advisor for the Cannes Film Festival, asserts that the 
Korean film industry's marvellous progress should not be reversed by 
reducing or scrapping the screen quota system, citing the collapse of the 
Indonesian and Taiwanese film industries as examples (Korea Times, June 17, 
2003). 
From this perspective, the former Minister of Culture and Tourism, Lee 
Chang-dong (2005), argues that the quota issue is a cultural one, so it should 
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be kept separate from the economic treaty negotiations. Lee, a former film 
director, has continuously insisted that the quota system remain unchanged 
despite U. S. pressure, comparing Hollywood movies to a `Dinosaur' that 
destroys the ecosystem. He argues that devising a method that counters the 
huge distribution and marketing advantage Hollywood companies have is a 
global issue and screen quotas may be an alternative to this. Thus, maintaining 
the screen quota system has contributed to the remarkable diversity of films 
available to viewers in Korea (ibid. ). 
Second, although Korean films have gained a larger following, supporters 
claim that they still will not be able to compete with Hollywood films, which 
account for 80 percent of the world's film market. Thus, it is claimed to be 
unfair that the BIT is to put Korean films on the same competitive plane with 
the U. S. directors and producers. Director and producer Kang Woo-suk 
emphasises that the Korean film market, in which Korean companies do not 
play a dominant role, would not be able to suddenly change from shoestring 
industry to sustainable industry with its own stable and healthy infrastructure. 
He refuted the suggestion that if the market share of Korean films passes the 
50% mark for 5 years continuously, then it would be reasonable to discuss 
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reduction of screen quotas (Maeil Business Newspaper, Feb. 11,2004). Film 
industry representatives also broadly agree with this, predicting a severe blow 
to the development of the film industry if the quota system is removed. Kim 
Mee Hyun (2003), policy researcher in KOFIC, argues that it is still premature 
to reduce the screen quota for local films. 
Third, it is argued that the guarantee of a certain number of screenings has 
made domestic companies willing to invest more at the production level and 
has raised the overall quality of Korean films. Along with other factors, it is 
said that this accounted for the increase in market share for domestic films 
from 15.9 percent in 1993 to more than 40 percent at present. It is certain that 
today is the golden age of Korean film. However, it is not a guaranteed fact 
that this will continue. Korean directors have made many splendid movies on 
the back of heavy investment. 
However, if a distributor is not interested, it will inevitably fail. Korean 
distributors are prone to focus on short-term returns, which is not helpful to 
the genuine development of the Korean movie industry. Local cinemas are 
more concerned with proven foreign box office hits, so it is easier and safer to 
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run Hollywood movies. Producer Jonathon Kim also feels `Korean films 
would otherwise be crushed by the Hollywood machine' (Interviewed in Nov. 
2004). 
Up until now, we have seen issues of cultural policy and the process of its 
implementation since the Kim Dae-jung administration. As seen above, since 
the Kim Dae-jung regime, the Korean cultural industry has undergone a series 
of substantial changes in policy in the name of liberalisation. TV and film 
policies in Korea have given priority to economic and political interests over 
cultural ones. 
To examine the government's objective for cultural policy in this context, it is 
worth referring to President Kim Dae-jung's inaugural speech (Korea Herald, 
Feb. 26,1998). In his speech, he emphasised that it was necessary to `pour the 
nation's energy into globalising Korean culture so as to keep expanding trade, 
investment, tourism and cultural exchanges in order to make our way in the 
age of boundless competition, which will take place against a backdrop of 
cooperation' (ibid. ). Here, the basic rationale lay in the conception that 
`culture is one of the rising industries of the 21st century and unique cultural 
commodities are a treasure trove for which a limitless market is awaiting' 
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(ibid. ). 
Accordingly, he pledged to aggressively nurture the development of the 
cultural industry. He kept his word. With the current boom in Korean pop 
culture in Asia, it is widely conceived that the widespread success of a cultural 
product can be compared to the annual sales output of a decent business 
corporation. For example, the Korean singer BoA as a cultural product has 
earned over $1 billion in Japan alone on the back of her 15 releases, two 
regular albums, nine singles and three special albums (Korea Herald, 2004, 
Jan. 7; Feb. 7). 
Likewise, Kim thought of the cultural industry a driving force for economic 
development in tandem with Internet technology. This was confirmed around 
three years later in another address entitled `Let Us Forge Our Future Through 
Reform and Harmony, ' to mark the 56th anniversary of Korea's liberation 
from Japanese colonial rule on August 15,2001. 
We are now living in an age of limitless competition. The only way to 
safeguard our survival is to continue reform and maintain a healthy 
economy. In this way, we will also be able to get out of the slump in exports. 
In the past, we depended mainly on semi-conductors, shipbuilding, 
automobiles, iron and steel and textiles for exports. But in the future, we 
must develop such next-generation growth industries as IT, bioengineering, 
cultural content (my italics), environmental technology and nano 
technology in parallel. .... The 21st century will also be an age of the 
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culture industry. Right now, a 'Korean boom' is sweeping China, Vietnam 
and other Southeast Asian countries. Taking this as an opportunity, we will 
push the development of the culture industry, which is known as an 
industry without smokestack (my italics). The Government contributed to 
efforts to improve our nation's image abroad and the earnings of our 
citizens by preparing the World Cup in 2002 and the Busan Asian Games 
well (Maeil Business Newspaper, Aug. 15,2001). 
According to the Cultural Contents Promotion Institution, the animation 
market has already surpassed the shipbuilding industry in output, and is also 
expected to have surpassed the semiconductor market by 2005 (MCT, 2004). 
However, Korea has only a 1.5 percent share of the world's cultural contents 
market. President Suh, Byoung-moon of the Korea Culture & Content Agency 
(KOCCA) estimated that annual income per capita would reach $20,000 if 
only the figure of Korea's share of the global cultural contents market went up 
to 5 percent (Korea Times, Sep. 13,2003). Thus, Korean cultural policy was 
and is still designed with more economic and even political objectives in mind 
than cultural ones per se. 
In this respect, the introduction of digital TV is another example. In 2000, the 
then senior presidential secretary for economic affairs Kang Bong-kyun's 
comment on the introduction of digital TV reveals government thinking on the 
matter. He said that `although there has been opposition to the early start of 
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digital TV broadcasts from broadcasting circles, it should start in 2001 at the 
latest, timed with the plans of the United States and Japan' (Hanguere, 2000). 
Kang asserted that Korea is 10 years behind Taiwan in colour TV broadcasting 
due to political conflict and, as a result, trails Taiwan in colour TV set exports. 
In his opinion, the faster adoption of digital broadcasting would have a 
positive impact on the nation's economy, given the fact that domestic set-top 
box manufacturers and digital TV makers would have a better chance of 
increasing the export volume of the products. 
With regard to the Korea-Japan World Cup in 2002, it was, needless to say, a 
golden opportunity to present Korea's standing in the high-tech broadcasting 
arena. When it came to the 2002 World-Cup, Korea did not miss its chance to 
boost the economy by way of sales of digital TVs and facilities. Despite 
lingering scepticism over the World Cup-induced economic boom, the 
tournament was big bonus for domestic consumer electronics makers such as 
Samsung and LG Electronics in sales of digital TVs. Additionally, the 
government and digital satellite broadcaster Skylife launched trial operations 
of interactive data broadcasting services, which is an essential step toward 
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complete digital satellite broadcasting, thereby making the most of the event 
in order to boost consumer interest in digital TV. 
In policy-making in general in Korea, when the government decides to boost 
or support specific sectors, it is estimated in advance that these industries, 
using the government support, would create certain volume of revenue and 
new jobs. This trend of policy-making has been applied to cultural policy as 
well. For example, the introduction of digital television was pushed by the 
government and the media sector because it was expected to cause a 
production generation effect of around $11 billion in the broadcasting 
equipment and the broadcasting services industries, exporting $30 billion in 
digital TV equipment with a net trade surplus of $19 billion over the five 
years from 2001. 
In terms of employment, it was predicted that 173,000 new positions would 
open in the broadcast engineering and digital broadcasting sectors. Under the 
trend of liberalisation, in the rationale of cultural policy, economic concerns 
have priority over cultural ones. The move from quota system to BIT reflects 
a belief that an unregulated market will serve Korea's economic interests 
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better than protectionism. Even opponents accept this economic rationale, 
defending the quota as a means to protect the economic health of Korea's film 
industry, not as a means of protecting Korean film culture. 
When it comes to the impacts of opening the market to Japanese cultural 
products, these have not been as big as expected and indeed somewhat 
lukewarm, as briefly mentioned in the previous section. After the third stage 
of the Korean open door policy to Japanese pop culture, such worries as seen 
above have been relieved mainly because the level of import has not much 
increased. As for films, the Japanese films that began to be released in Korean 
theatres in limited numbers from 1998 have not yet had a serous impact on the 
local industry. 
In the first stage of opening the market, Japanese films gained just 3 per cent 
of the South Korean market, suggesting that Japanese media companies could 
find it difficult to exploit the new opportunities in Asia's third-largest 
economy. As the Japanese films which could be shown in Korea were limited 
to those awarded top prizes at Cannes, Venice or Berlin, the impact was very 
minimal at the box office, in contrast to the press frenzy and worries from 
within the film industry. This was mainly because those films were more art 
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movies than popular ones. 
Furthermore, generally, there was has been an apparent waning of interest in 
Japanese features since the first and second opening, although much of this is 
likely due to the particular features which were released. Another persuasive 
reason for the lukewarm effect of Japanese cultural products was that many 
Japanese products, particularly animations, pop songs and comics, have 
already been available illegally, so many young people, who are most keen to 
access Japanese pop culture, have long since seen most of the products that 
were released since official market opening. Therefore, official market 
opening did not lead to a drastic flood of Japanese cultural products yet. 
However, as nearly all Japanese films could be released in Korea after the 
third measure of opening, Japanese films were able to gain more market share 
than before. Around the year 2000, a series of Japanese blockbusters, such as 
Ring2, Godzilla 2000, and international director Hayao Miyazaki's massive 
hit animations Nausicaa and Princess Mononoke, were rushed to release in 
Korea. In 2002 in particular, as Spirited Away gained success, Japanese films 
won back a more substantial share of the market, and in 2003 a more balanced 
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success was achieved. Likewise, Japanese cultural products in general are not 
sweeping across the Korean Peninsula, as was previously feared, but are 
expanding their impact by a process of gradual market integration. 
As for the TV industry, since the Kim Dae-jung regime, liberalisation and the 
deregulation of the TV market have become key words for preparing for the 
new information age. Though the Korean TV industry still operates in a 
protected media landscape because of Korea's long monopolistic government 
system and despite its role as public sphere to safeguard the plurality of voices 
and national identity, it is also changing. In the case of foreign ownership 
under the new Integrated Broadcasting Act, restrictions have been gradually 
reduced. For example, for cable operators, satellite operators and programme 
providers (excluding the comprehensive programming channels and the 
specialised programme news providers), investment or contribution of 
property by foreigners is allowed up to 33% of the total stocks or equity 
shares of the relevant corporation. Regarding network operators, foreigners 
may own up to 49% of the total stocks or equity shares of the relevant 
corporation, while foreign investment in terrestrial broadcasters is prohibited. 
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In relation to widening foreign broadcast services, the new Act establishes a 
new regulatory framework for foreign channel retransmission, stating that 
cable and satellite operators are permitted to receive and retransmit foreign 
channels with authorisation from the KBC. In March 2001, the KBC allowed 
the Korean language subtitling of the foreign channels' programmes in the 
viewers' interest. However, the re-transmission of the Korean-dubbed 
programmes on foreign channels is prohibited. As for foreign channel 
retransmission, the law states that the number of channels assigned to foreign 
channels shall not exceed the rate of 10 percent of the total operating channels. 
Accordingly, the available channel capacity of the cable and satellite carriers 
for foreign channels varies from four to eight. 
With the government's encouragement and the softening of regulations on 
foreign investment since Kim Dae-jung regime, international media agencies 
have aggressively entered the local market by forming strategic alliances, 
share purchases and acquisition. Under this trend, the content industry is 
adapting itself to the multi-channel and multi-media era and so globalisation is 
accelerating. Foreign firms have been tapping into the lucrative content 
market in Korea. In 2002, the local media content market, including 
196 
PART. H Chapter 4. Globalisation and Korean TV & Film Policy 
broadcasting, game software, recorded music, animation and movies, 
currently amounts to $12 billion a year (Sim, 2002). 
The content business is witnessing a large expansion in demand for 
entertainment in line with the development of technology and changes in 
lifestyle. The SERI report pinpoints that AOL Time Warner, the world's 
largest media group, has stepped up its marketing in Korea, distributing 
everything from movies to toys to books. Movie cable channel HBO has also 
gained in popularity in the local cable market through its partnership with 
local cable giant On Media. Walt Disney is reportedly considering entering the 
domestic animation market under a strategy to jumpstart the animation market 
in Asia. Its sporting channel ESPN has already built up a successful 
partnership with local terrestrial network MBC. 
The French media giant Vivendi Universal is striving to strengthen its leading 
status in the nation's online game market on the back of the outstanding 
popularity of StarCraft among Korean online games, which was developed by 
its affiliate Blizzard Entertainment. News Corporation, the Australian owner 
of the satellite channel STAR TV, looked into the local digital broadcasting 
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sector as its first step into the market, although this move was ultimately 
unsuccessful. Sony and Microsoft are rivalling for the local game console 
market. 
Conclusion 
As seen above, market opening has had various impacts on Korean society 
since the end of 1990. In particular, it led to the liberalisation of the Korean 
cultural industry, not only internally but also externally. How has this change 
taken place? The major factor to consider here is probably that cultural 
globalisation, as it has elsewhere, has swept over South Korea. This, no doubt, 
has to do with the recent opening of the country's domestic market. 
Up until 1988, the screening of movies from Hollywood or Hong Kong had 
always been controlled and limited by the government. However, the 1988 
Seoul Olympics, as seen above, brought about a major transformation in the 
Korean film industry. The government tried to open those markets to cope 
with the trend of liberalisation through mega-events such as the Olympics and 
the World Cup. As import restrictions on foreign films were lifted following 
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Hollywood direct distribution, for the first time, Korean films had to compete 
directly with Hollywood releases. 
Since Hollywood majors were allowed to distribute their films directly into 
Korea in 1987, Korean cultural policy has been changed, moving the industry 
away from a system strictly controlled by the government to a gradually 
liberalised one. In 1988, after U. S. film companies won the right to direct 
distribution, the Korean government intensified the screen quota system, 
which legally required Korean film exhibition from 121 to 146 days a year to 
safeguard against the dominance of Hollywood films. The Seoul Olympics 
and the Korea-Japan World Cup had a significant influence on Korean cultural 
policy as well as on the economy and society in line with Roche's (2000: 7) 
argument that mega-events such as the Olympics and Expo have been one of 
the main vehicles of cultural globalisation. 
In this context, the screen quota system can be considered a critical tool to 
help understand how Korean cultural policy has responded to pressure from 
outside and illustrate the politics of liberalisation and protectionist policy. 
Recently, as the debate has grown more serious after the government moved 
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to remove the screen quota system, Korea seems to have become an arena of 
collision between two ideologies, free market versus protection, or economy 
versus culture. As for TV, the ownership of MBC under government control 
was given over to public committee and shortly later a commercial TV 
network was established. 
In the last decade, Korea like other developing countries has come to taste the 
severity of the changed conditions of international trade. With the outbreak of 
a foreign currency crisis in 1997, there was a turnaround in circumstances so 
that Kim Dae-jung's new government could implement neo-liberal policies in 
almost every sector of Korean society. This meant, among other things, that 
Korea now had to remove tariff barriers and find its competitive leverage 
somewhere else. Such neo-liberal policies as the restructuring of corporations, 
the privatisation of the public sector, the opening of financial markets, and the 
flexibilisation of the labour market soon followed, fundamentally affecting 
Korean society (Korea Times, Feb. 21,2001). 
Most of all, as many Koreans had been worrying about by-products such as 
the import of violent or obscene material and the devastation of the Korean 
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cultural industry, the government made an effort to minimise the impact of 
market opening on the local industry. For example, Korean law still allows for 
the assessment of Japanese products such as the screening of a film or a 
concert, to make sure they are presentable to an audience. 
Especially, when it comes to the film and animation industries, the 
government has fostered film making as a venture industry since 1998, 
intensified training programmes for young filmmakers, and helped release 
Korean movies in foreign markets. In this regard, economic opening did not 
have to mean cultural opening. While encouraging economic liberalisation, 
the Korean government held back from social liberalisation, retaining strict 
moral controls. Korean `opening' under Kim (unlike previously) was carefully 
controlled and negative consequences were anticipated and addressed. 
Likewise, opening the market has consequently compelled the government to 
realign and intensify the industrial infrastructure of the TV and film industries 
with urgent necessity. The Korean TV and film industries in particular have 
evolved dramatically since the Kim Dae-jung regime. However, during that 
period, market opening was quite different from that before Kim Dae-jung 
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regime because the government perspective on the cultural industry had 
changed a great deal, and certainly to the benefit of the industry. Under Kim's 
regime, the cultural industry became a driving engine for boosting the Korean 
economy. 
To be sure, market opening represented a big threat for those local industries 
concerned but at the same time provided considerable momentum for the 
realignment of the local industry and the building of a sustainable industry 
infrastructure. Removal of barriers to Japanese culture would be surely an 
important symbolic step towards favourable relations between Korea and 
Japan. However, it was completely political and economic matter, as we have 
seen. Again the rationale is economic development, not cultural development 
or protection. 
The aforementioned adoption of new media such as digital TV will certainly 
benefit the consumer, but is intended primarily to increase Korea's share of 
that particular market. That is why, in recent times, most governments have 
been rushing to introduce and expand digital television in their countries. 
Consequently, in practice, Korean cultural policy and the cultural industry 
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appear driven more by economic or political interests than by a need to protect 
Korean culture. 
Likewise, the government made efforts not only to minimise the potential 
dangers of market opening but also to make the most of it as a big opportunity 
to elaborate aggressive strategies for attracting foreign investment. The 
Korean government's decision in this regard also reflects its confidence that 
the thriving Korean cultural industry has become strong enough to survive 
increased competition and can even benefit from new ideas imported from 
Japan and the U. S. 
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CHAPTER 5. WHAT MADE `HANRYU' POSSIBLE? 
The previous chapter introduced in broad brushstrokes the historical 
development and policy changes in the TV and film industries, highlighting the 
challenges and responses in each sector in the name of neo-liberalisation under 
globalisation. Based on that overview, this chapter is going to move on to 
analyse how Korea, which has been a heavy importer of cultural products for a 
long time, could become a rising exporter, especially to other Asian countries. 
Taking this further, this chapter is divided into two sections which will look at 
the external and internal factors in the Korean wave, Hanryu. The main factors 
that made Hanryu possible will be examined in the context of both sets of 
factors. Through this, I believe this chapter will provide us with an historical 
analysis of how the `Hermit Kingdom' has been changed from a post-colony 
which used to passively receive other cultures to a rising regional player, 
producing highly globalised cultural products. 
The first section on external factors contributing to Hanryu consists of three 
sub-sections, namely cultural similarity, Asian economic expansion and global 
capitalism, and consumer culture. In the second section, the internal factors 
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which have played a role in Hanryu will be examined in the context of an 
analysis of the Korean domestic situation. This analysis is mainly based on 
interviews that were conducted with leading figures in the Korean TV and film 
industries, mainly from August 2003 to mid-2005, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis (see Appendices for interviewee list). In addition, 
some theoretical reflections on the internal and external factors in the rise of 
Hanryu will be suggested. Why has the sudden popularity of Korean films, TV 
dramas and music occurred in Asian countries in recent times? Experts and 
leaders in this field are diverse in their opinions but do agree to some extent. 
Based on the analysis of interviews, data and literature reviews, this chapter 
concludes with three main external factors as outlined in the following sections. 
5.1 External Factors behind `HANRYU' 
5.1.1 Cultural Similarity 
It can be argued that under globalisation cultural difference is disappearing and 
that populations everywhere are increasingly subjected to the same global 
culture as markets and industries become more intensely connected in the 
process of globalisation, as mentioned earlier. This view is correct in some 
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senses but again, I should say, seems quite controversial because we still have 
our own national traditions and specific ethos, which make us different from 
other peoples and makes the world variegated. While American products 
undoubtedly have significant worldwide distribution, they fail to prevail in 
markets where strong local content is available. As mentioned in chapter one, 
there is ample evidence to demonstrate viewer preference for local programmes, 
showing that national audiences usually prefer television programmes produced 
nationally or in the national language to imported programmes (Moran: 1996; 
Becker and Shoenbeck 1989; Ferguson 1992; and Silj 1988). 
In Korea, particularly since the 1990s, programmes directly imported from the 
USA have not worked as well as in other countries, with a few occasional 
exceptions. In this context, parallel logic then suggests that local audiences tend 
to be more attracted to cultural products that are quite similar to their own over 
unfamiliar ones. This suggests that Korean TV dramas and films have been 
popular in the Asian region as opposed to other continents such as America and 
Europe because Asian people feel closer to Korean culture than to Western and 
to some extent Japanese culture. 
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In the case of China in particular. Korea is geographically very close to China 
and the two countries have a long history of cultural exchange. For example, 
Chinese characters were introduced and used before the Korean King Sejong 
invented the unique Korean system of writing, Hangeul. With the Chinese 
character system. Confucianism was also delivered into Korea and these two 
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had a huge influence on Korean society, particularly in relation to ideology, 
beliefs and culture. Therefore, this proximity could reduce the `cultural 
discount' on Korean cultural products. Owing to the high degree of cultural 
proximity, the narratives of Korean dramas also reflect life in other Asian 
countries like China, Japan and Thailand and this makes other Asian audiences 
empathise easily with Korean contents (Liu and Chen, 2004: 58). Accordingly, 
the recent Korean boom in Asian countries such as China, Japan and Taiwan 
can be understood in this context. Lisa Fan, a student from Cian in China, said 
that `she often watched Korean soap operas as she felt comfortable with them 
and did not have a feeling of distance, since Korean and Chinese cultures were 
similar' (interviewed in Nov. 2003). 
Korean entertainers also appeal to Asian audiences as a result of this cultural 
familiarity, as well as having a similar appearance. The Korean singer BoA, 
who is at the forefront of Hanryu in Japan, is a representative case. When she 
debuted in Japan several years ago, Japanese audiences found her familiar 
because her appearance is similar to that of Japanese people and she speaks 
fluent Japanese. Since her debut, BoA has topped the Oricon singles chart, the 
Japanese version of the Billboard singles chart, and the album charts several 
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times since 2002. This made her the first singer from outside of Japan to reach 
number one on the chart, having outsold Mariah Carey in album sales in Japan 
for the past two years (Korea Times, March 1,2005). 
Moreover, with this regional popularity, she became a new sneaker model for 
the Asian market in Japan, replacing Britney Spears as a result of a `glocal' 
marketing strategy. Even now, some Japanese people still think she is Japanese. 
Her popularity shows that an Asian star can appeal more to Asian audiences 
than Western superstars because their appearance and cultural background are 
more familiar. This can also appeal especially to older generations of Asian 
consumers who tend to feel unfamiliarity with Western culture and Western stars 
(BBC News, Nov. 14,2002; Korea Times, March 11,2004). Some Korean stars 
such as Bae Yong-Jun, Kim Hee-sun, Jang Dong-gun, and Won Bin are even 
more popular than Hollywood superstars in some Asian countries and their fans 
are not limited to teenagers but are popular across a broad range of age groups 
(Newsweek, May 3,2004). 
In this respect, Prof. Yun Hong of Qinghua University in Beijing said that 
`Chinese tend not to directly adopt culture from the West due to cultural 
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differences but they can easily embrace Korean pop culture, as it combines Asia 
and the West' (New York Times, February 22,2004). Jerry Hsiao (29), an IT 
contents developer, also agrees that `Taiwanese people feel distant from 
Americans, who have different skin colours, and have a kind of antagonistic 
feeling toward Japanese people' (Interviewed in Oct. 2003). Likewise, Korean 
culture is not viewed as threatening when compared with Western culture 
because of cultural similarity, and is more eagerly received than Japanese 
products because of Japanese colonialism in Asia. 
In short, the cultural similarity between Korea and other Asian countries has 
worked in favour of the recent surge of Hanryu in Asia, reducing cultural 
discount on Korean soap operas and films. Likewise, Korea's experience under 
colonisation becomes a new source of cultural resonance and strength. Thus, 
cultural similarity outweighs political difference. In particular, both the 
relationship between Japan and Korea and cultural policy on opening has 
changed from one-way flow to two-way flow and from emphasis on culture to 
emphasis on economy and diplomacy. Therefore, how Korea has internalised 
Western and Japanese influences through a kind of `reverse flow' will be 
highlighted in the next chapter. 
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5.1.2 Asian Economic Growth and the Media Boom 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Asia experienced the rapid development and 
opening up of its economies. The rise of the Asian economies has had a critical 
impact on the exchange of cultural products in the peripheries over the last 
decade. Satellite in particular is at the forefront of abolishing distance and 
allowing the linking of remote territories into new viewing communities. Thus, 
the advent of multi-channelling and the convergence of delivery platforms on a 
global scale have increased the demand for content and diversified the platforms 
by which content is distributed and accessed. Simply speaking, the increase in 
the number of channels means an increase in contents demand. 
Therefore, with the inception of industry outlets such as cable TV, pay TV and 
satellites in developing countries, U. S. TV programmes and films are needed, 
and at the same time, there is a demand for programmes from new sources in 
other regional centres. The demand from Asian countries for contents from 
Hong Kong and Japan is a case in point. Recently, Korea has also joined this 
trend as contents provider in Asia, leading to the creation of a new term, Hanryu. 
Thus, to make matters short, it can be argued that Hanryu resulted partly from 
the Asian multimedia boom, underway since the 1990s. Furthermore, the 
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president of KOCCA (Korea Culture & Contents Agency), Byungmoon Suh, 
points out that the increase in demand for cultural content has expanded 
information infrastructures and helped the rapid growth of the Internet and 
mobile communications, which are the two major factors enabling Korea to 
become an emerging cultural powerhouse (Korea Times, Sep. 13,2003). 
According to data from Liu and Chen's study (2004: 62-63), Korean 
programmes occupied 1.10 per cent of total Taiwan programming, though 
domestic production is the major source of television programming comprising 
85.19 per cent of the total, with programmes from other countries occupied just 
below 15 per cent as of May 2002. Among other countries, Hong Kong ranks 
top comprising 6.86 per cent together with Japan (6.37%), and followed by the 
U. S. A. (1.89%) and Mainland China (0.42%). More telling here is the fact that 
Korea has recently started to export more programmes to Asian countries than 
China and not much less than the U. S. A., which has been a major player in the 
programmes trade. At this point, more explanation on Japanese programmes in 
Taiwan is needed. As in Korea, the Taiwanese government had applied a ban on 
Japanese cultural products. However, whereas Korea banned Japanese cultural 
imports until 1998, Taiwan had opened its cultural borders by 1992 and the next 
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year effectively rationalised the Cable Television Law, leading to Japanese 
formats and genres, culturally closer to the Taiwanese than Western 
programmes, gaining a strong foothold on Taiwan's burgeoning cable and 
satellite channels (ibid. ). 
As above, as T. D. Lee (1998) argues, the increasing demand for audiovisual 
content in Taiwan did not automatically transform into support for the domestic 
audiovisual industry but speeded up the importation of overseas dramas and 
films for cable and satellite TV. Likewise, in the case of Taiwan, with the 
emergence and impact of a large number of cable channels on Taiwan's limited 
commercial market, many stations were unwilling to invest heavily in 
programme production and began to outsource television programming. A 
survey of drama programmes broadcast during prime time (8pm to 9pm) over 
19 channels in 2002 (Tsai, 2002) reveals that only 7 out of 19 dramas were 
produced domestically, while the other 12 dramas were all sourced in Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea, and China. The contrast with Taiwan reveals how the 
careful timing and planning of cultural policy was needed to open the market. 
In this context, Liu and Chen (2004: 72-73) argue that Korean drama has been 
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influential in Taiwan due to its cheaper cost in comparison with Japanese drama. 
Because of restricted budgets, Taiwan cable channels seek cheaper programme 
alternatives and the Korean programmes represent better value than Japanese 
programmes. Therefore, an increase in contents demand from Asian countries 
along with the advent of the multi-media age made Korean cultural products, 
which are comparatively cheap but of good quality, very popular. For example, 
in 2000, the price of Korean TV drama in Taiwan was about USD 1,000 for a 
one-hour show, while Japanese's dramas cost an average USD 10,000 in 2000 
(Hu 2005: 168). Such low prices in the late 1990s were not deliberate but 
natural because until then Korean drama had not received much attention from 
abroad and so the price was relatively low. 
Economic improvement and the media boom in Asia helped provide a revived 
market for cultural programmes in general. Korean TV programmes and films 
took advantage of this new market opportunity and outperformed neighbouring 
countries because of a deliberate, planned approach to market opening by policy 
makers. To demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach, it is interesting to 
note that by 2005, the price for Korean dramas in Taiwan had skyrocketed to 
from USD 1,000 in 2000 to USD 20,000 an hour (MCT, 2006). Naturally, it 
cannot be said that these external circumstances are the only reason that Korean 
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cultural products became popular in Asian countries; rather they represented an 
opportunity to which Korean exporters and government regulators responded 
effectively. 
5.1.3 Global Capitalism and Consumer Culture 
Wherever we go around the world, we tend to see almost the same looks and 
styles among various peoples, especially when it comes to metropolitan cities 
such as Los Angeles, London, Paris, Tokyo and Seoul. People on the street look 
strikingly similar. National culture has been more and more eclipsed by a 
consumer culture that is rapidly becoming global. Kang Nae-hui, Professor at 
Chungang University in Korea, maintains that `over the last few years, the 
ethnic features of young Koreans fundamentally changed. Unless you are very 
street-wise, chances are that you will not be able to distinguish Koreans from 
foreigners. Not a few young Koreans nowadays look foreign to us Koreans' 
(Korea Times, Feb. 21,2001). 
In this vein, we can also understand why many young Koreans have such 
interest in Japanese culture, at times on the verge of mania, regardless of the old 
generation's antipathy towards Japan and Japanese culture. Young South 
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Koreans and Japanese are the principal consumers of one another's cultures. It's 
not just that global consumer culture eclipses national identities, but that Korean 
openness to other cultures has correlated to other countries' willingness to 
accept Korean culture. There is a reciprocal relationship of globalisation. 
Korea's colonial past and the influence of U. S. culture in turn allow it to 
influence other cultures. Chinese youths are also not much different from their 
Korean counterparts in that both are keen to consume modernity and global 
capitalism. This trend is described well in the newspaper excerpt below: 
Imitating South Korean stars is also a must for the Chinese youth. Korean stars 
are in fashion on Wangfujing Street in Beijing, a Chinese equivalent of Seoul's 
hustling and bustling Myongdong, where you can see young Chinese who have 
dyed their hair to try to resemble their Korean idols. They are also seen holding 
accessories that bear the names and pictures of their Korean heroes. "On 
Wangfujing Street, many Chinese youths wear stylish fashion like their Korean 
idols and they like it, " said Jiao Ning, 15, a student of Beijing Jian Yuan 
Fazhong school (Korea Times, Aug. 23,2001). 
The emergence of young consumer groups in Asian countries is another main 
factor behind `Hanryu'. Along with rapid economic development, their 
aspirations to consume modernity have been growing fast. Prof. Cho Han, H. J. 
of Yonsei University (2003) attributed the spread of Hanryu to a newfound 
interest in Asian cultural products by Asian peoples who have undergone a 
similar process of modernisation and hybridisation. 
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With regard to this, Iwabuchi (2004: 211) echoes strongly that `the pleasure of 
feeling the same and dissimilar requires the minimum economic strength that 
enables people to enjoy consumer modernity. The disparity in economic and 
cultural power between the haves and have-nots has been despairingly widened, 
and the disparity itself has been left out of commentaries on global media 
communications. ' Because this disparity is less pronounced between Asian 
countries with a similar cultural history, the resistance to cultural exchange has 
been reduced. 
The younger generation is less inhibited by orthodox thinking and is thus more 
adventurous in their consumption behaviours. As a result, these consumers are 
more willing to purchase foreign products, and are more open to their influence. 
In the same context, professor H. J. Kim of Chugye University for the Arts 
emphasises that Korean pop culture is seen as edgy and fresh, especially for 
Chinese and Southeast Asian youths that have been longing for something 
different from overseas, in terms of both quality and style, as the world grows 
closer as a result of globalisation (Interviewed in April 2005). As Iwabuchi 
notes above, Korean cultural products represent something different yet also 
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similar, satisfying a desire for novelty alongside a need for reassurance and 
recognition. Yoo J. R., director general of the culture industry bureau of the 
Culture and Tourism Ministry, agrees with Professor Kim that Hanryu has been 
creating a favourable image of Korea within Asia. He claims that `there is a 
chasm between the young and old generations in China and Southeast Asian 
countries. They do not have what it takes to satisfy the cultural demands of the 
youth. Since Korean culture suits their emotional and cultural psyche, Korean 
dramas and films are gaining popularity' (Interviewed in 2003). Likewise, 
recent Korean pop culture is basically youth-oriented culture, so this theory is 
quite persuasive. 
However, as the trend continues, the audience range has also been slowly 
expanding to include young adults and even the older generations, as is the case 
in Japan. Jin Jai-soo, an official with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism said, 
`when the young people today have political power and are running our 
societies, then we will feel the full impact of this cultural exchange' 
(Interviewed in Sep. 2003). What strategies can be adapted for cultural products 
in peripheral countries like Korea be adopted to protect their identities from 
being commodified? According to the cultural imperialism argument, the global 
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marketing of cultural products will spread a single regime of cultural values as 
well as cultural products themselves around the world and this will entail the 
destruction of cultural identity and diversity (Dorfman and Mattelart, 1975). 
However, consumers tend not just to receive cultural products passively, but to 
select and adapt them based on their own desires, tastes and interests. Even 
official bans on Western cultural products are often not sufficient to keep such 
products from entering the country, just as Japanese culture continued to 
infiltrate Korea during the official ban on Japanese cultural products. 
Likewise, although consumers or audiences in periphery may seem to be 
manipulated into buying cultural products which are alien to them and 
destructive to their cultures, in fact they are actively employing consumer goods 
to express and forge their own unique cultural identities. The term hybridisation 
is used to refer to this process of the indigenisation of cultural products 
(Hannerz 1992; Willis 1990). Furthermore, consumers can, to some extent, 
creatively construct their own identities through the products they consume. 
5.2 Internal Factors Behind `Hanryu' 
As seen above, several external factors have influenced the boom in Korean 
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cultural products in Asia. However, these factors cannot fully explain their 
recent success. That is, those three external factors have existed for quite a long 
time and could be seen as advantages for any Asian country, not just Korea. For 
example, Indonesia or Hong Kong could also benefit from these factors. In this 
case, we might well ask just why it is that Korean cultural products have 
experienced such huge success overseas in recent times. There must be other 
critical factors involved as well as these external ones. Without the occurrence 
of a fundamental shift in the Korean domestic market, the external factors 
discussed earlier could not be seen to be advantages. Therefore, in this section, I 
will discuss the internal factors that made the recent success of Korean cultural 
products possible. 
5.2.1 Economic Crisis of 1997: The Search for Foreign Markets 
The extent to which the current success of Korean cultural products is an 
outgrowth of the 1997-1998 Korean economic crisis is little understood. Here, it 
is worth noting President Kim Dae-jung's perspective regarding the necessity of 
economic reform, which had a massive impact on the cultural sector, and as 
seen briefly in the previous chapter. In 1999, President Kim argued that foreign 
investment was vital for the national security of the divided nation and for 
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revitalising the troubled economy of South Korea, emphasising that the world 
was changing from economic nationalism to borderless globalism, and that as a 
result, the people would have to shed their parochial and narrow-minded 
nationalism (MBN, Feb. 22,1999). Essentially, his argument was that by 
attracting as much foreign investment as possible, Korea could become one of 
the world's industrialised economies rather than an economic colony of foreign 
superpowers. Such encouragement of foreign investment was justifiable in the 
context of the Korean economic crisis, which started as a foreign currency 
crisis. 
Thus, the government desperately sought to obtain foreign investment. However, 
foreign investment could not be obtained for nothing. It came at the cost of 
tremendous economic and socio-political transformation. The cultural industry 
also had to cope with this Asian economic crisis. Local producers could not help 
pushing themselves to turn out more commercially-oriented products. 
Essentially, their financial need has driven them to put more emphasis on the 
entertainment value and quality aspects of their productions. At the same time, 
in order to secure financial investment, they also needed to make a commitment 
to open and clear finance and accounting. Thus, the post-crisis revival that has 
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taken place since 1997 brought back the creativity of the 1960s in more 
marketable forms, targeting both overseas and domestic audiences. In this 
context, Tami Overby, executive director of the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Seoul, says that `the economic crisis spurred the Korean film 
industry to do things they would have done anyway, but they did it faster. It is 
no coincidence that Korea is now a global leader (Newsweek, May 3,2004)'. 
The Asian economic crisis also forced producers in the cultural industry to rely 
on Korean cultural products. The sharp drop in the value of the Korean currency 
made it prohibitively expensive to buy the rights to Hollywood films and 
foreign contents. After some domestic films and TV dramas experienced 
significant successes in other countries, local producers became more confident 
than ever before. Now, it has become necessary for them to consider overseas 
audiences and financing at the preproduction stage of their works. Korean TV 
dramas began to be subtitled for foreign audiences and were produced in two 
versions with or without music and effects (M & E) which enabled foreign 
importers to use them easily in their own way. Thus, in the production sector, 
the pre-sale of big projects or co-productions has become prevalent since the 
economic crisis of 1997. With the release of a string of blockbusters since the 
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success of Shiri in 2000, Korean films have now entered the high-priced market 
of big budget genre films. High production costs means that film companies 
need to sell these films abroad to retrieve production costs, not possible in the 
small domestic market alone. 
Under these circumstances, a number of international sales companies have 
been launched in the Korean film industry since the end of the 1990s. In the 
case of medium or major film companies or TV production companies, having 
an in-house international division or launching subsidiaries for international 
sales is no longer a rarity. Since the Korean film distributor Mirovision was 
established in 1998, it has made efforts to bring worldwide attention to Korean 
films. Most significantly, it was the first Asian company to open a booth at the 
Clemont-Ferrand International Short Film Market in France. This was a good 
step because one of the films, `The Picnic', was invited to the 52 "d Cannes Film 
Festival and was the first Korean film to receive an award at Cannes in 1999. 
r 
At the beginning, there was no clear market for Korean films overseas, so the 
business appeared to face high risks with low potential returns. This, however, 
soon changed; the business has made considerable profit, with over $3 million 
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in total international film sales in 2000 (Korea Times, March 14,2001). In 2001, 
Myung Films also launched the international sales company E Pictures and 
KangJeGyu Films, which produced Shiri and box office hit Taegukgi, and 
operates its own international sales company. Showbox joined this trend with its 
own international sales division in 2003. Meanwhile, network broadcasters, 
which have much bigger and more stable capital assets compared to film 
companies, have had international divisions for a long time. However, until 
quite recently, they focused not on selling their products but on buying foreign 
contents. 
Backed by the current Asian zeal for Korean pop culture, some companies 
started to enter foreign markets more aggressively, setting up local subsidiaries 
or offices. This now means that Korean entrepreneurs in the cultural industry 
have begun to think of developing and exploiting foreign markets in the 
long-term. The case of the Korean singer BoA referred to earlier reveals the 
paradigm shift within the Korean cultural industry towards foreign markets. 
BoA was exhaustively prepared for the Japanese market by SM entertainment, 
which is now one of the country's best-known entertainment companies. She 
was thoroughly constructed as a singer aiming first for foreign markets. To 
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reach other countries' audiences, she gained an advanced level of English and 
Japanese, her future career well in mind before she made her debut at the age of 
sixteen in Japan, not Korea. 
As for the film industry, CJ Entertainment has been very keen on building 
foreign bases. It already has an offshoot in Hong Kong to handle releases in 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and now is targeting Japan as the next leg of its 
expanding distribution network. Moreover, there is one case of a Korean 
company being localised in a foreign cultural sector. Good Fellas, a Korean 
exhibition company, has quite successfully entered the Vietnamese exhibition 
market, having opened several 12 screen (around 2,000 seats) multiplex chains 
in Vietnam since 2002, and with plans to build some 15 cinemas in Vietnam's 
major cities such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City and so on. On the back of this 
success in entering the market, this company is planning to expand its 
boundaries into investment and film production in Vietnam, with the 
participation of both Korean and Vietnamese stars. 
When it comes to the TV industry Arirang TV, the state-controlled English 
language broadcasting company, although 45 percent of its budget comes from 
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advertisement funds and company revenues, has continued this aggressive move 
towards foreign markets, reflecting the change of government strategy in 
cultural policy, or the `paradigm shift' referred to earlier. Launched by the 
Korea International Foundation in 1997 as the only international English 
language broadcasting company in Asia to carry out diplomatic duties, Arirang 
offers educational programmes and documentaries about South Korea, as well 
as movies and entertainment programmes. It has been playing the dual role of 
providing information to ethnic Koreans around the world and at the same time 
helping foreigners living in Korea and abroad to understand Korean culture. 
Here, more telling is the aggressive strategy adopted by Arirang TV in order to 
penetrate other markets (Samuel Koo, interviewed in Oct. 2005; Hyeondew 
Kang, interviewed in May 2005). First, Arirang TV made an effort to localise its 
contents by adding subtitles to TV dramas and pop music programmes popular 
among Chinese viewers and by expanding coverage of their favourite sports 
such as badminton and football. 
Second, Arirang TV has chosen to broadcast not on Koreasat 3 but on AsiaSat 
3s because the Korean commercial satellite, Koreasat 3, can cover only the 
Korean peninsula and surrounding areas but AsiaSat 3s, a multinational satellite, 
transmits over more of Asia Pacific, Oceania, Eastern Europe and Northern 
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Africa (Korea Herald, Aug. 12,1999). AsiaSat 3s already carries popular 
international satellite channels such as CNN, Star TV and Discovery, so they 
expect viewers tuning into them will automatically be tuning into Arirang TV as 
well. This also reveals something of its ambitious strategy towards foreign 
markets. The station aims at gaining entrance into three regions, namely China, 
India and Indonesia, which are the three most populous countries in the world, 
and therefore offer huge potential consumer markets. 
Accordingly, the programmes have been captioned in English and Chinese to 
target foreign viewers rather than just overseas Koreans. The case of Arirang 
suggests that the Korean wave was different from other regional powerhouse 
booms such as in India, because it was from the outset focused on non-Korean 
consumers rather than on diasporic markets. Its objective is to tap into a 
potential market of seventy million households in fifty nations in the Southeast 
Asia and Oceania regions. Initially only available domestically, Arirang TV has 
gone on to gradually expand its coverage to the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, 
North Africa, and the Americas (Korea Herald, Aug. 13,1999). 
Seventy percent of its programme content is entertainment and news 
programmes aimed at promoting tourism and business in Korea, with special 
emphasis placed on popular Korean soap operas, broadcast by and large through 
agreements with regional cable TV stations. Likewise, the content of the 
programmes has been designed to publicise Korea to international audiences as 
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an ideal destination for travel and as a sports superpower in Asia. Recently, 
Arirang TV reported that Korean entertainment programmes, such as Korean 
TV dramas and pop music, are in increasingly high demand in the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and India. The channel also offers tremendous advertising 
power to Korean firms wishing to expand into these densely populated regions 
(ibid). 
As seen above, the economic crisis eventually became a catalyst, spurring on 
the export of cultural products and leading the Korean cultural industry to 
exploit foreign markets aggressively, all results of the country's changed 
industrial landscape. The Korean cultural industries also turned Korea's lack of 
a significant diasporic market to their advantage. As Korea's expatriate 
community overseas is not large enough to be used for product network, the 
country's cultural industry has first targeted markets with similar cultures and 
then tried to appeal to global audiences. This makes Korean cultural products 
stronger than others in these competitive markets and is something that 
differentiates Korea from other cultural exporters that rely on similar language / 
culture in an expatriate community. 
5.2.2 Paradigm Shift in Cultural Policy 
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A number of factors related to Korean cultural policy had an impact on the 
Korean wave. First and most significant was the lifting of censorship. For many 
decades, the Korean film industry had to operate under very strict censorship 
laws, as seen earlier. However, around 1995-1996, the courts ruled that 
censorship was illegal, so it became possible to make a different genre of films. 
Korean films have become extremely diverse since this ruling, which is turn has 
greatly increased the appeal of South Korea's local product. For example, the 
mega-hit film Shilmi Island could not have been produced without the 
relaxation of censorship. 
The film was based on the true story of 31 commandos trained to go into North 
Korea in 1971 and assassinate the North Korean leader. Although the mission 
was cancelled, the story of what happened was kept quiet for two decades 
because it was believed that this non-fiction story could have provoked the 
governments of both North and South Korea, leading to conflict. Shilmi Island 
was among the first films to open up film production to anyone with the 
necessary creative and financial capabilities. This signalled the beginning of a 
new period of increased artistic freedom, replacing the previous situation where 
government favouritism towards a select group of producers led to greed and 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, government cultural policy since 1997 
has been highly influential in boosting the cultural industry. Most of all, the 
Korean government pushed for the advancement of telecommunications and 
commercial media products related to telecommunication and media 
technologies. This support for the industry attracted entrepreneurs in the TV and 
film industries in particular. Likewise, the emergence of new media services in 
Korea has stimulated indigenous TV and film productions, as Sinclair predicted 
in his book, New Patterns in Global Television (1996: 4). The opening of the 
domestic market to more producers in the 1980s was expected to provide a 
boost for directors, most of whom had previously had to hustle in order to make 
a living. 
As the Kim Dae-jung regime tried to reform by adopting a British-style 
economy through neo-liberalisation along with limitless competition, so its 
cultural policy was influenced by that ideology. However, the British-style 
neo-liberalisation adopted by the Korean cultural industry is much closer to the 
Blair regime's policy which aims at boosting the cultural industry from the 
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perspective of economic interest, in contrast to Thatcher's policy of reducing 
cultural subsidies. 
Kim's regime rearranged and boosted the cultural industry in preparation for the 
opening of the market to Japan. Most of all, a policy promoting tax breaks as an 
incentive to expand investment capital was introduced. The rationale was that, 
unlike the conglomerates that started early and have established secure ground, 
it is necessary to support, by means of tax breaks, companies that missed the 
opportunity to participate in the early stages and investors who are looking for 
new areas of investment. Another reason behind this policy is that investment in 
the film industry tends to be unpredictable and inherently entails high risks. 
Along with tax breaks, supportive measures for building industry infrastructure 
have been put in place. Taking a closer look at the support policy for production, 
the role of the Korean Film Commission (KOFIC) should be examined. KOFIC, 
a government-supported, self-administered body, was established in 1999 and 
financed by a tax on cinema tickets and government aid as result of the 
reorganisation of the Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation (KMPPC). 
It strives to promote and support Korean films both in Korea and abroad 
through funding, research, education and training, developing international 
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markets for Korean films and promoting intercultural understanding through 
film-based cultural exchanges. In addition to KOFIC, the Korea Culture & 
Contents Agency (KOCCA), which opened in 2001, has been focusing on 
dealing with the promotion of Korea's cultural industry and the initiation of 
international trade related to Korean culture. 
KOFIC has been a representative public organisation working for the promotion 
of the Korean film industry, a role similar to that of the UK Film Council. As 
Korean cultural products have become popular recently, the Hong Kong and 
Japanese cultural industries try to benchmark KOFIC's success. In exhibition, it 
is responsible for supporting the improvement of film screening environments 
to promote production indirectly. To do this, it loans exhibitors theatre 
renovation expenses every year and sponsors exclusive screening venues for 
active screenings of short films or non-commercial films. In film production, it 
assists in three broad ways, namely investment through the Investment Union, 
the provision of loans, and investment in individual projects. The Union is an 
association of venture capitalists, individual investors and public funding bodies, 
and KOFIC provides up to 20% of the Union's budget. Actually, for this 
investment, not only the production of Korean films, but also the importation of 
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foreign films and co-production become eligible. KOFIC makes a partial 
investment in individual projects or a provision of loans to projects that were 
previously considered questionable by investors because of doubts over their 
commercial viability. 
Furthermore, the renaissance of the Korean film industry owed much to the 
international film festivals held in provincial cities like Pusan, Jeonju and 
Puchon. The Pusan International Film Festival (PIFF), founded in 1996 and now 
a major international film contest, the Puchon International Fantastic Film 
Festival and the Jeonju International Film Festival have contributed to the 
renaissance of the film industry. The South Korean port city of Pusan is making 
a bid to become the production capital of the growing Korean film industry by 
constructing state-of-the art facilities and seeking foreign investment 
(Screendaily, Oct. 10,2000). 
Prospective financiers and co-producers get the opportunity to invest in some of 
Asia's hottest film projects at the Pusan Promotion Plan (PPP). It has quickly 
achieved prominence as a pre-market for upcoming projects by new and 
established Asian filmmakers, attracting over 1,000 industry guests from 
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Hollywood, Europe and elsewhere, and arranging hundreds of meetings 
between filmmakers and companies interested in their work. Likewise, the PPP 
has evolved into a premier meeting place for industry professionals with an 
interest in the Asian region. The presence of the Busan International Film 
Commission Showcase (BIFCOM), a locations and post-production market run 
at the same time as the PPP, also boosts the local economy as well as the 
Korean cultural industry (Screendaily, Nov. 15,2002; Screendaily, Oct. 8,2003; 
AFP, Oct. 14,2005). 
The current system of government support for the cultural industry has been 
instituted alongside a trend towards decentralisation and the development of 
local municipal authorities. Municipal government authorities have recently 
tried to launch a local media industry for boosting the local economy and 
intensifying the local image for tourism. Worth noting is the far-reaching 
influence its location support work has had on the economy in the Busan area. 
As a result, a manifold effect of industrial development, increased tourism, and 
a better city image has been gained. Accordingly, the Commission regards the 
formation of a nationwide film commission network, as has been developed in 
the U. K., to be a pressing need. 
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5.2.3 Creative Talent 
Infrastructural rearrangement, support policy and the aggressive strategy of the 
cultural industry are critical factors for Hanryu. However, without creative 
talents to make all these work, nothing could be possible. Under this multimedia 
boom and with the advent of the image age, it is not only feature production but 
also various kinds of content production that have become popular. A noticeable 
expansion of the animation and cartoon industry in Korea has also occurred in 
this context. 
The most critical goal in achieving sustainable growth, according to Suh 
Byoung-moon from KOCCA, is securing well-qualified personnel in related 
fields and educating them to be professionals. `There are about 120 
animation-related departments at colleges throughout the nation and some 40 to 
50 computer game-related departments, too. But the key is the quality, not 
quantity' (Interviewed in Aug. 2003). To this end, KOCCA has drawn up a 
comprehensive plan to cultivate specialised human resources, and has put it into 
action to produce experts with creativity and practical skills, which is the core 
infrastructure of the culture content industry. More than 200 companies are 
producing works in the animation genre in tandem with the games and character 
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industry. In these circumstances, a relatively large amount of film-related 
educational institutions have been established considering the size of Korean 
film industry. This reflects industry need and public interest. Many new 
directors have been schooled in Korea's booming short film industry, and made 
their feature debuts on the basis of the quality of their short films. 
Filmmaking is now no longer viewed as a low-status job. The proof of this lies 
in the changing attitude of the domestic audience; Koreans now flock to 
cinemas to watch the latest products offered by local directors. Young-joo Suh, 
Cineclick Asia's managing director of film export, says that `the quality of 
Korean films has improved massively in the last few years thanks to an influx of 
new talent. Korean domestic audiences are responding and our films are 
becoming more and more attractive to the international market' (Interviewed in 
Sep. 2004). 
Most of all, as the technical capabilities of the industry have expanded along 
with advances in computer technology, new generation directors have started to 
employ sophisticated digital imagery and special effects. At the same time, 
highly educated new talents who have studied abroad have also brought new 
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techniques to every field of the film and TV industries. These include financing 
and marketing as well as scripting and production. As more revenue came in, so 
better films could be made - but with the emphasis firmly on quality. That in 
turn encouraged ever more people to go to the cinema. It is a virtuous circle. 
Neither Matrix 2 nor Terminator 3 was as successful at the box office as some of 
the shorter / low budget films that were made at that time in Korea. Kim Min 
Jee, CEO of the Film Advertising Company, argues that this preference for 
home-made films over Hollywood imports was down to the creative process 
behind Korean films. She points out that `anybody can make big films if they 
had money, but creativity I don't think you can buy' (Interviewed in Oct. 2003). 
Because of cultural discount theory, home-made contents can easily appeal to 
local audiences' structure of feeling. 
However, it was not long ago that Korean audiences had thought watching 
Korean films in the cinema a waste of money and most audiences chose foreign 
films. That means cultural discount theory alone does not work in this case. Im 
Kwon-taek and Park Chan-wook, who won a Cannes Best Director Award and 
Grand Prix respectively, attributed the booming Korean cultural industry to its 
young talents. The question then is, where have all these new creative talents 
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come from so suddenly? In fact, this trend of the country's young talent entering 
into the cultural industry dates from the end of the 1980s. This development is 
particularly notable for the fact that the films of the 1980s did away with the 
closed-mindedness that characterised the Yushin regime of the 1970s. Moreover, 
many students demonstrated against the Jeon Doo-hwan military dictatorship in 
the 1980s and went to jail and this record made it very difficult for them to get 
decentjobs. 
The `Seoul Cinema Gathering' was a film production organisation with the 
underlying motive of addressing the reality of Korea at that time through the 
medium of film. It was formed in 1982 to rebel against the conservative film 
industry by members of Seoul National University's cinema circle, Yalasyoung. 
Even though it did not last long, its original members took centre stage in 
Korea's film industry in the same way as the `third generation' directors in 
China. Some of them worked as directors, some as producers with organised 
marketing strategies based on audience research, and some as f ilm critics. 
Therefore, they tried to find another way to resist the regime in the cultural 
sector and initiated their own cultural movement, which expressed realism and 
sarcasm in response to the reality in Korea. 
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Thus, in the 1980s, serious realist movies dealing with variegated topics and 
problem-oriented issues started to come out. The realistic narrative they express 
in their works is often used in conjunction with art house films intended for 
intellectuals and the festival circuit such as the works of Jang Sun-woo and Park 
Kwang-soo. They boldly discarded old stereotypes in movie-making under the 
slight relaxation of censorship (Kwak, 2003; Gateward, 2003). The political 
orientation of the works is often seen as portraying the neglected corners of 
society and rejecting the conventions of the popular melodrama. The group 
drew the attention of some intellectual groups to Korean movies. This positive 
trend continued in the 1990s with more and more Korean directors being 
acclaimed at various international festivals. 
Moreover, the young and shrewd staff that emerged after the 5th revision of the 
Film Act in 1984 chose conglomerate capital3 over the old film capital that 
came from within the film industry, then under considerable financial strain. 
Conglomerate capital, which is formed from capital irrelevant to the film 
industry, is different from old film capital in terms of both the scale of the 
3A more detailed explanation of `conglomerate capital' follows later in the chapter. 
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capital and the clearance of finance. The young generation staff treated 
economical consciousness on the same level as cultural consciousness 
(Yong-kwan Lee & Ji-suk Kim, 1999). Thus, entry of conglomerate capital into 
the film industry represents the inception of modernisation in the Korean film 
industry. Likewise, highly educated new talent has been breathing new vigour 
into the local entertainment industry, which had struggled amid the economic 
recession of the late 1990s. These new directorial talents became the catalyst for 
a modest boost in the film industry in the mid 1990s. However, their efforts 
were not enough to lead to a revival of the Korean film industry because the 
industry was experiencing a long downturn and their films did not appeal to the 
masses but to only a few fans. 
However, when the group of new directors met talented young Korean 
producers equipped with technology and financial strategy, their films began to 
attract more viewers thanks to marketing and packaging strategies. The Internet 
has now become a new source of talent for the Korean film industry. With the 
expansion of the Internet, Korea's current cinematic output features a refreshing 
diversity in mood and genre, which many in the industry are keen to preserve. 
The talent pool is the most important asset of the cultural industry. There have 
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been many talented young writers who are sometimes as young as 18 years old 
and who have made their debuts writing serial fiction or non- fiction on the 
Internet. 
As digitalisation is bringing sweeping changes to the nation's culture, including 
broadcasting and movies like in other countries, with their popularity among 
netizens (Internet citizens), there has been a boom in the remaking of their 
stories as films or TV dramas since 2002. Though these stories are not serious, 
they do reflect the young generation's way of thinking and lifestyle, increasing 
their appeal to this generation and contributing to the new trend of 
contents-making that includes film and TV programmes. Thus, the Internet has 
become a new means of identifying and developing creative talents and 
marketing their ideas. 
In addition, since 2000, KOFIC has been working towards fostering a workforce 
with exceptional talents. It offers assistance in the production of short films, 
including documentaries and animations. It provides students from film 
institutions with a certain portion of the post-production costs of short films in 
the form of educational grants, which is a way of fostering creative talent. At the 
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same time, it has supported an annual production programme for art and 
experimental films worth a total $1.6m since 2000 to promote diversity in local 
filmmaking and the international recognition of Korean movies. According to 
KOFIC, the total number of Korean movies that were screened at international 
film festivals in 2000 stood at 126, compared with 72 in 1999. This is an 
increase of more than 50 per cent (see a table in Appendices). 
Moreover, in recent years, as the domestic film industry underwent a profound 
change after the 1997 Asian economic crisis, and with the exit of the large 
business conglomerates such as Daewoo, Samsung and Hyundai that used to 
dominate the industry, venture capitalists have replaced the old conglomerates. 
Some of the big industry investors like CJ Entertainment and Orion are still 
linked to the conglomerates to some extent but their entry into cultural industry 
was before Kim Dae-jung regime. After venture capitalists had reformed 
investment procedures in the cultural industries, resulting in a more transparent 
financial system and a more efficient implementation of production 
management and deadlines, these big companies joined this market. 
Furthermore, their approach to industry was totally different from the former 
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conglomerates which had entered the cultural industries as so called `side job' to 
sell video player. I will explain this later in detail. A wave of fresh young 
filmmakers has begun to transform the industry. Audiences in Korea, about 90% 
of which are young adults between the ages of 18 and 23 (Variety, Jan. 10, 
2000), have responded in force, with interest in domestic films running at their 
highest level since the 1960s. 
Likewise, as a new generation takes control of the industry, Korean filmmakers' 
experimentation with different genres has been important in the industry's 
attempts to shape its own identity. Moreover, public interest in art house / 
experimental / minority interest films has been mounting and audiences are 
supportive of this brand of experimentation. Thanks to contemporary directors' 
multifaceted challenges, Korean films not only have drawn the audiences' 
attention domestically and regionally, but have also won critical acclaim in 
many foreign countries. Likewise, Korean cinema's rapidly expanding talent 
base has played a critical role in boosting the market and has become one of the 
most important factors behind Hanryu. 
Conclusion 
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The challenge to international media flow presented by the recent Hanryu trend 
can be analysed in terms of some of the interior and exterior factors that made it 
possible. As seen above, some key factors worked together and enabled the 
un-doing of the vicious circle that had been operating in the Korean cultural 
industry. Korea has moved aggressively to cast itself as the centre of Asia's TV 
and film market. Korea has been ruthless in adopting doctrines of neo-liberalism 
in its television and film industries so that broadcasters and producers, in 
adapting to the onslaught of market pressures, have had to reposition themselves 
strategically in response to the realities of globalisation. In this respect, the 
government and industry leaders are working to position Korea as a regional 
centre for the cultural industries in Asia. One of their principal ambitions, for 
example, is to make the Pusan Film Festival the Cannes of the East. 
Here Korean cultural policy played a crucial role in transforming these 
industries. Korea has controlled and protected TV and film industries for a long 
time. However, as seen in earlier chapters, partial opening without preparation 
in 1988 under foreign pressure was very damaging to Korea's cultural industries. 
As a result of it, Korean cultural industries were almost taken over by the 
Western and Japanese culture as happened in other countries. However, this 
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historical experience of unprepared opening gave Korean an unforgettable 
lesson about the need for a sustainable market structure supported by means of 
cultural policy. Once these industries were well established, they could open 
their markets from a position of strength and even brought about Korean wave. 
This more planned approach to `opening' indicates the important role played by 
cultural policy in a global context. 
Has Korean cultural policy towards the cultural industries been successful? 
When it comes to the efficiency of cultural policy, we have to evaluate how the 
minority's choice is protected. That is to say, from a cultural perspective, this is 
a question of cultural diversity. In the next chapter, we are going to examine 
some of the cultural challenges that face Korean policy towards the cultural 
industries. Chapter 7 will be an evaluation of Korean cultural policy in relation 
to the possibility of Hanryu as an alternative model for understanding and 
responding to cultural globalisation, based on counter flow and cultural bloc. 
Through these following chapters, I intend to understand the role of cultural 
policy under globalisation and the wider implications of the Korean case. 
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Chapter 6. Imitating Hollywood: Contents and Infrastructure 
Imitating Hollywood: Contents and 
The success of imitation in Korea, like in other developing countries, can best be 
understood within cultural and economic contexts. D. H. Lee (2004: 27) argues that `the 
Korean television industry with limited financial resources has sought to mimic 
Japanese content and utilise Japanese formatting know-how as a means of piggy- 
backing on the success of Japanese television which occurs in sometimes subtle, 
sometimes overt emulation of Japanese popular culture that is in turn recoded to 
accommodate Korean structures of feelings. ' Thus, imitating other cultures is attractive 
for audiences and producers alike. 
As a number of factors have come together to make Hanryu possible, Korean cultural 
products, such as films and TV dramas, can be seen to have imitated the Hollywood and 
Japanese models in terms of both content and industrial infrastructure, as seen in earlier 
chapters. In this chapter, I will examine the nature of this recent Korean Wave, looking 
at which Korean programmes and films gained popularity domestically and regionally, 
and what these have in common including some specific examples. After an 
examination based on interviews as to why the content of these programmes and films 
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has appealed to other countries' people, the recent characteristics of the infrastructure of 
the Korean TV and film industries that created these contents will be researched. 
Thus, through this process, we will examine how the Korean wave as a kind of `reverse 
flow' has internalised Western and Japanese influences. Moreover, by examining how 
the Korean TV and film industries have adapted to trans-national production 
conventions, I believe that we can gain a deeper understanding of how and why the 
Korean cultural industry has evolved in this context. This thesis can therefore explore 
how local contents in periphery work against the dominant grain of sophisticated 
Western cultural products. 
6.1 Imitating Contents: The Korean Blockbuster 
6.1.1 Definition and History of the Korean Blockbuster 
Korea has long had insular tendencies owing to its long history of being invaded by 
foreigners and has hence not typically made allowances for global markets (Osgood, 
1951). This was certainly the case up until the government's globalisation campaign in 
1996. However, under the trend of globalisation and neo liberalisation, the Korean 
cultural industry has eventually been enabled to produce cultural products of its own 
through processes of modelling, imitating and hybridizing, although importing cultural 
products remains a much more affordable option. In this context, the groundbreaking 
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success of the blockbuster Swiri, which transformed the Korean industry in 1999, is a 
representative example of cultural hybridisation and reveals the importance of its role in 
`the renaissance' of the Korean cultural industry. Swirl was South Korea's first home- 
grown blockbuster made by imitating Hollywood blockbusters. It ushered in a new crop 
of big-budget genre pictures that aimed to provide Hollywood-level thrills and effects at 
a fraction of the cost. Though Swirl cost $3.5 million to produce, it earned 10 times as 
much in ticket, video and export sales (KOFIC, 2002). For an example of such a 
production, see the case study on p. 269. 
More importantly, Swiri beat Titanic to become the biggest hit ever in the country at that 
time. As producer Noh Jong Yuri pointed out, Swiri restored the Korean people's trust in 
their own film industry (interviewed in Sep. 2004). It actually gave audiences the 
confidence in Korean films and belief for the first time that the quality of Korean 
productions could be comparable to that of Hollywood films, despite the fact that they 
were considerably cheaper to make (BBC World Service, Oct. 24,2003). Inspired by 
this success, newly independent production companies scrambled to deliver the next 
blockbuster and venture capitalists speculated on big-budget movies. 
Originally, the term blockbuster meant a book that was very popular and successful. In 
the film industry, it refers to high profile, star-studded event movies (Sinclair, 2000: 
167). When it comes to the Korean definition of a blockbuster, the term normally 
betokens films in which more than $5 million of production costs have been invested 
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(KOFIC 2003). In comparison with this, the average production cost for Hollywood 
blockbusters in 2002 was over $100 million (Variety, April 3,2005). Likewise, the 
Korean concept of blockbusters is an unclear term used to refer to those films in which 
bigger budgets than usual are allotted to domestically made films imitating Hollywood 
blockbusters. The use of the term has recently been expanded to encompass TV dramas 
and pop albums. 
As far as blockbuster TV dramas are concerned, there has been a series of big-budget 
drama serials in recent years. This is a new genre in the industry, with specific 
production conventions that originated from Japanese `lifestyle' drama (see `trendy 
drama' in Appendix) because it reflects fashionable and stylish lifestyles. From the 
beginning of the adaptation process, these dramas benchmarked Japanese lifestyle 
dramas and generated good ratings in contrast to traditional dramas, the key conventions 
of which are local flavour, historical anguish, and moral exhortations. The genre is 
characterised by several fundamental elements, including pop idols, symbols of love or 
promise, distinctive locations, fantastic occupations, sweet-sounding music, brand 
commodities and simple narratives depicting romance or friendship, all of which are in 
synch with the interests of younger generations who strongly identify with the characters. 
6.1.2 Asian Values and Cultural Discount 
As mentioned above, when the theory of globalisation was actively adopted within the 
Korean cultural industry, Korean cultural products had to be "standardised" in order to 
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build a more international audience although local and regional ways of thinking and 
living did not disappear in the face of imported cultural influences. Now, we are going to 
explore what these contents are like and how they have appealed to global audiences 
from the perspective of cultural discount theory. How could Korean cultural products 
like TV dramas and films appeal to audiences from other countries? Which elements of 
these products appeal most to foreign audiences? 
In this context, Liebes and Katz' argument is noteworthy. They pinpoint the key 
elements in the international popularity of U. S. prime-time television, based on the 
Dallas case, as follows: `(1) the universality, or primordiality, of some of its themes and 
formulae, which makes programmes psychologically accessible; (2) the polyvalent or 
open potential of many of the stories, and thus their value as projective mechanisms and 
as material for negotiation and play in the families of man; and (3) the sheer availability 
of American programmes in a marketplace where national producers cannot fill more 
than a fraction of the hours they feel they must provide (1990: 5). ' As Liebes and Katz 
emphasise, universality can be seen as the most important factor in making a local 
programme successful in the world market. The structure of content and the form of 
internationally popular serial dramas in particular are widely shared and may even be 
`borrowed' from U. S. practice, as the Mexican Telenovela (see notes in Appendices) did 
decades ago (Sinclair, 1996). 
That is to say, an international format, such as a global narrative like the Cinderella 
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Complex, can appeal to global audiences. The story of Cinderella, a Western fairytale 
popularised by Disney, is a tale familiar to most Asian audiences including Korean 
through their individual imports of Western culture (Korea Times, Feb. 12,2004). When 
Korea imports cultural contents from Japan, it has easily adopted a Western myth in an 
Asian setting. Likewise, recent Korean soap operas which have been popular in Asia 
have had a common theme: beating the odds to find true love and happiness. Although 
these soap operas differ from their Western counterparts in their less sexually explicit 
and violent images (less sensual and commercialised), nevertheless their primary appeal 
-a nostalgia for lost innocence - can be seen as a global theme. We can understand the 
popularity of the Korean TV drama Winter Sonata in Japan in this vein, as its values of 
perseverance and loyalty to pure love remained compatible with cultural codes prevalent 
in what might appear a distinctly different society. 
Furthermore to Western eyes, TV dramas such as Winter Sonata seem slow-paced and 
old-fashioned. However, their traditional romantic themes have appealed to audiences 
from other countries. Shin Hyun-taik, chairman of the Korean Foundation for Asian 
Culture Exchange (KOFACE), points out that `many peoples want to turn the clock back 
20 or 30 years because Korean and Japanese society has changed so much in that time' 
(interviewed in Aug. 2005). A reason for success of the drama is that `though more and 
more TV dramas deal with transient pleasures, it reminds the audience of their lost 
purity and their genuine love that they had experienced a long time ago' (Newsweek; 
May 3,2004). 
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Another example would be Im Kwon-taek's film Chunhyang, which major French 
media such as Le Monde and Les Cahiers du Cinema dubbed `a Romeo and Juliet from 
the Land of the Morning Calm' (Korea Times, Jan. 22,2001), and which is very much a 
traditional film. However, although the film was highly exotic for Westerners, they 
juxtapose and understand it in terms of their own traditional contexts, such as 
Shakespeare's work. That means that although it can be exotic, it also has recourse to a 
global standard of human feelings. In this vein, the fact that the American sitcom 
Friends, aired on a Korean cable company, also appeals a great deal to Korean fans is 
not surprising. Although it greatly embodies cultural difference, the close-knit 
friendships between the characters is something that we all may long for or relate to, 
which is certainly one reason that the sitcom is so successful in Korea. Gong Hee-Jeung 
of Skylife said that `the fact that fans can share a common interest and actively take part 
in this together is what Friends should be about. It's also set in New York City, a city 
many South Koreans admire, making it even more popular' (interviewed in Oct. 2004). 
These TV dramas and films with a moving storylines successfully portrayed the 
manifestations of love and characters in real life, to which everyone in the audience 
could relate. That is to say, they addressed the perennial theme of love in all its 
complexity in our ever-changing society; this is surely a standard theme the world over 
and an unchangeable value. Shuhei Kusanagi of Toei in Japan emphasises that `the 
Korean TV drama series offers more than a complex love story; the contents also retain 
a high degree intriguing plot twists, good acting and lines, not to mention breathtaking 
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scenery backed up by melancholic music tunes, like the sound and visual effects of a big 
screen production which are used to capture one's imagination' (interviewed in Nov. 
2004). In a nutshell, both standardisation and particularisation are key words here. With 
regard to standardisation, Japan in particular is worth further consideration. The 
Japanese cultural industry has been one of the important players in shaping transnational 
media flow in Asia and even in the world market and is a good example of 
standardisation. In the Asian region, the Japanese broadcasting and film industry is 
viewed as a model for the successful adaptation of Western television and film culture to 
its own cultural context. It has deployed a systematic marketing strategy for its cultural 
products in Asia to evade deep rooted anti-Japan sentiments derived from the colonial 
experiences of a number of other Asian countries (Iwabuchi, 2002; Time, Nov. 22,1999). 
From the early 1960s, Japanese animation, known as Japanimation, has been consumed 
internationally while Japanese television programmes, aside from animation, are thought 
not to attract international audiences due to cultural and linguistic differences. The 
Japanese animation industries have always had the global market in mind and are 
mindful that the non-Japaneseness of characters works to their advantage in the export 
market (Henshushitsu 1995: 36-97; Stronach, 1989: 144). Therefore, it is no accident 
that Japan has become a major exporter of culturally odourless products. All of these 
strategies represent a kind of standardisation process aimed at reducing cultural discount. 
According to this logic, producers or directors must find subject matters and ways of 
expression which are convincing and appeal to international viewers with different 
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cultural backgrounds and different ways of seeing and judging things. The key factors 
for achieving universality seem to be content (story), culture and language. As Hoskins 
and Mirus (1988) argue, the universal appeal of American popular culture is largely 
attributable to the international prevalence of the English language and America's status 
as the origin of mass culture. Australian and English-speaking Canadian productions 
have appeared in schedules around the world. That is, their status as English-language 
producers means that Australia and Canada are different to most other countries in that 
they both export outside of their geo-linguistic region. 
However, where they differ is that Canada, despite its proximity to the USA has failed, 
until recently, to produce sufficient audience-drawing indigenous programming in 
popular genres. As a result Canada has not produced the same volume and range of 
exportable programmes as Australia has done over the years. The comparison indicates 
that language is not the only factor. For some programmes, culture may be more 
important than language, as in the case of Brazilian programmes in Portuguese being 
extreme popular among the neighbouring Spanish-speaking countries. For the same 
reason of cultural differences, conversely, the possibility of box-office success for 
American films in foreign markets is not always guaranteed, especially for those with 
comparatively smaller production budgets. In this vein, Ko Jeung-Min, director of soft 
industry at the Samsung Economic Research Institute, also points out that `though 
Korean films cannot compete with Hollywood films, they can enter into other Asian 
countries which have a similar ethos and structure of feeling. Thus, the warning that 
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cultural imperialism results in the expansion of Western values expanding all over the 
world and the destruction of local or regional traditions and values or ethos and structure 
of feeling is not true' (interviewed, Oct. 2004). 
Here, we might well ask what this regional ethos or Asian value is. Of course, the 
concept of an Asian value is very fuzzy and difficult to describe. However, we can say 
there is a common feeling among the Japanese, Chinese and Korean peoples. In 
comparison with Western values, Asian people tend to put a higher value on the 
individual's harmony and conformity with the whole rather than on individuality, 
originality and creativity per se. All of these are of Confucian origin (Hsiung, 2001: 
374). Korea, as influenced by Confucianism, tends to traditionally distrust the kind of 
Western culture advanced by aggressive commerce and the kind of laissez-faire 
economics fostered by liberal markets. Family values play a dominant role in Asian 
culture. 
To take this further, we can raise a theoretical question: how do such values integrate 
with one another to produce a new collective identity as defined by Western or Asian 
values? It is through the bodies of shared representations that people come to give 
meaning to their life situations and activities and so learn to orient themselves, to take a 
stance towards the complexes of objects, events, actions, and possibilities that make up 
that world. Values are particularly important in this context (Anderson, 1991). They are 
shared standards upon which people in a collective base their moral and aesthetic 
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judgements. Therefore, peoples' thoughts, feelings and actions are structured through 
their orientation toward certain values. People learn to ask and answer such questions 
meaningfully through the internalisation of the values of their society. This construction 
of shared values is achieved in part through culture and through cultural exchange. So 
`culture as a way of life' is partly realised and developed through `culture as system of 
communication' (Williams, 1981; Willis, 1990). Thus, Asian values are embedded into 
all systems in Asian countries, although it is well known that the economic structure has 
changed in many of the advanced countries through contact with Western Christian 
work ethics. 
In Eastern ideology, Confucianism, in which Korean society is deeply rooted, would 
have had an influence on the building of `Asian things' in every field. Confucianism has 
been developed blending `in varying degrees with other cultural contents in Asian 
countries such as Islam (as in Malaysia, Indonesia and other places), Buddhism (Taiwan, 
Thailand etc. ), Shinto (Japan), Marxism (China) and Christianity (South Korea, the 
Philippines, etc. ). The ethos from these Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity ethics 
is ingrained in Asian people's way of life and thinking patterns, passed down from 
generation to generation through family rearing and social mores' (Hsiung, 2001: 367). 
Hsiung attempts to design a scale of high to low rankings in terms of the extent to which 
a nation is imbued with Confucian cultural influence, then `identify the Asian nations in 
three groups on a sliding scale of high, medium and low: (1) China, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, (2) Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand and (3) the Philippines, 
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Indonesia and Japan' (ibid. ). Here, I would like to note that Hsiung's argument is 
missing a point in that South Korea has been deeply influenced by Buddhism as well as 
Christianity and Confucianism. Until now, Buddhist and Christian, each account for 
roughly half of the Korean population (NSO, 2003). That is to say, South Korea has 
developed under the cultural influence of all of these ethics. This reveals the deep roots 
of Korean hybrid culture through its long history, a factor which can be seen to reduce 
the disadvantages of cultural discount for Korean cultural contents. 
Vietnamese Huong Nguyen who studies in Korea, argues that the reason Korean TV 
dramas have been popular in his country is `because they deal with relationships in the 
family and the value of family' (interviewed in Sep. 2004). That is to say, the similar 
patriarchal positioning of the father within the family - the relationship between parents 
and children and between father and mother - has enabled audiences in other Asian 
countries to seamlessly read and articulate the `original' intention of texts such as films 
and TV programmes. Mr. Su Man Lee, president of SM Entertainment, also argues that 
`it is easier to get access to China than Western music labels and film studios because of 
Korea and China's cultural link' (interviewed in Sep. 2003). That is to say, Korean 
companies such as SM Entertainment have crucial advantages that could allow them to 
snare young Chinese consumers before their Western competitors. 
Likewise, `Asian values' which emphasise family unity, the Confucian value system, 
paternalism and groups over individuals and Western pragmatism create cultural 
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similarity among Asian countries and reduces the cultural discount mentioned in the 
earlier chapter. Asian values can easily appeal to the same structure of Asian people's 
feeling. At the same time, those values can also appeal to Western audiences because of 
their exoticism, which works in the opposite direction to cultural discount. That is to say, 
Asian values which create difference for Western audiences might be well received by 
virtue of their unfamiliarity. As mentioned above, simply achieving universality alone is 
not the most important factor. There is compelling evidence (Dalton, 1992; Laing, 1986) 
to suggest that successful products tend to have cultural specificities and universality at 
the same time. The reason that imitating Hollywood films alone cannot be successful in 
the world market is that contents which only imitate standardisation cannot in the end 
compete with Hollywood contents, which represent the prototype of standard isation. 
In this context, Im Kwon-taek is still doubtful about the autonomous power of Korean 
movies, stating that `we do not want to admit that Hollywood movies are superior, but it 
is a fact. We cannot catch up with their material superiority and sophisticated techniques. 
At one time, I tried to catch up with Hollywood movies, but it was useless. So, I decided 
to produce movies that appeal to Koreans' native sentiments. To the foreign audience, I 
could not only tell a good story but move their hearts to beat in time with Korean hearts 
as well' (interviewed, May, 2002). Strong nationalism and cultural identity in themes of 
historical events or cultural roots feature in the works of filmmakers such as Yi Tu- 
young and Im Kwon-taek. In a sense, these films were successful because of their 
exoticism, which captured the interest of critics at international film festivals. As Im said, 
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speciality should be infused into contents. Yet, there have always been misreadings, 
ambiguities and resistance against speciality owing to cultural discount. 
In Korea in particular, there is a specific value of feeling, known as Han. According to 
the Korean-English dictionary (Minjungseorim Peonjipgook: 2418) the Han means 
grudge, spite, enmity and resentment. The feeling, which emanates from the period of 
Japanese Imperialism and the Korean War, which devastated and split Korean families, 
surfaces in many Korean melodramas (Time, Nov. 14,2005). However, this has changed 
quite rapidly in recent times. Nowadays, it seems that this kind of Korean value is 
slowly being merged with the new commercialised contexts in the TV and film 
industries and in order to appeal to young audiences who never experienced Japanese 
Imperial rule or the Korean War. This is the case in films such as Taegukgi, JSA and 
Simlido. Fallows (1994: 122) states, `Asian insular culture has diminished the impact of 
economic theory and created a distance from the cultural artefacts of McWorld seen 
nowhere else. ' 
In this context, Variety (Nov. 17,1997) also comments that `known for centuries as "The 
Hermit Kingdom, " Korea is fast shedding its image as a repressed, ultra-conservative 
country. ' This movement toward `Western values, ' as many in the conservative media 
call it, has been spearheaded by the offspring of wealthy businessmen. These upper- 
middle-class young people grew up watching TV shows such as Friends and Sex and 
City, listening to South Korean and imported rap music, and hanging out in dance clubs, 
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singing about tearing down the establishment. Advertisers have been quick to see that 
there is money to be made from these new mores. Here, it is said that there now exists a 
mix of various values in modem Korea. This coexistence of tradition and modernity is 
particularly evident in the younger generation, and as such it is possible that a 
generational change has taken place. This is visible in particular in the youthful 
character of the creative industries and their products, which could be seen as a kind of 
`mediator' of hybrid culture. 
While Korea obviously suffers a disadvantage in terms of language, but it enjoys an 
advantage in terms of both culture (polyvalent) and content (primordial). According to 
the theories of Liebes and Katz mentioned earlier, the primordial content of Korean 
cultural products could derive from the uniqueness or particularity of Korean cultural 
values while Korea's polyvalent culture from its historic experience of colonisation and 
cultural exchange with aboriginal countries could help Korean cultural products achieve 
commonality. `Cultural discount' is multidimensional, not just a matter of shared 
language. This explains how the Korean wave, disadvantaged by language and its lack 
of diasporic market (Cunningham and Sinclair, 2001), could achieve such success, using 
polyvalent and primordial culture to its advantage. Here, obtaining commonality and 
particularity at the same time is a form of `glocalisation', as discussed in chapter 2. 
Likewise, though Korean filmmakers, young and old, possess amply rich imaginations, 
creativity and cinematic skills and know-how, they have also been forced to find out 
more about world audiences in order to capture overseas markets, that is, they have had 
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to target the `global standard'. Therefore we can summarise that the success of Korean 
cultural products is based on their globalisation. 
In terms of content, appealing to common values engenders cultural assimilation among 
Asian audiences, weakening the level of cultural discount. At the same time, 
primordiality appeals to audiences from other countries by means of its exoticism. 
Accordingly, standardisation and specialisation are both needed to communicate with 
global audiences. Of course, there has been another economic reason favouring the 
export of Korean blockbusters. As the cost of distributing American films in Japan is 
quite high, there is a large demand for blockbusters similar to those from Hollywood. 
Thus, the key ingredients to the success of Korean cultural products are cultural 
assimilation and economic opportunism. From the point of view of industrial 
infrastructure, the restructuring of the Korean cultural industry to prioritise streamlined 
production and marketing strategies with IT, and an increasing demand for content, have 
also facilitated economic opportunism in the Korean cultural industry. This issue will be 
explored in a later section. 
6.1.3 Hybridisation of the Hollywood Style and Asian Values 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, there are broadly two directions of cultural flow. 
One is a periphery's imitation of a centre and the other is a centre's imitation of the 
periphery. Hollywood remakes of Asian contents are a representative case of two-way 
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flows of media. This is because Hollywood in the centre now copies contents from 
countries in periphery, just as countries in periphery have made local substitutes 
imitating contents from the centre (Korea Herald, July 18,2002; Korea Times, July 14, 
2003). During the 1960s and the 1970s, a great quantity of American programmes was 
made available to Korean viewers, as already noted. In later years, the increasing 
ownership of television receivers by the lower-income `grassroots' usurped the 
hegemony of Western programming and led to the formation of strong local genres. 
The substitute products for the U. S. model in local countries are made first by imitating 
and then indigenising in order to adapt them to the local culture. This dynamic process 
aimed at reducing cultural discount exploits the hybridisation of global and local 
products. In this context, the fact that the local adaptation of a specific format is more 
popular than the simple importation of the programme can be explained by the theory of 
cultural discount. In the process of cultural flow, the American model has been 
generalised and the Japanese model also adapted as a benchmark model for the 
commercial media. However, many Korean `lifestyle dramas' are now being exported to 
Japan, which represents a reversed flow. Korean broadcasters have produced 
programmes different from Japanese ones, adjusting to local `structures of feeling' as 
well as to local production conditions, although some Korean TV producers have been 
tempted to copy Japanese hit programmes in the face of limitless competition for ratings, 
taking advantage of the fact that Japanese programmes have been banned for decades (D. 
H. Lee, 2004: 52). In this vein, D. H. Lee (ibid. ) argues that the success of Korea in 
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`learning' from Japan has helped the Korean television and film industries compete in 
the Asian marketplace. Additionally, there is a transfer of ideas to Taiwan from Japan 
via Korea. Though based on Japanese and Western attributes, the success of Korean 
drama series in Taiwan can be attributed to the fact that Korean dramas target all age 
groups (Liu, Y. -L. and Chen, 1998; Jung, 2004) which is different from exported 
Japanese TV dramas. 
Some blockbusters work as well in overseas markets as they did in the domestic market. 
This implies that Korean blockbusters reach a regional standard which can appeal to 
regional audiences. Just as TV programmes, films, and popular music do not turn 
individual consumers into passive receivers in any single society, the power to transmit 
information worldwide likewise does not stimulate automatic imitation or conformity 
(Lull, 2000: 233-234). D. H. Lee's (2004) study on the phenomenon of copycats and 
clones of foreign programmes in Korean television explores the precedents of adapting 
American and Japanese TV programmes and films into local languages and the robust 
hybridity that already existed in various cultural products. 
As seen previously, Korea's experience under colonisation has become a new source of 
strength and cultural resonance with other Asian countries. In this sense, hybrid cultural 
products, such as the Korean blockbuster films and TV dramas, create a chain of values 
that can be modified and extended across national boundaries as well as within domestic 
market systems. As a result, they are instrumental in promoting the development of the 
263 
PART. III Chapter 6. Imitating Hollywood: Contents and Infrastructure 
cultural industry, particularly in peripheral markets (Moran and Keane, 2004: 11). As 
well as responding to the emergence of a new generation of consumers, as mentioned 
above, producers in the cultural industry have tried to create a new image by a blending 
and bending of old genres. Many of the major Korean hits in recent years have provided 
an interesting twist to their genre. A representative model of the Hollywood-style 
Korean movie, Swiri (1999), shrewdly combines the Hollywood action blockbuster with 
the Korean melodrama to result in a film which appeals to a wide spectrum of viewers. 
You Kun, president of the Korea National Tourism Organization (KNTO), said that 
`what the country needs is to develop something very traditional, something very 
modern and something that shows the transition from the traditional to the modern' 
(interviewed in Sep. 2004). This implies specialisation and universality at the same time. 
In this sense, cultural hybridisation entails a more complex form of cultural 
standardisation and heterogenisation than the mere trading of programme rights. In 
business jargon, `glocalization' is simultaneously global and local, and involves taking a 
global view of the market, but one which is adjusted to local considerations, and formed 
by telescoping the global and the local to make a blend (Tulloch, 1991: 134). What is 
being promoted is not simply a `global localisation' that aims to adapt the shared culture 
to accommodate local differences but also `local globalisation' that makes audiences feel 
a sense of participation in a global society through the reciprocated enjoyable 
recognition of local specificities articulated through shared formats. 
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Likewise, the localisation of cultural specificity is articulated while the globalisation of 
cultural products assumes a `hybrid' modality, rather than consisting simply of the 
dissemination of American products (Garcia Canclini, 1995). Indeed, the fact that 
Korean hit films and TV dramas appeal to audiences in other Asian countries means that 
Korean cultural products have not been adversely influenced by cultural discount, 
because cultural discount is offset by cultural similarities within the region. Therefore, 
we can say that Korean TV dramas and films found acceptance in other countries 
because they fuse Hollywood style and Asian values. 
6.1.4 Case Studies of Korean Film and TV Drama 
f SUCCESSFUL KOREAN FILM: Swuu (1999) 
-The Beginning of Swiri 
The year 1999 marked a turning point in the Korean film industry, with a marked jump 
in the box-office performance of local movies and an increased confidence among 
people involved in the film industry. Shiri triggered the boom. Director Je-gyu Kang 
understood that audiences did not want to watch a movie dealing with overly serious 
themes and ideology but preferred something entertaining and stylish. Thus, he set a 
tragic love story in a specifically Korean context. For a year, he worked on the scenario 
and spent another year writing it up. He rewrote the script at least 12 times in order to 
get it right. 
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-Finance and Marketing 
Swiri cost $3.5 million to make including publicity expenses ($400,000). At the time it 
was the most expensive Korean movie ever made. Most domestic films cost only half as 
much to make. Samsung Entertainment Group (SEG) which was a subsidiary of 
Samsung decided to fully invest in the movie after looking through the scenario. SEG 
was willing to take risks, unveiling plans for a big-budget genre film of a type that had 
never before been made in Korea. Indeed, the film was tightly constructed, and in many 
ways it rivaled action movies from Hong Kong and Hollywood. It proved to other 
investors that movies with high production values and an exciting plot yield high returns. 
It is said that this was the first Korean film to separate out the roles of director and 
producer (Jong-Yoon Roh, interviewed in Oct. 2004). Until then, the director had also 
managed to raise funds, decide on the casting and make all other decisions. In producing 
Swiri, the director focused on making the film while SEG as a producer made all the 
other related commercial decisions. Since Swiri, Korean film companies have started to 
place great importance on the role of producer. The director Kang Jae-kyu sweated for 
around a year on the production itself while SEG focused on production management, 
marketing and promotion. 
Swiri was clamorously promoted and marketed under the catch phrase `Korean-style 
blockbuster'. For the first time in Korean film production, the film's producers 
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conducted market research on audience attitudes and purchasing behaviour, customer 
satisfaction, brand awareness and advertising effectiveness. Swiri had a strong 
marketing strategy involving the use of billboards in front of cinemas for the first time in 
Korea and secrecy about the film's content in order to raise curiosity. It also introduced 
Hollywood-style `running guarantee' contracts whereby the actors and directors are paid 
according to box-office returns, a new concept in South Korea. 
-Content 
Swiri is a native freshwater fish found only in Korea. In the movie it was used as the 
code name of a North Korean secret service agent with a mission to steal a newly- 
developed bomb from the Korean Defence Ministry and detonate it during the World 
Cup in order to provoke an armed conflict between the two Koreas. Its story line 
involves North Korean authorities attempting to trigger war by planting terrorists in 
South Korea, despite outwardly promoting amicable North-South ties. 
The story, an espionage thriller about a terrorist plot hatched by North Korean agents 
was likely to draw interest in light of real-life circumstances which the two Koreas have 
coped with. At the same time, it also deals with the ill-fated love story of two secret 
agents from North and South Korea. Swiri is a gripping tale of South-North antagonism 
and love across the border. Thus, viewers have debated over the film's genre, with some 
describing it as a Hollywood-style action film while others term it a melodrama. It can 
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be safely said that it is both, offering both the action-packed special effects expected 
from Hollywood studios and the conventions of melodrama that have attracted Korean 
movie-goers for decades. 
-Target Audience 
The film needed an audience of 4.5 million in order to break even. Thus, the film set its 
sights on a large range of moviegoers from 18 to 50 and it succeeded. Most of all, in 
perspective of story and genre, although Swirl dealt with the division of Korean 
peninsular which is a sensitive social issue in Korea, the film did not present the issue in 
a grave or ideological perspective, choosing instead to titillate the audience with a love 
story and appealing to its taste for excitement and entertainment with nail-biting thrills 
and action. Thus, it shrewdly combined the Hollywood action blockbuster with the 
Korean melodrama to result in a film which appealed to a wide spectrum of viewers, 
especially to the younger generation of teenagers and over-20s who tend to ignore 
Korean films and prefer Hollywood movies. The response of this younger audience was 
especially enthusiastic. 
-Performance in the Korean market 
Korea had never before attempted a genre film on such a scale, and the result was 
greater than anyone's expectations. Within three weeks of its release, it had attracted 
more than one million viewers in Seoul, becoming the highest-drawing Korean film in 
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history up until then. The film broke Titanic's box office record for the biggest audience 
ever in Korea and attracted more than six million viewers in Korean theatres. In the 
critical field as well as at the box office, it has drawn praise from a wide variety of 
sources. It received honours for best picture and best actor at domestic awards 
ceremonies. Most critics applauded Kang Jae-kyu for regenerating a Korean film market 
dominated by Hollywood films. Chan-il Jeon said "The film shows well-placed action, a 
full-orchestra and astonishing special effects. All of these let it win over fans" 
(Interviewed in Oct. 2004). The making of the film has even been analyzed and offered 
up as a model for Korean businesses. In this vein, Yang-joon Jeun said, "I cannot deny 
Swirl is a copycat of Hollywood blockbusters. But it definitely set a new trend in the 
Korean film industry and market (Interviewed in May, 2005). " 
Moreover, it provides the unlikely catalyst for South Koreans who have been struggling 
against economic turmoil and Cold War fears. Sung-ryul Han analyzed that `the 
unexpected big hit of Swiri was attributed to the social trend such as the public's 
growing interest in the development of inter-Korean affairs, the economic woes which 
let the public find mental comforts by indulging in entertainment and changes in the 
younger generation's attitude toward the North in the era of President Kim's Sunshine 
Policy of engaging North Korea'. 
-Performance in markets outside Korea 
The revenues from ticket, video and export sales for Swiri were approximately ten times 
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the film's overall budget (KOFIC, 2002). One of the main reasons for this was its 
performance in overseas markets. It was the first Korean film to be exported to Japan 
and earned $1.3 million amid enthusiastic reactions from the media and audiences when 
it opened on 36 screens in Japan in 1999. One third of the production costs were met 
through export to Japan alone. Ninety percent of seats were sold at 37 Japanese theatres 
on opening day, encouraging the producers to expect another round of popular success 
with the film's first overseas release. The number of theatres showing the film increased 
to more than 200. 
According to their contract with Japanese distributors, the film's producers were entitled 
to fifty percent of the revenue from future ticket sales and video release, with a 
minimum guarantee of $1.3million. Director Kang Je-gyu said that Swiri had taught him 
about the international market. A Japanese exhibitor Miyazawa Yashiro said "the action 
is more powerful than a Hong Kong action movie and the story is deeply moving. " The 
level of coverage in the local media was unprecedented, with local daily newspapers 
such as Sankei running special coverage on the movie's opening, and NHK and Fuji 
television featured the film during their prime-time broadcasts. 
f SUCCESSFUL KOREAN TV DRAMA: 'DAEJANGGEUM' (2004) 
-The Beginning of Daejanggeum 
Daejanggeum (Jewel in the Palace in English title) was directed by Byeong-hun Lee 
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who specialized in epic drama. According to my interview with him in November 2004, 
he found by chance the story of an ancient female doctor in a Korean chronicle while he 
was making another hit epic drama `Hur Joon' about an ancient doctor in Korean history. 
Based on this discovery, he used a woman's success story in ancient Korea as the 
concept for his sixth TV drama series. After that, his partner playwright Yeong-hyeon 
Kim wrote the storyline consulting with him. It took about four months to complete the 
storyline. The story was historically based but the teleplay by Byeong-hun Lee and 
Yeong-hyeon Kim was 90% fiction. 
-Finance and Marketing 
Daejanggeum, `the Great Jang-geum' in English, was produced by Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC)'s in-house production company, MBC Production. 
The production was fully funded by MBC which is financed by commercial advertising. 
The total cost of production was $11 million. The cost per episode was about $150,000 
which was about twice the average cost of other Korean dramas. In particular the 
producers spent a lot of money on researching and presenting historically accurate food, 
sets and clothing. The TV mini-series Daejanggeum was first aired on MBC from 
September 2003 to March 2004 at 9: 50pm. Each episode ran for 70 minutes and 54 
episodes were broadcast over about 6 months. Conscious of the export potential as a 
result of the boom of Hanryu, the producers cast the program to appeal to overseas 
audiences and paid more attention to realistic descriptions of Korean food culture and 
beautiful scenery than in previous Korean dramas. Otherwise the marketing and 
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promotion strategy was not much different from other productions. Like other dramas, it 
was advertised on MBC TV and MBC website. The viewer ratings for the mini-series 
averaged 47% which is a great achievement for a series of 54 episodes to sustain to that 
level of audience throughout the run and even reached a high of 57.8 %. According to its 
producers, as of March 2004 the production had earned $25.5million through advertising 
sales, Internet VOD (Video on Demand) service, overseas sales and exploiting the brand, 
as set out below. 
Table 7. Incomes from Various Sources of Daejanggeum 
(Source: MBC Production and MCT) 
Sources Incomes 
Advertising slots $19.2 million 
Sales of other branded products such as books and comic books $3milion 
VOD service $900000 
Export sales $2.4million 
-Content 
The story is based on the story of a real historical figure (Jang-geum) who was the first 
and only woman to serve as head physician to the King in the rigidly hierarchical and 
male-dominated social structure of the Chosun Dynasty. Before being a head physician, 
she spends a harsh life owing to jealousy and conspiracy. Such a story is quite rare in 
Korean historical drama because it is based on a professional court lady. Before that, 
most epic drama in Korea had been focused on historical heroes and showed no interest 
in ordinary women or servants. Thus the production offered a unique narrative and 
perspective on Korean history. At the same time, the story also deals with a success 
story which is likely to have a broad appeal. 
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It shows the spirit of hard work, loyalty in love, strong family ties and a society filled 
with a deep respect for seniors and parents. Culturally, Korean society tries to cherish 
and considers as precious those values which Asian people initiated and upheld from 
Confucianism. On the other hand the story also goes against Confucianism's distinction 
between men's work and women's work. In terms of Confucianism, woman's social 
activity and professional success are frowned upon. In this respect, the drama does not 
rigidly follow the old values but adopts some modem values in order to appeal to a 
younger generation. Commenting on this, its writer Young-hyun Lee said "it is a 
feminism drama packaged with historical drama" (IF, summer: 29,2004) 
-Target Audience 
The range of audience for Daejanggeum was younger than that of normal epic drama. 
Before 2000, the main audience for epic drama was middle-aged people and productions 
did not target audiences under the age of 30. However, from the late 1990s epic dramas 
began to develop their style and storylines to appeal to younger and overseas audiences. 
In terms of story, the new drama included main characters from the common people not 
just the palace and began to pay attention to female heroines from the lower class. In 
style the new drama used striking visual effects and fashionable modem music. All of 
these were to appeal to the younger generation. Daeganggeum was a representative case 
for this trend since 2000. 
-Performance in the Korean market 
Daejanggeum caught the attention of Korean TV viewers with its unique combination of 
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two themes: the successful rise of a female, which had rarely been covered in the 
historical genre, and the elements of traditional food and medicine. According to TNS 
Media Korea (Aug. 24,2004), the highest ratings of Daejanggeum was 57.8 percent 
which is 10th in the history of Korean TV dramas and its average rating was 46.2% for 
six months. It was one of the biggest hit dramas in 2004. As well as being popular with 
audiences, it was also praised by critics because it extended the genre with its edifying 
story, sensational plots and fine cinematography. As it was given a warm reception in 
Korea, TV programme buyers from other Asian countries were already expressing 
interest before the final episode had aired. 
-Performance in markets outside Korea 
Most popular Korean dramas have been well received in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China and 
Japan. Daejanggeum was the same. Daejanggeum was first exported to Taiwan and 
achieved total export sales of $5 million by 2005. The boom of Daejanggeum abroad 
began in Taiwan and spread to other Asian countries and even to the Middle East, 
Europe and Australia in 2006. From May 2004, Daejanggeum aired in Taiwan for three 
months outperforming other Taiwanese mini-series and snatching the title of most 
viewed programme of the season. Overall, Lbejc mum ranked second in the TV ratings in 
Taiwan and was the first Korean drama to achieve this. The novel Daejanggeum based on the series 
became a bestseller in Taiwan and the original sound track of Daejanggewn `Ohnara' ranked the 6th in 
the g-music Asia Chat. (Taipei Yonhap, August 3,2004). Following Taiwan, in 2005 the final 
episode of Daejanggeum became the most-watched television show in Hong Kong 
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history. More than 40% of Hong Kong people watched it (Hong Kong Oriental Daily 
News, Oct 20,2005). 
6.2 Imitating the Hollywood System 
It is not only in the contents of films and TV dramas, but also in the infrastructure of the 
TV and film industries that Korea has been imitating Hollywood. While hybrid content 
did try to achieve universality in order to reduce cultural discount, Hollywood-style 
infrastructure has maximised economy of scale (Cowen, 2002). TV drama and 
filmmaking technology has developed considerably and production systems have 
evolved to become more centred on public tastes, resulting in a new look for Korean 
films and soap operas. The film and TV market in Korea has undergone significant 
transformations in the past five years, and these in turn have created unprecedented 
opportunities. 
In particular, the key characteristics of the Western capitalist model, such as vertical and 
horizontal integration for exploiting foreign markets (Levitt, 1983) and the maximisation 
of marketing strategies, have contributed to make the Korean cultural industry more 
systematic and commercialised since the end of the 1990s. In this section, we will 
examine how the Korean TV and film industries have been imitating the Hollywood 
systems. The aim of this examination is to investigate the development of the Korean 
television and film industries from net importers to exporters from the perspective of 
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industry structure. Since the Hollywood system was adopted in the Korean cultural 
industry as outlined below, the industry's infrastructure has been changed in practice. 
6.2.1 Exploring Overseas Markets: The Search for Economy of Scale 
First of all, it is not the domestic exhibition market but the export of films that tends to 
represent the breakthrough for growth, because the domestic market has reached 
saturation point (Verdin and Van Heck, 2001). From the perspective of economics, 
although a film may reach an audience of five hundred thousand, the revenues are not 
likely to be profitable because of skyrocketing production costs. An article in Variety 
(Nov. 29,2000) postulated that soaring budgets ($ 5-8.5 million) were not sustainable, 
given the relatively small Korean movie-going population and the limited market for 
such films overseas. 
The film Taegukgi (the Korean word for the national flag) is the biggest Korean 
blockbuster produced to date, with some $ 13 million invested into its production. To 
reach the break-even point solely through domestic sales, more than 7.5 million people, 
which is almost one sixth of the whole population of Korea, would have to have gone to 
see this film. Thus, even a film such as Taegukgi cannot be profitable in the domestic 
market even if it breaks all existing box office records. In this vein, Taegukgi focused 
more on the overseas rather than the domestic market from the stage of pre-production. 
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Director Kang Je-gyu said that Swiri had taught him about the international market. The 
total production budget of Swiri was $3.5million; one third of the production costs were 
met through export to Japan alone. Following this, Kang Je-gyu adopted various kinds 
of marketing strategies for his latest film Taegukgi, aimed at targeting the international 
market from the beginning. He tried to make a film that speaks not only to local 
moviegoers, but also to those abroad. In this context, even the casting of Jang Dong- 
geon and Won Bin as the lead actors in Taegukgi was in some way connected to his 
strategy; the actors' fan bases in Japan and Southeast Asia were taken into consideration 
in their casting (interviewed in Sep. 2004). 
In this context, Kang points out the importance of distribution. He emphasised that `it is 
difficult if a film is limited to the local market which is why we are conscious of 
developing a strategy to access Asia and even Europe and North America. For a Korean 
film to be competitive internationally means it has to fight not only with Asia but also 
Hollywood. To do this, we have to raise the distribution system as well as the quality of 
films. I want to make Taegukgi a stepping stone in overcoming these problems' 
(interviewed in Sep. 2004). With this vision and effort, Taegukgi was consequently sold 
to Universal Japan for an undisclosed sum in advance of its release. Along with that, it 
earned $100million in total revenues from its release on 300 screens in Japan (Yonhap 
News Agency, Sep. 29,2004). Apart from Japan, the film's producers signed contracts 
worth over $10 million in total with European and Asian distributors at the 2004 
American Film Market (ibid. ). 
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It is definitely not wise in investment terms to increase production costs beyond what is 
considered adequate for the domestic market in an attempt to produce a blockbuster 
(Verdin and Van Heck, 2001). As such, the makers of blockbusters must take the 
overseas market into serious consideration when deciding on production costs and sales. 
If the Korean film industry were to make use of foreign markets, overseas pre-sales 
could emerge as a good way of offsetting the financial dangers of producing 
blockbusters, while also helping to attract overseas investment. The most representative 
example of such a case is the film Tube, which posted the highest export earnings of the 
first-half of 2003. While this film did not do very well in the domestic market, 70% of 
the original production costs were recouped through its export. This strategy was 
successful as the film was felt to have potential in the overseas market because of its 
Hollywood style (Suh Young-joo, interviewed in Sep. 2004). 
Thus, from the viewpoint of production companies, foreign markets can be another good 
source for securing risky financial backing and, at the same time, a means of 
maximising profits through the economy of scale. Tse Seung Jae, president of Sidus, 
also placed emphasis on entering into the Japanese market. He remarks that the DVD of 
WhaSanGo, which barely sold 30 thousand copies domestically, was able to sell 110 
thousand copies in Japan and earned $3million in that market. He added that Japan is a 
tempting market in view of the population, which is three times that of Korea, and cost 
of living (interviewed in Oct. 2004). In this vein, Iseki Satoru, representative of the Hak 
Company and producer of The Crying Game, Smoke and The Assassin, also points out 
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that `it is very important to wisely choose distributors when exporting a film overseas in 
order to establish the required networks and to also promote the film in the domestic 
market' (KOFIC, 2003). 
In the TV industry, as a way of making inroads into foreign markets, Cheil Jedang 
forged an alliance with MTV Network Asia in 1999. Cheil Jedang gained a great 
advantage in joining hands with a global brand armed with a pan-regional marketing 
ability. The alliance is also beneficial to MTV. The most visible outcome of the strategic 
alliance between M-net and MTV was more active marketing, which targeted overseas 
advertisers interested in the Asian market. With the help of MTV, M-net aims to export 
Korean pop music more systematically to the Asian market. MTV programmes on M- 
net were reproduced to meet the tastes of local viewers in Korea, introducing Korean 
video jockeys to MTV programmes in cooperation with the U. S. company, and having 
Korean pop music occupy some 30 percent of the block apportioned to MTV on M-net's 
airwaves (Kissup Hwang, Interviewed in Nov. 2004 ). 
Needless to say, the reciprocal effect between success both at home and internationally 
helps to influence international investors and audiences, and seems to vindicate the 
importance of developing a strong domestic industry as a platform for international 
success. Soap operas and films that have been successful in the domestic market also 
tend to succeed in overseas markets. As in the case of A Fine Spring Day, where the film 
company Sidus attracted prior investment by Japan's Shochiku and Hong Kong's 
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Applause Pictures on the basis of the pre-sale of local copyrights, it has become possible 
to export to Japan at a higher price based on box office success in Korea. Such early 
returns of cost indicate that there is growing interest in Korean films, particularly in Asia, 
with Japan being the most important market. That is to say, it is generally the case that a 
film that is hugely successful in the domestic market tends to be exported to other Asian 
countries while it is very rare that a flop is exported easily and under good terms to other 
countries. 
In this circumstance, there have been recently established pre-production plans which 
are aimed at recouping all or part of the original investment through overseas sales, 
especially for big budget films. One of the practices currently employed to increase the 
possibility of this coming to pass involves increasing the number of overseas investors 
and making them investment partners at the planning stage, rather than granting them 
distribution rights after the completion of the film, in order to offset the high price of 
copyrights for Korean films. 
Thus, it is important to produce films that can be understood in Asian countries with less 
cultural discount. In this context, certain strategies are employed to promote the pre- 
sales of Korean films overseas and in the Asian market. Likewise, the Korean cultural 
industry has developed an export capacity by exploring overseas markets to maximise 
the economy of scale although at present this is for a regional rather than a global export 
market. 
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6.2.2 Horizontal and Vertical Integration: The Multi-windowing Effect 
Hollywood majors like Disney have exploited cross-promotion opportunities, from 
theme parks to other businesses. Disney stores and parks are used to promote each other, 
while also selling tickets for Disney shows, videos and DVDs. Through the use of 
multiple release windows, they maximise revenue across the full spectrum of theatrical, 
video and TV entertainment. `Windowing', the concept of `one-source, multi-use', has 
quickly become common practice in the cultural industry, and is used to maximise the 
economic value of TV programmes and films (Reitman, 1986). TV and film 
conglomerates use windows to sell viewers their own films and programmes in greater 
numbers. 
Since the mid 1990s, Korean conglomerates (known as Chaebols, see note in 
Appendices) have tended to both vertically and horizontally integrate their enterprises. 
The phenomenon of the Chaebols' entry into the cultural industry started with the initial 
investment field and was then expanded to incorporate production, distribution, 
screening, video and cable TV. Their vertical and horizontal integration strategy in the 
cultural industry was comparatively easier than that of old production companies. This is 
because the Chaebols have the considerable advantages of big capital and domestic and 
international networks, i. e. the same advantages enjoyed by major Hollywood 
companies. A by-product of this process was the accelerated advancement of the most 
underdeveloped domains in the Korean film industry, distribution and screening. Until 
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1999, when they withdrew from the film business, the conglomerates formed the main 
source of financial backing for the Korean film industry. These conglomerates 
transformed market structure by bringing with them a `shoestring business' management 
style and introducing a streamlined production system from pre-production to post- 
production, systematised marketing strategies and the rationalisation of finance. 
In the case of investment, the investor gets to hold all rights to the film or programmes, 
and for the investment company to profit from these copyrights, a sufficient 
distributional capacity is required. As a result, the conglomerates started to build up their 
own distribution channels such as cable TV, multiplexes and new media like Internet 
TV (Korea Times, Sep. 14,2000), and in the process they opted for a strategy of co- 
management with the existing, first-run theatres in Seoul, which had been transformed 
into or replaced by multiplexes. As the conglomerates became more and more extensive 
investors, production companies that dealt exclusively with their films began to appear. 
It was in the course of these changes that a specialist distribution sector began to emerge 
in the Korean film and TV industries. For example, companies like Samsung and 
Daewoo signed contracts for exclusive distribution rights with local major production 
companies. Accordingly, they achieved a rise in the number of profit windows available 
to them. As the conglomerates expanded their field of interest to the cable TV business, 
which started in 1993, and formed their own film channels, they needed programmes to 
fill them. This was the beginning of media convergence in Korea. 
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Samsung, for instance, advanced into the video market in the late 1980s through its 
programme distribution company Starmax, and from 1992 to 1995 the company also 
figured in the film production industry, investing partly and fully, through its affiliates, 
partly or fully, in almost 30 productions. During this period, Samsung also moved into 
the cable TV industry by opening a film channel called Catch One in 1993. In 1994, it 
advanced into the cinema exhibition business. In 1995, the company established the 
Samsung Media Business Group, which was to be in charge of all general film-related 
affairs. This development was of significance, not only because it brought together all of 
the group's different affiliates, but also in the sense that it marked the birth of a 
specialised, full-scale investment and distribution company. The business methods of 
the Samsung Media Business Group proved to be typical of those employed by the 
investment and distribution companies affiliated to the conglomerates (Noh Jong Yun, 
interviewed in Oct. 2004). 
However, the slack business in the cable and satellite TV domains discouraged the 
conglomerates as did the Korean film industry's worn-out box office and distribution 
system. In 1997, at the same time as the foreign currency crisis in Asia, the companies 
started to withdraw from the film business. Small, family-run and Chaebol-backed 
production companies began to give way to independent firms that functioned like 
Hollywood studios, producing multiple films each year and distributing them nationally. 
However, in 1999, as the Internet became a chief business machine for almost every 
industrial sector in Korea, the development of IT technology changed the functioning of 
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the economy, of society and of culture on a global scale. In all areas of the cultural 
industry, the convergence of contents and infrastructure such as in vertical integration 
was accelerated (Korea Herald, Sep. 8,2004). In particular, the satellite broadcast 
licence has become a sort of entry ticket introducing the new media moguls to the next- 
generation multimedia market, as broadcasting, telecommunications and the Internet 
move toward digital convergence (Hawkins, 1997; Tunstall, 1999). The more channels 
they have, the more audiences they can attract. 
Here, the theory of economies of scale can also be applied. Therefore, as many Internet- 
based companies experience an increased need for a variety of contents, they have 
started to invest in content making companies or to merge with them. This conjuncture 
of the need for contents and advances in technology provides an engine for the 
development of the audiovisual content industry, which has been reconfigured by multi- 
channelling, audience-customisation, and a local propensity for producing lively 
contents. In the cultural sector in particular, where the mixing of IT and contents is an 
essential element for successful operation, users can select what they specifically want 
to watch on the Internet, including news, entertainment, education, business and music, 
in a way very different from conventional mass media. Internet broadcasts are therefore 
expected to be highly customised in order to meet the diversified tastes of their viewers. 
This represents both a great opportunity and a significant challenge for producers. The 
three national television networks, KBS, MBC and SBS, which began airing digital 
broadcasts of some of their programmes in 2000, had to cope with stiff competition from 
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commercial satellite broadcasting, which made its debut in the second half of 2001 (Son, 
Chang-Young, interviewed in Sep. 2003). Likewise, through this trend of convergence 
and multi-windowing, the small domestic film and television sector has to accrue 
economies of scale and cope with limitless competition. 
After the retreat of these conglomerates following the foreign currency crisis in Korea, 
new conglomerates such as CJ and Orion came into the business. For a more detailed 
examination of these new conglomerates, see the case studies at the end of this chapter 
on p. 300. These new conglomerates were able to benefit from the improved 
infrastructure left behind by their predecessors. However, it cannot be denied that there 
is a difference between the big companies specialising in home appliances that started 
producing VCRs in the middle and late 1980s, and which started in the video industry 
and expanded into investment and distribution, and the newer, larger companies with 
footholds in the cinema business and cable TV industry. 
After 2000, the film industry fell into a frenzy of consolidation in all sectors, including 
production, distribution and exhibition. For example, CJ Entertainment, one of the two 
most powerful companies in the Korean film industry, operates in investment, 
distribution, production, video, international sales operations and owns the multiplex 
movie cinema chain CGV, while its sister company CJ Media operates cable and 
satellite channels M-net, the Food Channel and Home CGV. 
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This is not an isolated case, with rival company Cinema Service also pursuing vertical 
integration. Through a process of buyout and merger with parent company Locus 
Holdings to form Plenus Entertainment, Cinema Service aims to have the ability to 
control nearly all aspects of the filmmaking process, from investment and production 
through to marketing, exhibition, and video releases. It also operates its own studio 
complex, Art Service, a video DVD arm, a small film school, a talent management 
company and Primus Cinema, a fledgling multiplex chain. Primus Cinema, jointly 
owned by Plenus Entertainment, which is a parent of Cinema Service, and MVP Venture 
Capital, was launched in 2002 (Screendaily, April 14, July 25, Aug. 15,2002). 
Although Korea's distribution sector has been dominated in recent years by Cinema 
Service and CJ Entertainment, other new players have emerged. The upstart company 
Korea Pictures in particular has joined Cinema Service and CJ Entertainment as one of 
the strong players in the local market. With strong local films, once a film becomes a big 
hit, the production company can easily expand its power to distribution and easily earn 
more profit. Korea Pictures distributed the hit films Friend and My Wife Is a Gangster 
and ranked third among distributors with a 13.1% market share from only seven releases 
in 2001. The Orion Group also has longer-term ambitions towards vertical integration, 
producing, investing in and distributing films for multi-media conglomerates. Mediaplex, 
local media subsidiary of the Orion Group established in 2000 is also worth noting. In 
2002, it entered the distribution field in cooperation with financiers KM Culture, co- 
investing in and distributing the majority of the films financed by KM Culture, then 
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called Megabox Cineplex. Shortly thereafter it joined with U. S. -based Loews Cineplex. 
Meanwhile, Lotte Cinema, a subsidiary of the conglomerate Lotte Group, has made a 
gradual entry into the film distribution and production sectors. 
CJ Entertainment in particular has continued to acquire rival companies such as Tube 
Entertainment and Plenus Entertainment. In 2002, Cinema Service and CJ Entertainment 
ranked numbers 1 (22.3%) and 2 (18%) respectively in the distributor rankings, 
combining to capture 61% share of admissions to local films and a 40% share of the 
market around the time the two companies tried to merger. If the merger had been 
possible, it would have created the Korean film industry's biggest-ever company. Many 
had worried that the creation of such a large company would have had a distorting effect 
on the rest of the industry. If the deal had been completed, the result would have been a 
horizontally integrated company that would have towered over all others in film finance, 
production, distribution, and exhibition. 
However, due to protests against the merger by a number of citizens groups, together 
with the possibility that the deal could be blocked by Korea's Fair Trade Commission, 
the merger failed although it later happened indirectly. Plenus entertainment merged 
with Korea's online game giant NetMarble in 2003 instead of going ahead with a 
planned merger between Plenus and rival studio CJ Entertainment (Screendaily, June 1, 
2003). NetMarble, which has been 51% owned by Plenus since November 2001, has 
shown explosive growth since its launch in early 2000, accounting for 39% of the online 
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game market and posting a profit of $12.7m on total revenues of $22.5m in 2002. With 
this merger, Plenus Entertainment has gained a more stable financial footing and a 
strong source of profits while NetMarble gains complete access to one of Korea's top 
content providers in its bid to embrace video-on-demand and become a total 
entertainment portal. As such, CJ Entertainment became indirectly connected with 
Cinema Service through its merger with NetMarble in 2004. 
Stressing convergence and vertical integration within Cinema Service's existing 
activities, the company aimed to link enormously powerful contents providers that cover 
the whole field of the film industry such as film production, distribution, talent 
management, and even film equipment rental (Screendaily, Aug. 15,2002). However, as 
Cinema Service separated from its parent company Plenus Entertainment in 2004, CJ 
Entertainment had a partnership with Cinema Service in production and distribution. 
This reveals just one of the many possibilities open to companies in the Korean cultural 
industry in their pursuit of strategies towards vertical integration. Such consolidation is 
not limited by domestic boundaries. CJ Entertainment's mother company, the Cheil 
Jedang Group, a food and consumer products conglomerate, had a stake in the major 
Hollywood studio DreamWorks SKG and has been moving toward a strategic alliance 
with major international media companies in an effort to strengthen its overseas 
influence and recognition. 
During this boom in the cultural industry, broadcasting stations also started to invest in 
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the production of cultural contents such as films, songs and dramas for various kinds of 
old and new media. However, broadcasting stations tried not to invest their capital 
simply based on commercial potential, as commercial value was not the decisive factor 
for them. MBC, for example, is not a completely private company as they receive 
support in the form of government funds. Their public image must therefore be reflected 
in the selection of the contents in which they invest. 
When it comes to the method of entering the film industry, these broadcasting 
companies have been extending their areas of operation into the film industry in 
accordance with their own present circumstances and conditions. Likewise, as vertical 
and horizontal mergers and acquisitions among companies in the cultural industry and 
other industries continue, a merged entity tends to tower over all others in the 
investment, production, distribution and exhibition sectors. As film and TV industries 
become more heavily capitalised, the merger and acquisition activity referred to above 
have resulted in a major realignment of the cultural industry. 
6.2.3 Exploiting Various Financial Sources 
There had been a need to internationalise the financing structure of content production in 
order to gain more money as production budgets increased with the advent of Korean 
blockbusters. However, since the end of the 1990s, the financing of cultural products has 
come out of Internet funds, the stock market and special cinema funds established by 
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venture capital firms for the production of multiple titles. Between 1999 and 2000, $ 
13million was raised in 17 investment funds (MCT, 2003). This reveals that the Korean 
entertainment industry has attracted great interest from local investors. 
The biggest difference between investment companies and the conglomerates lies in the 
speed of their decision-making and their more flexible organisational structures. 
Compared to the conglomerates, where it can take up to 6 months to move from 
proposal to the execution of the production budget, passing through several decision- 
making stages, in the investment firms, the person directly in charge does the arbitrary 
decision-making or receives sanction from the owner, which saves time in the decision- 
making process (Oh, Wan-Jin, interviewed in Nov. 2004). 
Also, if it turns out that the earning rate is low or that a higher profit can be expected in 
other areas, it can quickly stop its investments. As regulations require that trust funds 
and individual private investments, be invested in a publicly listed company, Korean 
companies have tended to try to go public (Yonhap News Agency, June 25,2003). In 
2002, CJ Entertainment broke new ground, issuing a 30% stake worth $34 million as the 
nation's first film-related company to issue an IPO (Initial Public Offering) (ibid. ). The 
company's share price doubled in value in the course of the day, with investors citing the 
strength of the local film industry as grounds for their optimism. 
In the meantime, many local investors have already invested directly in production 
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through netizen (a portmanteau of Internet and Citizen which means Internet user) funds, 
raising cash from private individuals over the Internet (Variety, Jan. 1,2002). This can 
act as an alternate model for the funding of local Internet firms based on the stock 
market such as Simmani and Daum. Marketed purely as an investment tool, Simmani's 
netizen funds are made available in a limited initial offering several weeks prior to a 
film's release for investments as small as $10 (Eum Yoon-Sang, interviewed in May 
2005). For the duration of the fund's term which lasts until three months after the film's 
release on video, investors may freely trade shares at prices set by the market. When the 
fund expires, the film's performance in terms of theatrical admissions, video sales, cable 
TV, Internet rights and international sales are taken into account and shareholders are 
paid an appropriate return on their investment. 
The first netizen fund introduced in 1999 by online start-up Intz. com was based around 
the idea of having online users invest directly in a wrestling comedy, The Foul King. 
Designed as a marketing rather than an investment tool, the fund was used primarily to 
finance offline promotional events and press screenings, to which the fund's 
contributors would receive special invitations. The film eventually earned its investors a 
97% return on their investment. Such high, quick rates of return appealed to individuals 
in comparison with a floundering stock market. Other companies specialising in the 
funds quickly appeared and investor demand skyrocketed. Although investors large and 
small flocked to netizen funds with high expectations, most films led to significant 
losses for individual netizen fund investors, such as Kilimanjaro, which produced a 54% 
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loss for its 212 investors (Yoon, Zong Yeon, interviewed in Dec. 2004). 
However, by means of this new type of investment, Korean filmmaking has been 
changed. Investors began to call for public access to distribution plans and scenarios 
prior to release. As a result, pre-production had to be intensified in order to attract more 
investors. Despite some fears of high risk in cultural industry, netizen funds are 
spreading from the film industry into other forms of entertainment, notably Korea's 
booming music industry. Netizen funds appear to have settled as a permanent fixture in 
the Korean film industry, with virtually all major local releases and many imported films 
making use of the funds' marketing power. These new netizen funds not only introduced 
a new source of capital, but also led to a more transparent and aggressive approach to 
distribution and marketing. At the same time, producers can take advantage of online 
investors' responses, monitoring their replies about scenarios, shooting and promotion 
throughout the filmmaking process. 
In addition, netizen funds and other private investments signal increased public 
confidence and involvement in the industry, and have resulted in greater pressure to 
build in pre-sales, distribution and financial controls. This in turn has encouraged the 
banks to be more supportive and place more trust in the sector. The $7.8m Hana Cinema 
Trust Fund No. 1, launched in 2001, marks the first ever involvement of the banking 
sector in Korean film financing, with the bank starting to provide a means for the public 
to invest in films. This implies the Korean film industry has matured enough to be able 
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to win this level of trust from the banking sector. With its continued growth, the Korean 
cultural industry has also started to attract investment from foreign companies and this 
has become another major source of financial backing. For example, the U. S. -based 
investment company Warburg Pincus took a 7.1% stake in Cinema Service (Lee, Jae-Jin, 
interviewed in Dec. 2004). In 1999, MTV acquired equity stakes in Korean music cable 
channel M-net, a subsidiary of the CJ group, a move that led to the first formal 
investment of foreign media capital in Korea such as MTV and Sony (Park Dongho, 
interviewed in Nov. 2004). 
As above, with the advent of investment companies, the Korean cultural industry was 
introduced to the concept of the executive producer who deals with the general 
commercial matters of cultural products including films, from drawing investment 
capital to striking deals. Furthermore, as the investment firms control the production of a 
film or soap opera through a thorough management of their funds, the importance of 
pre-planning was highlighted, as well as the fact that this requires managing the sensible 
execution of the given budget in a production. The adoption of an advanced finance 
system in the cultural industry means that most funds divide their investments into 
several productions to safeguard against failure at the box office owing to the typical 
view of the cultural industry as a risky business. Consequently, the rule-of-thumb 
approach to estimating the budget has slowly disappeared. Thus, the influx of financial 
capital into the Korean film industry has contributed to the build up of a modern 
production system, the so-called Hollywood system. 
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6.2.4 Maximising Commercialisation 
As far as the worldwide popularity of U. S. soap operas all over the world is concerned, 
Sinclair agrees that `vigorous marketing [rather] than the universality and primordiality 
of the US soap opera is certainly a reason for the international success of Dallas because 
`universality and primordiality' are features of the genre as a whole rather than peculiar 
to US soap opera' (1990: 4). America definitely has very strong marketing skills that 
Korea still needs to develop further (Wasko, 2003; 1994). Moreover, Korean marketing 
skills are weak compared to smaller regions such as Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 
Until quite recently in Korea, it was common practice that the production of cultural 
content, including films and TV programmes, was not based on market research. 
However, as in the case of automobile exports, Korean producers are learning that a 
carefully planned and boldly executed marketing drive can help promote sales of their 
films and TV dramas abroad as well. As an example of new market awareness, People- 
meter services used to predict the market in the media industry were introduced by the 
U. S. business survey agency ACNielsen's Korea branch, and in the late 1990s, this 
service was broadly adopted by the cultural industry. Since the end of the 1990s, the 
Korean cultural industry has become rapidly commercialised, imitating various 
marketing strategies used by Hollywood majors. The movie Swiri owed part of its 
success to the clamorous promotion activities marketed under the catch phrase `Korean- 
style blockbuster', aimed at challenging its Hollywood counterparts. After that, studies 
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to collect information on audience attitudes and purchasing behaviour, customer 
satisfaction, brand awareness and advertising effectiveness have started being conducted 
in the cultural industry (Sim, 2002; Kim and Yang, 1998). 
With the advent of high levels of competition in the film and television industries, the 
managerial and commercial aspects of production became a means of mediating the 
irrationality of creativity (Ryan, 1992: 153). As creative personnel were often 
considered to be less in tune with the logic of the marketplace, it was necessary to 
administer the discipline of repetition and standardisation around both work practices 
and creative output to ensure that commercial goals were realised (Moran and Keane, 
2004: 10). Korean producers favoured by the success of several Korean TV series and 
films that used aggressive marketing strategies are now adept at promoting their 
programmes, often sending leading actors and actresses to other Asian countries on 
Hollywood-style promotion trips as Hollywood stars do (Christy Lee, Interviewed in 
March. 2005; Suk, Songja, interviewed in Dec. 2004). 
Likewise, the Korean TV and film industries have been developing a star system on the 
Hollywood model. It is interesting to note that the main blame for the skyrocketing costs 
of productions has been attributed to the increased costs brought about by the star 
system which has been in operation since around 2000. As blockbuster films have 
become an enduring trend, the talent management companies that have big stars have 
tended to expand their field of interest into production. Labour costs for both cast and 
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crew have shot up, and talent management companies such as Sidus HQ have started 
demanding significant percentages of a film's gross profits in return for the casting of a 
major star. Moreover, as production costs rise, the market for product placement and 
merchandising tie-ins has been evolving to help diversify risk. The benefits of marketing 
cultural products are not only for proven blockbusters; even the poorest production 
company can benefit from the implementation of marketing strategies (Lieberman, 
2002). Since 1995, the average production cost of Korean films has increased more than 
two-fold to $2.2milion in 2000, posting a continued increase from $Imilion in 1995 and 
$1.9m in 1999 (KOFIC, 2001). Meanwhile, average promotion and advertising spending 
has almost quadrupled since 1998. In the case of soap operas, the cost of one episode of 
a Korean TV drama can be as high as $55,000 as of 2002 (KBC, 2004). Though the 
increased number of productions explains part of the rise, a glut of investment capital 
has led to vastly increased spending on budgets and particularly on print and advertising 
costs. 
Graph B. Export Price per Episode of Korean TV Programmes 
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As promoters push for Hollywood-style openings, marketing budgets have soared above 
$1 million per film; this is more than triple the average budget in the late 1990s. 
Although arguments for reducing the production costs of Korean films have been raised, 
the reality is that large-scale films with production costs in excess of $5 million are 
continuing to be either produced or prepared (Screendaily, March 7,2002). Taegukgi is 
a good example of a production imitating a Hollywood marketing style. The film, which 
was Korea's biggest budgeted film ($12.8m), spent an additional $1.7m on promotion 
and advertising. The production company used various kinds of marketing strategies, 
and as Newsweek (May 3,2004) mentioned, `Kang Je Gyu's marketing of Taegukgi 
offers a blueprint many in Asia could follow'. Most of these methods are hallmarks of 
the Hollywood marketing style such as world premiere screening, wide release and 
exhibition. First of all, it launched a world premiere screening in February 2004 for 
foreign and local guests as Hollywood major companies normally do, a first in Korean 
f ilm history (Yonhap News Agency, Feb. 4,2004). 
Secondly, it followed a wide release strategy, which is one of major characteristics of 
the Hollywood marketing style (Grant & Wood, 2004: 76-77). With the help of these 
marketing methods, Taegukgi had a record-breaking debut on more than 500 screens and 
earned $10.7 million its first weekend. Thus, wide release has become a trend not only 
with Hollywood blockbusters but also for Korean blockbusters. Silmido opened on 450 
screens and earned $9.6 million in its first weekend. In February 2004, three Korean 
films (Silmido, Taegukgi and Once upon a Time in High School) occupied 67% of 
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screens in the nation's 1200 cinemas (Screendaily, February 11,2004; Korea Times, Jan. 
9,2004). Some films, like Yeochinso, began to be released simultaneously in both Korea 
and other Asian countries, as is typical with major Hollywood films. Yeochinso, in 
which Bill Kong, producer of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, was an investor, was 
wide-released in Taiwan and Hong Kong at the same time. More recently, actor Bae 
Yong Jun's new film, April Snow, was released simultaneously in 10 different Asian 
countries owing to his popularity throughout Asia (Korea Times, Aug. 23,2005). This 
strategy was also aimed at minimising the illegal downloading and pirating of DVDs 
throughout the regions, again a strategy typically used by Hollywood majors. 
Thirdly, Taegukgi exhibition in a theme park was introduced for the first time in film 
marketing in Korea. As a final indication of this new market orientation, Taegukgi 
opened a couple of months earlier than the intended release date in order to boost would- 
be audiences' interest in the film. Furthermore, the film was screened with English 
subtitles in selected Seoul theatres for the first time (Korea Times, June 7,2002). 
However, wide release does not guarantee a big success. Moreover, not all big budget 
films can be guaranteed a large number of screens. Kang Je-gyu said that `ever since the 
industry reformed, it has become more and more like America. Cinemas will cut movies 
which do not attract audiences almost immediately because there are so many other 
films waiting to run (interviewed in Sep. 2004). ' For example, the expensive animated 
feature Wonderful Days managed to secure only 28 screens in Seoul on its debut 
weekend, ultimately drawing 47,000 admissions and earning an average $8,600 per 
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screen. Although this was the strongest ever opening of a local animated film, it was not 
enough to secure the financial success of the film. Matchbox is another example. These 
two have proven that even though a film may be classed as a blockbuster in terms of its 
production costs, it can easily flop if it cannot achieve wide release, and even then, wide 
release does not guarantee major success. This is due in part to extreme competition 
under market conditions. 
Furthermore, the Internet boom caused the growth of the on-line advertising market. 
Thus, the promotion of `e-marketing' has been very important in order to appeal to 
Internet-driven younger audiences. In particular, as of 2000, around 3,000 entertainment 
portals became listed on the Web, introducing on-line movies, music and broadcast 
services (MCT, 2001). The advent of satellite and cable TV in the 1990s and their 
market penetration and growth afterwards have begun to shift the balance decisively and 
inexorably in favour of the online marketing of commercial cultural products. This 
means that the marketing and advertising of cultural products has been expanding from 
the traditional media towards new media forms such as digital TV and the Internet 
(Korea Times, May 31,2000). 
With such a plethora of cultural content-related websites already in existence, the focus 
for the production and distribution as well as marketing of films is rapidly shifting from 
the traditional media such as TV and cinema to the ever-expanding Internet. iCBN 
(Internet Cinema Broadcasting Network), the first Korean Internet company specialising 
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in online screenings, was established in 2000. In this context, online marketing has taken 
an unusual turn in South Korea's booming cultural industry. 
Film and TV drama fans can turn to the web, not only to read about their favourite films 
or programmes, but also to watch them, advertise them via word of mouth and even 
invest in them. In March 2001, two weeks prior to its scheduled release, the gangster 
film Friend raised $1 million from 190 online investors in one minute. Moreover, in 
May 2001, a month before its release date, action-comedy Kick the Moon raised $ 
1.5million in only ten seconds. As mentioned before, these `Netizen funds' are the latest 
online development. Local film companies have found the funds to be a huge boon - less 
for the money they provide than for the loyalty or advertising effect it engenders among 
their young investors. 
6.2.5 Case studies of Two Major Communication Conglomerates in Korean 
Cultural Industry: CJ Entertainment and Mediaplex 
fCJ ENTERTAINMENT 
-Structure of Ownership 
CJ Entertainment is a subsidiary of the conglomerate CJ Group which is a food and 
consumer products conglomerate and acts as a media and entertainment business arm of 
300 
PART. III Chapter 6. Imitating Hollywood: Contents and Infrastructure 
the conglomerate. It was initiated as a film division of CJ Corp in 1995 when CJ Corp. 
took part in the foundation of DreamWorks Studio in the U. S. and spun off from CJ 
Corp in 2000. After it went onto the stock market with an Initial Public Offering in 2002, 
it was owned by CJ Corp (37%), foreign investors (16%), JH Lee (15%), institutional 
Investors (14%) and others (18%) according to CJE as of end of 2004 (Source: CJ 
Annual Report). 
-Range of Activities 
<Diagram 1> Media Entertainment Business in CJ 
CJ Entertainment I 
MOVIE MISIC II CATV CAME 
CJ Music Cinema Art Service Music Service Movie AD & 
publishing Film production studio 
& distributor & star 
management 
CJ CGV Primus 
Multiplex Multiplex 
operator Cinema 
CJ Media 
Multi-program provider broadcasting & CATV channels 
CJ Joycube CJ Nkino 
Home Online movie 
Entertainment portal 
franchise 
CJE DreamWorks 
Hong Kong SKG 
CJ Cablenet 
Top MSO with 7 
SOs nationwide 
CJ Internet 
Online 
game portal 
Netmarble 
(Source: CJ Entertainment) 
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As seen above, the fast changing media contents market is destroying longstanding 
barriers among filmmakers, broadcasters, talent management firms and mobile carriers. 
CJ Entertainment has been part of this trend. At first, the company began to distribute 
films and expanded its range to investment, production and distribution. Through the 
multiplex movie cinema chain CJ CGV which is its subsidiary company, it controls 
exhibition. In 2004, CJ Entertainment had a partnership with Cinema Service in 
production and distribution. This reveals just one of the many possibilities open to 
companies in the Korean cultural industry in their pursuit of strategies towards vertical 
integration. Such consolidation is not limited by domestic boundaries. 
Moreover, another subsidiary CJ Media which operates cable and satellite channels M- 
net, the Food Channel and Home CGV. CJE can find a market for most of its film 
contents by supplying it to these cable channels which can be said to represent `one 
source, multi-use'. Emphasising convergence and vertical integration within Cinema 
Service's existing activities, the company aimed to build links covering the whole field 
of the film industry including powerful content providers, film production, distribution, 
talent management, and even film equipment rental. 
-Profits and Turnover 
When it comes to turnover and profits, the revenue of CJE was $65.1 million in 2001 
and increased to $71.5 million in 2002, $103.6 million in 2003 and $118.4 million in 
20004. As for profits, it earned $8.5 million in 2001, $6.1 million in 2002, $17million in 
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2003 and $19.1 million in 2004. These numbers may not appear impressive in terms of 
scale. However in terms of market dominance, the influence of the company is huge. CJ 
CGV became the leading multiplex cinema operator in Korea with admissions of 33 
million and market share of 25% in 2004. Through rapid site expansion in prime 
locations, it also became the number one operator in the Korean theatre market, 
operating 26 sites with 207 total screens as of year 2004. 
-Main Overseas Markets 
CJ Entertainment's main overseas markets are China, Taiwan and Japan. Around 80% 
of its films were exported to these areas. Thus, it has been very keen to build foreign 
bases in these countries as well as seeking to penetrate foreign market through co- 
production with foreign partners. Thus CJE has a Hong Kong subsidiary, CJE Hong 
Kong, to handle releases in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. CJE Hong Kong is the 
distributor of CJE & DreamWorks films in China and Hong Kong. By setting up CJE 
Hong Kong, the company was able to increase foreign distribution, especially through 
pre-sales of domestic films. Now CJE is targeting Japan as the next leg of its expanding 
distribution network. 
J\ 
fMEDIAPLEX 
-Structure of Ownership 
Orion was a subsidiary of confectioner, the Tongyang Group. However, in 2001 Orion 
303 
PART. Ili Chapter 6. Imitating Hollywood: Contents and Infrastructure 
was spun off from the Group along with media, movie, and entertainment subsidiaries to 
form a new group of its own, the Orion. Mediaplex was the local media subsidiary of the 
Orion corporation, as owned mainly by Orion. In 2006, it made an Initial Public 
Offering. As of 2006, it was owned by Orion Corp (57.5%), Hwa-kyoung Lee, wife of 
Chul-gon Dam, CEO of Orion corporation (10.2%), Employ Stock Ownership 
Association (3.1%), Public Subscription (28.6%) and others (0.6%). (Source: Mediaplex 
IR Report) 
-Range of Activities 
Since 2000 the Orion Group expanded its range of businesses from the confectionery 
industry, into the entertainment and media business. Mediaplex, which is the 
entertainment and film business subsidiary of Orion Group, was established in 1999. 
Mediaplex had longer-term ambitions towards vertical integration, producing, investing 
in and distributing films for multi-media conglomerates. In 2000 Mediaplex entered the 
exhibition field by opening the Megabox theatre complex and in 2002, Megabox 
established Showbox to provide a platform for its entry into movie production and 
distribution. Through Showbox, Mediaplex formed two investment cooperatives to 
strengthen such activities. Mediaplex set up a vertical integration strategy through 
Megabox and Showbox. At the same time, it also achieved synergies in cooperation with 
other subsidiaries such as cable TV channels OCN, Tooniverse, and On Style. Through 
these channels the contents Megabox produces can be distributed effectively and 
efficiently. Thus, Orion can capitalise on a variety of media contents using Megabox, 
304 
PART. III Chapter 6. Imitating IIoIhwood: Contents and Infrastructure 
Showbox and popular cable TV channels as distribution channels. 
ORION 
Retail 
Almý 1411, Cosifrkctiö Ma 
Restaurant 
100.0°h 54.6% 82.2' 
Orion Snack 
International Co. Buy the Way Medial 
88.8% 55.0' 
China 
rise ON* Mega[ 88.5% Orion Food Co. 
100.0% Orion Food (Si Co. 
100.0% Orion Snack Co. 
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100.0% Orion Food RUS Co. 
Vietnam 
100.0% Orion Food Vim Co. 
Media Gaming 
42.5% 52.1% 
ON'Media Sports ToTo 
100.0% 
MPP MSO STT On-Line 
814% OCN. 76.0% Donggu 
62.9% Bodook TV 64.5% Soowung 
78.5% On Game 55.1% Youngdong 
80.2% Digital On Media 52.5% Donqbu 
Source Orion 
-Profits and Turnover 
In tandem with the entertainment media group, On Media which continues to show 
remarkable growth in sales every year. Mediaplex has kept gro\\ ing in both revenues 
and market share. When it comes to turnover and profits, Mediaplcx achieved $90 
million in revenue and $8 million in profits in 2005 which led Mediaplex to become the 
second largest player in the Korean film industry. The company's exhibition unit, 
Megabox, was especially successful, receiving the world's largest number ol'admissions 
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in a day and named the best exhibitor in Asia in 2003. In 2005 the film distribution unit, 
Showbox snatched the top position in a market it had only entered three years previously 
by drawing more than one million viewers to its first movie and more than five million 
to its next hit, and achieving an average of more than two million viewers per movie 
over its first three releases. With these favorable performances, Mediaplex successfully 
listed shares on the Kosdaq (Korea Securities Dealer's Automated Quotations System) 
market in 2006. Mediaplex thus became Korea's second major film company following 
CJ Entertainment even though it was a relatively new entrant to the industry. 
-Main Overseas Markets 
The main overseas markets for Mediaplex are China and Japan. These markets have 
huge audiences with sufficient economic means to pay for entertainment such as films 
and TV dramas. As a strategy for oversea markets, Showbox of Orion group launched its 
own international sales division in 2003. It tried breaking into international film markets 
to show and distribute its hit films to other countries. As a result, a Korean mega-hit in 
2005, the movie Welcome to Dongmakgol was sold for a $2million minimum guarantee 
to a major Japanese movie distributor at the 2005 American Film Market (AFM). Based 
on the success of Megabox in the domestic market, Mediaplex plans to enter into 
overseas markets with its exhibition business Megabox. In 2008, Megabox is going to 
open two cinemas in China before the Beijing Olympic Games and to expand its 
network of entertainment and contents businesses there. 
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Conclusion 
What links all of these strategies designed essentially to imitate the Hollywood system is 
that they are all related to networking (or distribution). This is not confined to the film 
industry, but is representative also of the TV, music and games industries. All of the 
cultural contents industries need to make particular use of this new approach because the 
success of a cultural product is based on the principle of high production cost but almost 
zero reproduction cost (Vogel, 2004). Thus, networking is the best strategy to achieve 
economies of scale. This is why most semi-peripheral powerhouses are based on 
diasporic markets which work as a network for cultural products. The Korean wave has 
been rising without the benefit of a diasporic market or network abroad and as such is a 
rare case. 
In this vein, Doherty writes `[the] resulting blend of Hollywood narratives and Korean 
attitudes and locale creates an interesting, if sometimes schizophrenic, result .... 
The 
popular Hollywood film genres and their Korean counterparts crossbreed with amazing 
ease. Westerns, private eye films, spy adventures, historical costume drama, and the pop 
musical have all been adopted and put into an indigenous setting' (1984: 145). In TV, 
the influx of Japanese television culture has further facilitated cultural hybridisation 
locally and has played an important role in bridging the gap between global pop culture 
and local pop culture. 
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In the late 1990s, greater cultural exchanges with Japan as well as the more marked 
presence of the global media in Korea, along with the development of new media, 
complicated and hybridised the Korean cultural landscape to a greater degree. They 
were trans-localised from Japan and the USA and re-localised in Korea. In the case of 
Korean popular culture, it is said that Korean cultural talents successfully combine 
Korean culture and the distinctive features of the United States, Japan and even Europe. 
Korea successfully localised the influences of Hollywood and Japan by imitating, 
emulating and appropriating the original contents, although sometimes it did remain 
dominated, colonised or worried by its dominant international competitors. Thanks to 
this characteristic of hybridisation, Korean pop culture can be easily accessed via 
common elements and therefore can appeal to peoples from other countries or cultures. 
To sum up, we must first of all recognise that Korean popular culture has itself evolved 
alongside the importation of Western media culture, especially American media culture. 
The formation of a distinctive Korean television and film culture has been 
contextualised by American media culture. Japanese culture is another resource which 
has explicitly and implicitly influenced Korean culture. Ironically, given that it was 
banned from 1945 to 1998, Japanese culture has become an important vehicle for 
shaping Western culture within a Korean context as specifically as or even more so than 
American culture did. Thus, the Korean blockbuster can be said to be a mixture; 
Western style in terms of industry structure and content management but with an Eastern 
touch in structure of feeling. 
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This hybridisation trend has also influenced the TV, game and music industries. 
Production companies that are linked with investment firms have made aggressively 
large-scale productions based on the idea that such investment would bring positive 
results, with these products becoming hits, and therefore becoming viable in overseas 
markets and eventually bringing about the enlargement of the entire Korean market 
based on economy of scale. We know well enough where the barriers of 
incomprehension between languages may lie. Likewise, the deciding factor for 
competitiveness in the audio-visual industry is basically related to its language and 
cultural market size. 
One may rather facilely explain the popularity of Indian and Hong Kong movies in 
much of the developing world by referring to the fact that they are cheap, which appeals 
to distributors, and action-packed, which appeals to somewhat unsophisticated audiences. 
In other words, cultural discount derived from culture and language and economy of 
scale based on market size does matter. The consumption of audio-visual products 
assumes, as prerequisite elements, a certain understanding of the language or the culture; 
therefore it is a common knowledge that the number of populations using same language 
or sharing a similar culture is an important variable. 
Thus, productions that target only the domestic market could be a big risk. The financial 
risk is lower, while the market risk is higher. Conversely, by taking a higher financial 
risk and pursuing international hits, the market risks and rewards are arguably more 
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attractive. Once again, there is a paradox here. Including the financial approach 
mentioned above, the Korean TV and film industries have been imitating the Hollywood 
systems in industry structure and production management. Since the Hollywood system 
was adopted in the Korean cultural industry, the industry's infrastructure has been 
changed in practice. 
The cross-synergy idea of horizontal and vertical integration was introduced in order to 
maximise efficiency and benefits through the economy of scale as cultural products 
strive to exploit overseas markets, as previously discussed. Aggressive marketing has 
also played a part in developing diverse marketing methods and expanding the market 
through cooperation. All of these were keys in the development of the Korean television 
and film industries from net importers to exporters through the imitation of the 
Hollywood system. In some respects Korea has not only emulated Hollywood but 
actually gone beyond the Hollywood, particularly in its innovative models of finance 
and investment. 
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CHAPTER 7. The Korean Way: A Compromise between 
Two Extremes 
The flow of culture across state borders has been a longstanding concern to state 
policymakers seeking both to guard national prerogatives and to define and 
develop social identities in ways consistent with their vision of the nation 
(Curran and Porter 1983; McGuigan 1996; Higson and Maltby 1999; Hill 1999). 
As seen in earlier chapters addressing the economic factors behind Hanryu, 
Korea has successfully implemented a number of cultural policy changes in 
recent years in response to globalisation, resulting in the transformation of the 
domestic cultural industry into a Hollywood-type system. Korean cultural 
policy since the Kim Dae-jung regime can be said to have been quite successful 
in terms of economic interest, social inclusion and national image. 
Outsiders have recently begun to view Korea as a model for survival for other 
local cultural industries in the region. Delegations from Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Taiwan and all over Asia have been flocking to Korea to study the Korean film 
renaissance at the Pusan film festival held in Korea every autumn, trying to 
learn from the Korean policy behind the recent boom. For example, at the 
311 
PART. III Chapter 7. The Korean Way: A Compromise Between Two Extremes 
`Revitalising the Hong Kong Film Industry Forum' organised in an effort to 
combat the sharp downturn in production levels and box office receipts in 2002, 
a representative of the Korean Film Commission was called on to outline how 
the body had contributed to the current boom in Korean cinema (Screendaily, 
Oct. 22,2002). In the creation of a Hong Kong Film Commission to centralise 
all of the territory's film support mechanisms, the benchmarking of the Korean 
Film Commission was one of the key proposals. Likewise, the Asian cultural 
delegations arriving in Seoul now recognise the extent to which the region's 
other major markets lack vitality when compared with Korea. Hong Kong 
producer Bill Kong, who made Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, says that 
`Hong Kong people including me look at Korea with an envious eye. 
Filmmakers and audiences have found a real vibe between them, like in the 
1970s and '80s in Hong Kong' (Newsweek, May 3,2004). 
Here, important questions remain: is this model sustainable? Can it really be 
generalised in this way? Policies on globalisation have had a dual effect, 
promoting economic success at the expense of cultural diversity, a development 
with which Korea is now having to cope. When it comes to fair competition, as 
opposed to free competition (Chomsky, 1999: 367), the Korean wave has not 
guaranteed cultural diversity by fair competition. Thus, there is a need to look 
beyond superficial phenomena and undertake an extensive analysis of the 
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effects of Korean cultural policy on the Korean wave in reality. 
7.1 The Dilemmas of the Korean Cultural Industry 
When it comes to discussing the Korean cultural industry of recent years, it is 
necessary also mention the phenomenon of the Korean blockbuster, despite the 
fact that their history is relatively short. As a result of the rapidly changing 
industrial environment and changes in the market, various Korean blockbusters 
have emerged and in turn led to changes in industry conditions. It is said that 
Korean blockbusters and the quota system have, in a sense, accelerated the 
renaissance of the Korean cultural industry. 
However, at the same time, there has been concern that the current perspective 
of the cultural industry, bent on the production of blockbusters, may ultimately 
impede the diversity of Korean TV programmes and films regardless of quota 
system. Thus, we need to establish what blockbusters mean to the Korean 
cultural industry and what the cultural implications of this are, that is, we need 
to find out what kind of role the quota system for screen and broadcasting plays 
within a Korean cultural industry that is highly dependent on its domestic 
market. Here, we need to note how it became possible to produce and develop 
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Korean blockbusters within the industrial structure of the Korean cultural 
industry and the dilemmas they have caused in the industry. 
7.1.1 Broadcasting & Screen Quota System 
The U. S. claims that the screen quota system in Korea is having negative effects, 
undermining profitability and leading to a decrease in screening venues (Kim 
Hyu-jong, 1998), particularly as this system remains the largest obstacle to the 
U. S. 's plans for large-scale investment to build multiplex cinemas in Korea 
(Kim Mee-hyun, 2003). Contrary to the U. S. 's claim, Korea has in fact 
witnessed an increase in the number of screens, including multiplex cinemas, as 
well as in the number of filmgoers, all while its screen quota system has 
remained firmly enforced. Even with the financial difficulties resulting from the 
foreign currency crisis of 1997, the number of cinema screens in the country 
increased from 497 in 1997 to 707 in 2000 (MCT, 2001). 
Meanwhile, since the advent of multiplex cinemas, the import of foreign movies 
has declined from a peak of 458 in 1996 to 366 in 2001, belying expectations. 
That is to say, the increase of multiplex cinemas reflects the popularity of 
Korean films, which has occurred regardless of the screen quota system. In this 
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case, quotas for screen and TV seem not to be needed any more. Furthermore, 
because of the domination of the domestic television and film market by a 
handful of major local companies, there is a need to re-evaluate the role and 
effectiveness of the quota system, which was established in order to protect 
domestic cultural products for cultural diversity. Are these quotas for screen and 
broadcasting working towards their original objectives of supporting fair 
competition for smaller cultural products and promoting cultural diversity? Thus, 
an examination of the logic behind the argument against the quota system is 
needed. 
All countries outside of the U. S must, at a national level, establish a certain 
support system to protect their own films or TV programmes, in addition to 
establishing certain regulations to prevent a monopoly of cultural products from 
one particular country. As a flagship case, former French Culture Minister 
Jacques Lang proclaimed all-out war against Hollywood's cultural depredation 
and rules were established in 1989 requiring that 60 percent of all film 
programming on French television be European and 40 percent of music played 
on French radio and television be of French origin (Miller, 1996: 79). France 
operates various support systems in order to maintain its culture, tradition and 
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cultural industry. According to Xavier Merlin, director of European and 
international affairs at France's National Cinema Centre, the French government 
collects 11 percent of local cinemas' total profits and part of the profits from the 
television and video industries to invest in the domestic film industry (PIFF 
Seminar, 2002). 
From the perspective of international trade conventions, the screen quota system 
in particular has been given cultural exception status by various international 
free trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) in 1986 and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 
1994. Producer Yoo In-taek noted that `the U. S agreed to exclude cultural 
products for Canada when they signed the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and there is no reason they should not do the same for 
Korea' (interviewed in 2003). 
It is broadly accepted that a cultural product is more than just a commodity, so it 
should be considered outside of international trade negotiations. Even within the 
World Trade Organization there is a movement to make exceptions for cultural 
issues like screen quotas. According to international agreements, governments 
may seek to restrict foreign content on various `morality and national security' 
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grounds, and might invoke Article XIV of the GATS. This might result in a 
programming quota for domestically produced contents. 
Behind the Korean film industry and civil society's protests that the screen 
quota system should not be abolished was the fear that the abandonment of the 
system would eventually lead to the total loss of the Korean film and TV and its 
cultural specificity. Nob Jong Youn, a producer with the film company Sidus, 
emphasised that `it is necessary to ensure a steady base of filmgoers and to 
create a varied viewing culture by producing diversified films' (interviewed in 
Oct. 2004). There is a need to cater for the tastes of diverse audiences. Not 
having the opportunity to see domestic films and TV dramas will naturally make 
audiences neglect local contents as they are an experience good which means 
audiences can only become used to such contents through a long-term exposure. 
Likewise, there are some justifications that quota system is needed. First, 
devising methods that could counter the huge distribution and marketing 
advantage held by a few centres is a critical point globally. Mee-hyun Kim of 
KOFIC refutes the notion that `repealing the quota system would favour 
competition, as this competition would essentially be between Hollywood 
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blockbusters with average production cost of $100 million and Korean films, 
the production costs for which average only around $4 million' (interviewed in 
Aug. 2003). Her argument is that cinemas prefer to show pictures of proven 
box-office powers like The Lord of the Rings and Terminator. Korean films, 
which mostly do not have such box-office strength, cannot compete with those 
Hollywood films without protective policy measures. 
This is precisely why the quota system for films and TV programmes has 
continued to be supported in Korea. Thus, the U. S. argument that the current 
screen quota system should be changed to a subsidy system is irrational because 
the production of films or TV dramas has no meaning when there is no 
guarantee that they will be shown. Besides, one might also well ask why we 
should subsidise the local industry if the public is turning away from it. The 
simple answer is that this would mean the progressive marginalisation of local 
film production and the collapse of the local film industry. 
Second, with the development of technology, there are likely to be increased 
opportunities for diverse cultural products and yet at the same time this situation 
paradoxically solidifies the domination of the market by a few companies with 
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large capital and distribution networks. In the case of cinema, it is said that 
online digital technology offers a wider variety of exhibition opportunities. Thus, 
the U. S. has a more tenable opinion here on the lack of reason for maintaining 
the current screen quota system, based on the expansion of screening methods 
and increased screening opportunities related to advances in digital technology. 
If the two points above are added to their belief in lending resolute investment 
towards the building of multiplex cinemas in return for scaling-down of the 
screen quota system, it could become even more difficult to uphold the 
counter-argument. 
Most of all, the U. S. 's argument is premised on a gradual decrease in the 
importance of cinema screenings, compared with the pre-digital era. However, 
screening in cinemas has its own unique merits which other screening 
technology cannot replace. The expansion of screening opportunities stemming 
from the advancement of digital technology has created an expectation of 
high-volume sales supported by high investment, resulting in high volume 
profits which should eventually help attract more viewers. The economy of 
scale is applied here. Consequently, a perception that in film, the Internet 
screening can replace cinema, and so screen quotas for cinema exhibition 
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should be scrapped, is unreasonable. 
Likewise in TV, Internet broadcasting complements television rather than 
replacing it, and does not threaten but rather reinforces the dominance of 
established TV companies. The Internet has provided an alternative source of 
viewers and revenue for the companies without making too great a dent in TV 
viewing figures. That is why these new methods should not be considered 
substitutes but rather compliments to the more established methods. Digital 
media has resulted in more viewers based on market expansion and this in turn 
has led to an emphasis on profitability over content. 
Thus, although the way cultural products are circulated and consumed is rapidly 
changing as digital technology advances even further, within the TV industry 
most nations have restrained their television industries by instituting local 
content standards. Thus, the Internet is just a tool for communication and so can 
increase flow of regional contents and flow of global contents at the same time, 
which is up to the users themselves. That is to say, depending on how users take 
advantage of the Internet, it can be used as a facilitator on global 
homogenization or global diversity at the same time. Thus we cannot say that 
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the Internet accelerates the flow of regional culture or global culture in only one 
direction. 
Third, film festivals cannot offer an alternative to cinema screening for small 
budget films. Lee Chang-dong argues that `the exposure received through film 
festivals is not enough and cannot compensate for a cinema release. Accordingly, 
the screen quota shows another alternative approach' (Young-Jin Kim, 2003: 
119). Furthermore, some major broadcasters dominate the market by means of 
vertical and horizontal integration boosted by media convergence, though there 
have been increased opportunities for small companies to enter the mainstream 
market with the increased number of distribution methods. 
Such hard evidence demonstrates that the screen quota system has not weakened 
the Korean film market. Rather, major Korean companies have entered into the 
exhibition sector by means of building multiplex chains across the country, 
reinforcing their influence on the film market and consequently on the Korean 
cultural industry (S. Y. Lee, 2005). The local television broadcasting industry, 
on the other hand, is split over the further liberalisation of the market. The 
foremost interest of foreign countries is broadening the programme quota of 
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foreign programmes on local TV channels. With regard to this intention, it is not 
a major concern for the nation's terrestrial broadcasting companies because their 
broadcasting schedule is composed of mostly domestic programmes based on 
ratings and stable capital in comparison with other new media broadcasting 
companies. 
However, it would pose a problem with regard to cable and satellite 
broadcasting companies, which are major importers and rely on cheap 
programming from overseas and local independent production companies. This 
is because an increase in the foreign TV programme quota would ultimately 
diminish or even devastate the local independent TV programme production 
industry. In this vein, Song Kyung-hee remarks that `the Taiwanese TV 
broadcasting market is a good example. The country used to be an active TV 
programme exporter. Presently, 70 percent of the programmes aired on its four 
terrestrial TV channels are domestically made, but as for cable TV channels, 
which dominate the Taiwanese TV broadcasting market, only 20 percent are 
locally made' (Kyung-hee Song, 2004). She argues that as a result of expanding 
foreign TV programme quotas, the country has lost virtually its entire TV 
programme production base. In contrast to this downturn in Taiwan, the success 
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of local programming in Korea is such that the quota system is being 
benchmarked in other countries. 
The broadcasters, whom one would expect to be averse to widening the foreign 
TV programme quota, are instead welcoming it since they will save costs and 
benefit from reduced risk in purchasing foreign programmes that have already 
been verified in foreign markets. This is essentially because of the distortion 
within the local industry, with terrestrial broadcasting companies owning 
production and transmission facilities, a similar case to that of distributors or 
exhibition owners in the film industry. 
As a result, the local industry lacks independent TV content providers. While 
terrestrial networks maintain a dominant quota of local programmes, other less 
financially independent channels provide a mix of both foreign and local 
content. Therefore, a legal framework or some degree of regulation should exist 
even in a free market under neo-liberalism because monopoly under free 
competition tends to cause market failure which hinders the choice of free 
markets. Thus, regulators have turned to enforcing content standards in order to 
protect cultural diversity. 
323 
C7 7 
PART. III Chapter 7. The Korean Way: A Compromise Between Two Extremes 
Rules on the ratio of Korean films and animation to be shown on the air 
implemented in 2000 provide a typical model for the quota regulation of 
domestic cultural products. This rule has been adapted to an incentive system 
favourable to broadcasting companies. This means that programming 
Korean-produced films during prime time hours will give the broadcasters 1.5 
times the actual programming time. This regulation states that films, animation 
or popular music from any one foreign country cannot exceed the 60% of the 
allocated total foreign production programme time. This act can be seen as an 
attempt to regulate the excessive importation of U. S. -produced programmes and 
to diversify programme contents. 
Up until 1998, terrestrial broadcasters, which are all equipped with both 
production and transmission facilities, could only air a maximum 20 percent 
foreign TV programmes every month; the quota was set at 50 percent for cable 
TV and satellite TV channels, to encourage diversity in the portrayal of 
international cultures. The programming of independently produced contents is 
also a big issue. The major terrestrial broadcasters are required to transmit 
independently produced programmes for more than 10% of their total prime 
time zone broadcasting hours and for over 30 percent of the total monthly 
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schedule. As we have seen so far, the perception that terrestrial TV broadcasters 
have both production and transmission outlets and thus enjoy a competitive 
advantage and the assumption that the effect of the increase in the foreign TV 
programme quota would therefore be minute, have proved to be incorrect. This 
is mainly because broadcasters tend to import programmes based on economic 
considerations rather than because of cultural concerns. 
Taking all this into account, the programming quota follows the lines of the 
screen quota argument from the perspective of the economic interest of each 
sector. Private TV and cable channels in particular express the view that the 
country should operate the quota system in a flexible way because, in reality, the 
foreign programme ratio has been dropping for the past five years. Moreover, 
the proportion of South Korean films screened by the country's cinemas 
exceeded the required government quota in the first six months of 2003. Local 
films accounted for around 45 percent of the total screening days since 2000 
(Yonhap News Agency, Sep. 7,2003). This figure was also close to that of 
Korean films' share of the local industry, which far exceeds the minimum 18.6% 
required by the screen quota system. This means that Korean movies were in 
high demand because they have brought greater profits to cinemas than 
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imported films. 
What I would like to focus on here is the fact that the increase in screening or 
broadcasting opportunities for local films and TV programmes does not 
guarantee an increase in the release of small budget films or TV programmes. 
Although a booming market favouring the big blockbusters can be seen as a 
sign of industry success, it cannot make the industry healthier. If the cultural 
industry in general is healthier, it opens up opportunities for minority producers. 
Structurally providing opportunities for minority productions can provide 
creativity and alternative thoughts which could enrich both cultural content and 
the industry as a whole. 
When seen from this perspective, Korea's cultural policy including the quota 
system in the screen and broadcasting sectors takes on an even more important 
meaning. Jun-dong Kim (2002) argues that subsidies to increase the screening 
of domestic movies and to support the related infrastructure and the education 
of related personnel may be possible alternatives to quantitative restrictions. 
Therefore, it is now time for the Korean cultural industry to put into operation 
not a quantitative but rather a qualitative support system. For example, in order 
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to support minority films with a view to promoting cultural diversity, it would 
be reasonable to propose the operation of an art screen in every multiplex 
cinema. 
7.1.2 Economy of Scale vs. Cultural Diversity 
It is said that in the beginning, the entry of investment companies into the 
cultural industry was a structural determinant behind the trend of producing 
Korean blockbusters. In fact, the changes brought about by these investment 
funds in the production environment of Korean films and TV dramas has helped 
develop Korean blockbusters in a number of ways, as outlined below. First of 
all, as the investment funds are concerned only with profits, the backers tend to 
concentrate their investments on definite box office hits and strongly 
commercial films with big star actors and star directors. After the spectacular 
box-office failures of 2002, most new projects are relying more on stars than on 
narratives (story) or special effects. There is a belief that big stars can guarantee 
at least moderate success. Thus this dependence on big stars has resulted in the 
churning out of blockbusters. 
Second, investment in production tends to aim at repeating success within one 
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particular genre so that only one type of film, for example romantic comedies in 
the case of Korean film production, is being repeatedly produced. The problem 
of monopolisation by certain genres, such as gangster comedies or trendy 
dramas (see notes in Appendices), is that these become prevalent to the 
detriment of other kinds of films and TV dramas. As such, it was imperative for 
the new generation of movie makers to set box office success as their primary 
goal, and the producers or directors have striven to make movies suited to the 
tastes of younger audiences that have tended to prefer foreign films. 
In today's industry, these economic considerations towards commercialism are a 
much greater constraint on filmmakers and producers than government 
censorship on the content of each cultural product, as conglomerate capital 
investors and financial capital investors could turn their backs on the industry at 
any time; this ultimately makes the cultural industry relatively unstable. 
Therefore, the more investment companies feel there is risk associated with 
investing in the cultural industry, the more they lean on big stars and trendy 
genres, as they believe these guarantee above average audiences. Accordingly, 
stereotypical Korean blockbusters are systematically churned out in a distorted 
industrial structure as these blockbusters attract the most of the investment, 
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distribution and exhibition opportunities. Consequently, the smaller independent 
producers lose out, with a knock-on damaging impact on cultural diversity. The 
partnership of investment companies and major production studios has 
strengthened this trend towards monopoly by a few blockbusters. The few, 
commercially successful films tend to monopolise cinema screens. 
Moreover, riding on the back of the popularity of Korean films and TV dramas, 
investors are pouring large sums of money into big films and TV dramas. As a 
result, mid-level investment in cultural products is starting to disappear. For 
example, despite an ever-increasing number of screens since 2000, the move 
towards wide releases has resulted in a smaller overall number of films being 
screened, as seen in chapter 6. In 2004, three blockbusters, Silmido, Taegukgi 
and Once Upon a Time in High School, dominated over 60 percent of screens in 
the nation's 1,272 cinemas, which means that opportunities for other minor film 
producers to screen their films were relatively low. 
The then Minister of Culture and Tourism, Lee Chang Dong (2003) declared the 
current film distribution system the biggest obstacle to offering more diversity 
to moviegoers. In the system, if there are two films that receive similarly 
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positive reviews from moviegoers, distributors feel that they have to choose, to 
push one film and sacrifice the other, even if the difference in public opinion is 
small. This structure further strengthens the large competitive edge enjoyed by 
U. S. media-based merchandise while further reducing the opportunity for 
products from small-scale markets or small scale language and cultural areas to 
access markets abroad. 
Additionally, in order to secure box-office hits, the cinema owners became 
subject to a process of `block booking', whereby hit movies were bundled with 
other less marketable films from the major film distributors (see notes in 
Appendices). When Hollywood majors distributed their films to other countries, 
they did the same. Thus, local films are subject to disadvantageous treatment 
because of `block booking' as they lose chances to compete. Due to such 
distribution mechanisms, cinema owners, production companies and even 
audiences had more limited choices. 
What we have hitherto overlooked is the fact that the current situation of the 
Korean cultural industry is quite different from what it was several years ago. 
The current situation of monopoly can be seen to result not from large 
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Hollywood companies but from a few Korean majors. Excepting only a handful 
of Hollywood blockbusters, most U. S. films, other foreign films and most 
Korean films have to cope with the competition put forward by major Korean 
studios when releasing their films. In a way, this situation holds certain benefits 
for local companies. With local companies boasting such power, the unfair 
activities typical of Hollywood majors, such as block booking or blind booking 
(see notes in Appendices), are now difficult to make work in the local market. 
However, instead of Hollywood majors, major Korean companies have cornered 
the distribution and exhibition markets while smaller Korean companies have 
difficulty getting their films or TV dramas released. Indeed, current trends seem 
to bear this out. Though for last four or five years Korea has been most dynamic 
in terms of the success of its cultural industry, in a very short time, a few major 
Korean companies like CJ Entertainment and Cinema Service have come to 
occupy the whole market and have become a `Little Hollywood' (Lucas 
Schuwazacher, interviewed on Oct. 12,2005). 
Likewise, the biggest problem with regard to Korean blockbusters is that those 
blockbusters tend to dominate screens just as much as their Hollywood 
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counterparts, while low budget and art films are losing ground. The Korean TV 
industry follows a similar pattern of monopoly by a few large companies. 
Unlike in the U. S., where broadcasters purchase their programming from 
independent production studios, all stages of programming in Korea are 
completely dominated by the terrestrial television stations with only a few 
exceptions. Korean broadcasting giants do not want to lose their influence and 
therefore oppose outsourcing programmes for fear that their own station 
organisations would shrink as a result. 
The theoretical goal of Korean cultural policy is to create a multi-polar 
industrial structure in which independent content providers compete with each 
other to sell their products to broadcasting companies or distributors. The most 
important issues here are diversity, experimentation and risk-taking in the 
cultural industry. In terms of variety in markets and products, the situation 
should be viewed from a different angle. From a protectionist perspective, 
cultural diversity should be maintained at all costs. However, protectionism 
does not guarantee cultural diversity. As we have seen, a small number of local 
companies have replaced trans-national corporations in the domination of the 
domestic market. To nurture the local champion to compete against a global 
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competitor tends to result in an infringement of cultural diversity by damaging 
small local companies. Meanwhile, the Korean government and local companies 
in the cultural industry argue that the Korean cultural market should be 
protected in order to safeguard Korean cultural identity. 
However, major companies in the Korean cultural industry produce 
quasi-Hollywood cultural goods in order to expand their market share to 
neighbouring countries and try to dominate those local markets to become a 
strong regional player on the basis of strong domestic market share. This is a 
dilemma with which the Korean cultural industry still has to come to terms. The 
unprecedented expansionism that has taken place in the Korean cultural industry 
is a manifestation of monopolistic capitalism, which seeks new markets in 
which to sell its extra products. Large firms can more easily dominate small 
markets than larger ones. Director Kang Je-gyu said that `in the film industry, as 
in other businesses, only the strong survive' (interviewed in Aug. 2003). Much 
like the `survival of the fittest' credo, only strong companies can survive in the 
market. Companies in the cultural industry of a small country do their best to 
dominate their local market as leverage for competing with global companies 
subscribing to the economy of scale theory. 
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Therefore, for smaller markets, a particular concern is the availability of 
resources to support indigenousness as opposed to less expensive `imported' 
content (Waterman and Rogers, 1994). Besides, for cultural products in 
particular, as the investment fund capital is formed by its partners for profit, it is 
important to secure a stable distribution network in order to maximise the profit 
to be gained from cultural products. For example, the TV and film market in 
Taiwan is almost entirely occupied by foreign cultural products because of the 
weak resources and infrastructure of its own industry (Hu, 2005). 
Accordingly, preventive policies should be set up to protect against unfair 
practices by major distributors, such as tie-in sales. For example, in case of the 
U. S., in order to ban monopoly in the film industry through anti-trust legislation 
in the late 1940s, the U. S. government compelled the major film studios to sell 
off their cinemas on the principle that it was oppressive to make and sell movies 
while controlling their outlets (Puttnam, 1997: 219). 
Therefore, diversity in TV programmes or films cannot be attained without 
making sweeping reforms in the dominant structure of the present industry, 
while nurturing creative, capable and independent production companies at a 
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grass-roots level. In addition, the fact that a wide range of audience tastes 
should lead to a variety of productions is also an issue although this thesis will 
not deal with it. 
7.1.3 Anti-Hanryu and Two-way Flow 
Korean TV dramas and films used to not travel much beyond Korea's borders, 
but since the late 1990s, they have begun to acquire a strong following 
throughout East and Southeast Asia, as we have already seen. However, there 
does exist some resistance to Korean cultural products in other Asian countries 
that have been very high importers. For example, there are some reports that the 
exportation of Korean programmes to China has decreased owing to moves by 
the Chinese authorities to restrain the Korean wave (Hanguere, Dec. 19,2005). 
Recently, moreover, Korean celebrities, who enjoy popularity across Asia, have 
become the object of both malicious rumors and false reports (Korea Times, 
August 24,2005). The stories about some Korean big stars have been simply 
blown out of proportion or distorted without any evidence. Some Korean stars 
have evidenced this trend, such as Bae Yong-jun who said that he felt an 
anti-Hanryu feeling in another Asian country during a recent interview (Go 
News, Aug. 26,2005). 
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Behind these scenes, there are some reasons that anti-Hanryu is expanding in 
other Asian countries. First, the skyrocketing production costs of Korean TV 
dramas and films have resulted in antipathy among traders and the press in other 
Asian countries. Han Young-Soo argues that such Anti-Hanryu sentiment has 
resulted from the profit-driven strategy that has been implemented for exporting 
Korean cultural products (interviewed in Dec. 2004). In a sense, this is partly 
because Hanryu is largely reliant on a few high price films or TV dramas, and 
the success or failure of these in the Japanese market can greatly affect the 
export unit price. It is also down to increased production costs. For example, the 
production cost of an episode of Taiwanese TV programmes is generally less 
than $17,000, whereas the cost of an episode of a Korean TV drama can be as 
high as $55,000 as of 2002 (Liu and Chen, 2004: 71). 
Kang Man-seok (2004) points out that `Korean broadcasting companies have 
been repeating temporary and unplanned business practices since the 
broadcasting interchange between Korea and China began ten years ago. ' For 
example, the rights to a single broadcast of Section TV Entertainment News, the 
entertainment programme made by MBC, are sold at $1,000. For TV dramas, 
the copyright price can range from $1,400 to $271,700 (ibid). Kang argues that 
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this means the standard selling price and trade criteria are not systemised, so 
trade deals have typically been considered on a case-by-case basis. 
In this context, Taiwanese TV channel Videoland decreased time slots for 
Korean soap operas from 811 hours in 2003 to 356 hours in 2004 as the price of 
Korean TV dramas had increased drastically. Jung Yun Kyoung (2004) reported 
that the Taiwanese audience is not favourable to Korean programmes. She 
argues that despite the Korean TV drama boom, in recent times, Taiwanese 
audiences do not watch Korean programmes as often as was previously thought. 
According to an interview of 419 Taiwanese people, 71.5% of them regularly 
watch programmes from other Asian countries, while only 32.9% reported 
watching Korean programmes. Additionally, 16.1% responded they prefer 
Korean programmes to Taiwanese ones, while 56.8% dislike Korean 
programmes more than Taiwanese programmes (ibid. ). 
Second, cultural exchanges between Korea and other Asian countries have 
tended to be a largely one-way flow from Korea to other countries, which has 
led to concern and antipathy towards the Korean wave. Although Korea itself 
has suffered from the one-way flow from the U. S. for a long time, it has also 
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done the same to other Asian countries. Just as Korean people believe that 
Americanisation or the domination of Hollywood films damages Korean 
cultural identity, so other Asian countries feel the same about the Korean wave, 
Hanryu, although the feeling may not be as strong. 
The recent negative perception of Korean TV programmes which began in 
Taiwan has been expanding. In Vietnam, some people argue that Korean cultural 
products are leading the young Vietnamese towards materialism because they 
try to indiscriminately imitate the Korean yuppie lifestyle portrayed in TV 
dramas and films. Such negative reaction from the Vietnamese is exactly the 
same as the Korean reaction to Japanese cultural products. As mentioned in 
earlier chapters, the announcement by the government of cultural opening to 
Japan caused considerable anxiety in some sectors of Korean society, feeling 
rooted in fears of cultural imperialism and concerns over the violent and 
sexually dominant contents of Japanese mass culture products. These two 
perspectives reflect the prevailing idea that Korean culture is so pure and 
vulnerable that it should be protected from other aggressive and polluted 
cultures. 
However, these worries proved quite different from what was experienced in 
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practice. Most of all, the implication that Japanese pop culture is uniquely 
dangerous and low in quality is biased and ignores the international successes of 
many Japanese writers, musicians, artists, and architects. In the area of pop 
culture, Japanese films and Japanese animation have received positive 
international attention. Japanese fashion and design have competed successfully 
with the American and European centres of fashion and design. 
As for sexual and violent contents, Japan is certainly not the only country to 
have such contents. Many Hollywood films and Korean films contain extremely 
violent scenes; many rock music lyrics are violent and sexually explicit. Thus, 
these concerns for cultural diversity and moral purity against Japanese culture 
were to some extent merely a convenient disguise or smokescreen for the real 
objective, which was economic protectionism. In this respect, Giddens (1991: 
24) emphasises that `one aspect of the dialectical nature of globalisation is the 
push and pull (my italic) between tendencies towards centralization inherent in 
the reflexivity of the system of states on the one hand and the sovereignty of 
particular states on the other. This could be the same with the cultural exchange 
between centre and periphery. ' As he mentions, exchanges are not unilateral but 
interactive. However, just as the Korean wave made Korea a regional centre in a 
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short time and in one direction (from Korea to other Asian countries), it also 
generated anti-Hanryu sentiments in its target markets. As a result, companies in 
the Korean cultural industry have recently started looking seriously at 
international co-productions and seem eager to pursue co-productions which can 
enter into local markets easily and lessen antipathy towards foreign cultural 
products. This is a strategy common among trans-national corporations and is 
useful for reducing cultural discount and maximising economy of scale. 
For example, SM Entertainment has reduced the costs and risks of its entry into 
the Chinese market by licensing its products to a Chinese partner. Moreover, it 
is localising its cultural products by setting up an academy in South Korea to 
discover and nurture Chinese pop stars as well as introducing Korean stars to 
China. The company is to launch Chinese versions of its successful South 
Korean bands, keeping the same name and style but substituting local artists for 
their Korean counterparts. Lee Su Man, CEO of SM Entertainment says that 
`this would be the world's first example of a "franchised" pop band. We will use 
Chinese talent to appeal to a Chinese audience but meeting Korean production 
standards' (interviewed in Feb. 2005). 
Cultural flow from centre to periphery does not necessarily result in only the 
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one-way flow of cultural imperialism. Owing to such interactivity of cultural 
flow, cultural opening can benefit a country rather than simply damaging its 
culture and economy as it did to Korea. As mentioned in the previous section, 
contrary to expectations, Japanese cultural products have not yet swept across 
Korea. Conversely, Korean cultural products have begun to position well in the 
Japanese market since the implementation of the open-door measures. 
According to the KBC (2004), the import of Japanese TV programmes totalled 
$2,730,000 in 2000 right after the third measure but the next year decreased to 
$1,630,000. Korean presence in the Japanese TV market, on the other hand, has 
increased. In 2001, total revenues from Korean programme export to Japan 
came to $1,180,000; in 2002, this increased to almost double that amount at 
$2,310,000. 
In fact, though there were no legal restrictions on the importation of Korean 
culture in Japan, there was relatively little interest there in Korea beyond certain 
intellectual circles before the Korean open-door policy to Japanese culture was 
put in place. Kusanagi Shuhei has analysed the situation and surmises that 
`lifting the ban on Japanese pop culture showed that Koreans were not as hostile 
to Japan as many Japanese thought. This will encourage more Japanese to take 
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an interest in Korea, which will stimulate cultural exchange in many fields' 
(interviewed in Nov. 2004). 
With the opening up of the Korean market, the cultural sectors of Korea and 
Japan began to make unprecedented efforts to appeal each other. This implies 
that the open door policy has stimulated the growth of new business between the 
two nations. There were several co-productions of TV dramas between MBC of 
Korea and Fuji TV of Japan, such as Friends in 2001, Thundershower, 
Afternoon of Shower, Rain in 2002 and Star's Echo in early 2004 (Chosunilbo, 
Jan. 26,2004). Worth particular note is the Korean TV drama Winter Sonata, 
which was first broadcast on Japanese satellite TV and rerun on Japanese public 
broadcasting service NHK several times, which has intensified the Korean 
boom in Japan. The following excerpt by a Japanese journalist describes the 
new relationship between the two countries in detail: 
For the first time, South Koreans can legally buy CDs of Japanese singers and 
rent Japanese movies at the local video store. Japanese can now be heard on 
cable television, which until recently would have been greeted with the same 
kind of outraged reaction from some listeners as playing Wagner does in Israel. 
In Japan, many people who had never thought about the Korean peninsula are 
watching South Korean television dramas and studying the language. Kimchi 
- the spicy pickled vegetable that is Korea's national dish - would have been 
dismissed a generation ago, but it is now becoming a favourite in Japan. A new 
generation of entertainers are effortlessly crossing borders between the 
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countries, as well as to Taiwan, Singapore and China. This opening of markets 
to Japan has occurred as South Korean confidence grows in its own "soft" 
power (New York Times, Feb. 22,2004). 
The fact that thanks to the boom in Korean films, U. S. distribution companies 
are now keen to distribute Korean films is further confirmation of a two-way 
flow. It is estimated that the number of such cases will increase as Hollywood 
distributors begin to invest in Korean films such as The Phone and recently 
Silmido (Hangookilbo, March 20,2002). As for distribution, not so long ago, 
the distribution field was dominated by Hollywood majors who distributed their 
films directly to Korea. Local film distributors in Korea normally tend to be 
keen on distributing foreign films because the distribution of foreign films is 
more stable than that of local films, which used to account for a lesser portion of 
distribution fees. 
However, the converse has also occurred: Korean distributors are competing to 
get Korean films. Moreover, as Korean distributors became stronger market 
players, they have begun distributing some Hollywood films in the Korean 
market. Therefore, Korean and foreign joint ventures and joint financing of 
production, distribution and exhibition are blurring the hierarchy between 
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Hollywood and Korean film. As such, the local distribution scene in Korea has 
seen significant changes in recent years. 
What is more, with Korea emerging as a new hotbed of adaptable products, U. S. 
studios have been buying up the rights to remake Korean films in Hollywood 
since 2001. Miramax for the first time purchased the rights to Korean comic 
gangster film My Wife is a Gangster and Korean ancient martial arts movie 
BiChunMoo (Screendaily, May 17,2001). Other Hollywood majors such as 
Dreamworks SKG, MGM, Warner Brothers and Fox 2000 Pictures have also 
started to acquire Korean films (indieWire, May 6,2002; Korea Times, July 14, 
2003). 
This remake frenzy is helping sustain a Korean film profit and is making 
Korean producers think about export from the stage of pre-production. 
Hollywood majors have bought most of these Korean features not for release 
but for remakes due mainly to cultural discount. They believe remaking the 
films can appeal to American or global audiences easier than the original films 
can. Through this, these major U. S. companies can minimise their risk and costs 
by using local joint venture partners and can easily access the local market. UIP 
vice president of sales and marketing Asia, Kurt Rieder, explained the 
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companies' reasons for seeking out local films: `There is a financial benefit but 
it also allows them to learn about the local market and the potential for growth. 
The reality is this is not a good time to be representing a US company' (cited 
from Financial Times, Oct. 30,2003). 
In TV, through satellite TV, some other products from countries in the periphery, 
like Korea, can gain exposure to world audiences. For example, in early 1999, 
while Star TV was making efforts to enter local markets with its global contents, 
it introduced a programme called Seoul Flash, designed to promote the Korean 
fashion industry among Asian viewers. Seoul Flash was a 10-minute 
programme on STAR-TV's music and entertainment Channel V broadcast 
weekly for a year introducing hot trends in the Seoul fashion industry, top 
shopping areas in Seoul and images of the metropolitan capital of Korea aimed 
at Channel V's primary audience, the youth of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
In a sense, Hanryu can be attributed to this kind of programme on Asian satellite 
(Gong Hee-Jeung, interviewed in Nov. 2003). Thus, cultural flow cannot be said 
to be purely one-sided. Satellite TV has been considered a tool of cultural 
homogenisation or even cultural imperialism in that it disseminates Western 
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trans-national corporate products and values. However, as seen above, it 
disseminates cultural contents from periphery as well. 
7.2 Market Opening with Industry Support 
Although liberalisation has become a mainstream and irreversible trend, the 
financial debacle of 1997 reminds Koreans that liberalisation can be a 
double-edged sword. As most acknowledge the inevitability of the far-reaching 
liberalisation measures that have been implemented since the so-called IMF era 
started, there still exists an underlying anxiety over the pace and magnitude of 
this liberalisation. The first point I would like to raise in relation to this 
statement is the fact that, despite all of this, unregulated markets do not 
necessarily guarantee freedoms to many people. The indiscriminate application 
of free market principles could limit cultural diversity and multiplicity. 
In this context, an analysis of the outcomes of the current system, considering 
the environmental changes that have resulted from the advancement of 
globalisation and digital technology, is demanded. The main issue between the 
U. S. and other countries concerning this globalised environment relates to how 
to further strengthen the efforts of each country in preserving its own cultural 
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identity in the midst of an ever-expanding private domain, rather than to reduce 
its government's interest and effort in maintaining cultural identity (Cargo, 
1995: 215-224). 1 believe that such an analysis will help us explore and 
highlight a point that the protectionist-free market dichotomy has missed in the 
context of the rising Korean cultural industry. 
Essentially, Korea tends to promote a market-driven system and protectionist 
policy in the cultural industries at the same time, despite the fact that they seem 
to be at opposite ends of the spectrum. However, Korea seems to have found 
`the third way', which is a combination of these two. Improvement of cultural 
policies and free trade must strive to maintain their synergic nature rather than 
forcing a choice between the two. In this context, the Korean case could be a 
good example for the combination of these two extremities. We might now ask 
how this compromise could be possible. 
The Korean government has been challenged to develop and implement cultural 
policies to deal with globalisation. It has striven for a global audience, working 
towards a deregulatory environment and enhancing policy effectiveness at the 
same time since the end of the 1990s, although the U. S. has been critical of 
cultural policies that are perceived as protectionist, calling them barriers to free 
347 
PART. III Chapter 7. The Korean Way: A Compromise Between Two Extremes 
trade. Unlike the productive manufacturing sector, the Korean cultural sector 
remained relatively inefficient until quite recently. Many domestic institutions 
and companies remained stable but stagnated due to the shield erected by the 
government to protect against foreign competition. 
In spite of this, and thanks to the lively formation of investment funds, the 
Korean cultural industry has been able to expand its scale and as a result 
revitalise the industry. After the mid 1990s, the influx of financial capital into 
the Korean cultural industry was especially influenced by policy factors. In the 
`New Economy Five Year Plan' of July 1993, the film industry was designated a 
knowledge-based service industry within the manufacturing industry in the 
industrial development strategy section. Later, the 1999 `Cultural Industry Basic 
Law' of the Kim Dae-jung administration introduced a policy that companies in 
the manufacturing industry would receive favours in taxation and financial 
matters, such as a reduction in corporation tax. 
These changes in the national policy made it possible for investment companies 
to launch their business in the cultural industry. It was for this reason that An 
Nyum, Korea's then finance minister, applauded companies such as SM 
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Entertainment and CJ Entertainment as being crucial to the country's economic 
development in the face of growing competition from the low-cost 
manufacturing powerhouse of China on its doorstep. He pointed out that `we 
have to develop service sectors such as logistics, tourism and cultural content 
and become a more knowledge-based economy' (Financial Times, Feb. 2, 
2002). 
Besides, the government had to support domestic cultural industry in 
preparation for market opening to Japanese cultural products. In this context, it 
was believed that the creative industries would play an increasingly important 
role in the economy. Likewise, as the economic value placed on cultural 
products was re-evaluated, government policy changed to support the cultural 
industry. Thus, this support is not primarily intended to promote diversity but 
rather to maximise competition with a view to attracting investment. 
As a result, these policies have developed the market economically while 
limiting it culturally. In this context, diversified films can only be possible under 
a particular infrastructure of support, like Internet or government initiatives for 
independent films. Independent films only get these `secondary' media, not 
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exposure to mainstream audiences. Thus, while big budget films explore new 
genres and special effects, influential voices in the industry are also calling for 
support for smaller films in order to safeguard creativity and diversity. Korea 
shows that there are still close ties between government and industry. The 
cultural industry is no exception. 
Government funding and new initiatives from the private sector like the 
CJ-CGV Independent Film Fund look to help provide funding for independent 
films. The CJ-CGV Independent Film Fund is a yearly $ 300,000 bursary that 
CJ Entertainment and its affiliated company CGV launched to promote the 
production of independent films. Furthermore, CGV operates two specialised 
screens for the release of independent films. In the TV industry, to ensure fair 
competition and diversity, the new government act on TV policy in Korea sets 
limitations for Multiple Programme Providers (MPPs). The qualifying revenue 
of any one MPP should not exceed 33% of the sum of the sales of the total 
programme providers. Likewise, the government still has a role in building 
infrastructure in order to meet the rising demand for cultural diversity catering 
to different tastes. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is said that although some governments still try to regulate or censor, or 
subsidise or intervene, their efforts are increasingly futile, because the market 
for cultural commodities has become so global, the technologies so impervious 
to local control, and the ideology of free trade so pervasive. The more 
globalisation prevails, the more pressures there are to move towards a free 
market, so that it proves extremely difficult for policy makers to resist. 
Furthermore, from a neo-liberalist perspective, the GATS and its successor the 
WTO were aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating tariffs and other 
barriers to free trade. 
However, owing to the division between centre and periphery, if foreign 
investment in cultural activity from the `centre' is allowed, there tends to be a 
concern that only culture from the centre will survive and this worry becomes 
an obstacle to completing mutual trades and exchanges between centre and 
periphery, such as a MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment). Therefore, 
the growing dispute between trade agendas, on the one hand, and cultural policy 
goals, on the other, has recently been debated in the context of finding a 
mechanism to deal with the culture and trade conflict. Korea has been at the 
centre of the cultural battlefield between local tradition and global media flow, 
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and protectionism and free market values. The cultural industry in Korea has 
been creating national champions behind a protective wall of tariffs and 
regulations thanks to the huge business potential of the entertainment sector. 
Larger and wealthier markets, with greater resources available for the provision 
of media, can afford a greater diversity of output than smaller markets. Small 
markets in overlapping languages areas such as Switzerland and Belgium are 
especially prone to market domination by non-indigenous suppliers. 
Consequently, the smaller the size of the market, the more the planning of 
government policy and interest rightfully becomes an absolute necessity in 
order to preserve the country's linguistic and cultural heritage and identity. 
Although the quota system enabled the Korean TV and film industry to remain 
stable and successful both in the domestic and the Asian markets, it also caused 
a number of dilemmas: 1) a few domestic majors dominate the market and this 
has led to a reduction in cultural diversity, which is believed to be protected by 
the quota system; 2) the Korean cultural wave from periphery has also brought 
about anti-Korean sentiments, just as Americanisation from the centre did, 
although the reaction has not been quite so strong in the case of Korea. 
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Thus, these dilemmas reveal that Korean cultural policy, one of critical points in 
making the Korean cultural wave possible, has given priority to economic 
interest over cultural interest (cultural diversity). Despite the overwhelming 
success of a number of local films, as outlined above, there is increasing 
concern about the fate of medium-sized and smaller features because many such 
films tend to have a hard time securing release, with the strongest competition 
existing between Hollywood Blockbusters and their Korean counterparts. 
Big-budget productions tend to occupy screens while mid-sized artistic films 
find it harder and harder to access cinema audiences. A handful of multiplex 
owners dominate the market. 
Similarly, in the TV industry, three terrestrial broadcasters have enjoyed 
oligopolistic power for a long time. For example, when it comes to the 
programmes quota, the less well-off cable companies cannot import cheap 
programmes from foreign countries. A particular problem with such an uneven 
structure is the fact that one part of the sector (terrestrial broadcasters, Korean 
film blockbusters) succeeds at the expense of another (production companies, 
cable companies, art films). 
However, despite this weakness, Korean cultural policy has played a key role in 
the recent `make-over' of the Korean cultural industry. Market opening, which 
helped the Korean cultural industry cope with global competition, and structural 
support such as the quota system, IT infrastructure and the Pusan Film Festival 
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have led to a massive shift in the industry, from being an importer or imitator of 
foreign contents to becoming a net exporter. The quota system, IT infrastructure 
and the Pusan Film Festival have been put to work as the structural tools 
guaranteed to stimulate and boost creativity in the Korean TV and film 
industries. 
Cultural policy should be required to regulate against decreased diversity of 
products and a narrower range of political viewpoints. Thus, deregulation and 
re-regulation are more appropriate names for the changes in cultural policy that 
took place in South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, for the 
coexistence of fragmentation for diversity and convergence for competition, 
government intervention is needed. By deregulating for competition, through 
measures such as market opening and re-regulating to support cultural diversity, 
government policy has attempted to stimulate the creativity of the people in the 
sector, making them more competitive. This sums up the Korean approach to 
cultural policy as a compromise between two extremes. 
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CHAPTER 8. Conclusion: Rethinking Media Flow in 
Periphery and Possibility of a `Cultural Bloc' 
Cultural products have a basic and inseparable relationship with language and culture 
during the production, distribution and exhibition processes. Thus, the producers from the 
countries with a broader language base and cultural market can bring in larger profits 
than their counterparts from smaller language and culture-based countries, even though 
they both produce similar cultural products. Smaller national markets may be more 
dependent on the importation of popular cultural commodities, as Korea was in the past. 
Moreover, the country with the larger language base tends to have more business 
personnel entering its competitive cultural industry, resulting in further improvements 
such as higher budgeting commitment and better quality production development. The 
new recruits are drawn by the `larger language base' and by the fact that industries in 
these countries are more profitable owing to that larger language base. There is a chain 
reaction here: shared language means increased profits which imply attracting more 
people and this means better quality and even more profits. However, the degree of this 
dependence on shared language base can differ according to the kind of cultural 
commodity, and can differ over time. Hence, countries with small language base and 
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cultural market have some potential for becoming a centre of sorts in their own right. In 
this vein, the success of the Korean Wave in other Asian countries without the 
advantages of a diasporic market or common language cannot be explained. By exploring 
the Korean case in reality, this thesis has challenged the assumption that globalisation can 
be equated with cultural imperialism. It also presents a case study of a specific country's 
cultural policy in response to globalisation. 
Several commentators have understood globalisation in terms of a theory of neo- 
liberalisation and one way media flow. On the contrary, the case of Korea indicates some 
alternative possible outcomes. The influence of Korean popular culture on other Asian 
countries including Japan does not support the standard cultural imperialism thesis, 
which criticizes global domination by Western culture. Furthermore, it does not conform 
to other models of `counter flow' which are based on a diasporic market. 
Thus, many wonder how Korea has become such a powerful force in the cultural industry 
in the Asian region in such a short space of time. In this context, I have tried to connect a 
theoretical argument about 'counter-flow' with the specific case of Korea and show how 
this theory operates in practice. One of the chief contributions of this thesis has been to 
challenge the existing theories of media flow by exploring the specific Korean case as a 
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new model of counter flow, and hence to make us rethink the role of cultural policy under 
globalisation. 
In this concluding chapter I will consider the Korean experience of Hanryu in a broader 
context. First, I will examine some of the criticisms and limitations of the Korean model, 
whether such criticisms are justified and how some of the limitations might be addressed. 
Secondly I will consider the extent to which the success of Korean creative industries can 
be attributed to government cultural policy and the relation of cultural policy to other 
contextual factors in Korea. Finally in section 8.3 and 8.4 1 will consider the legacy of the 
Korean model. Whilst it may not be possible to present Korea as a sustainable model for 
other countries to follow, perhaps Korea's current success can form the basis for a new 
cooperative model of cultural exchange among neighbouring countries. This `cultural 
bloc' model may represent a practical legacy of Hanryu, even if the wave itself may 
eventually subside and the precise circumstances surrounding its successful development 
may prove difficult to reproduce elsewhere in the future. 
8.1 `Hanryu' and Its Challenges as a Counter Flow 
As mentioned above, I have argued that Korea has successfully absorbed foreign cultural 
influences, generating hybrid products based on popular US models, especially in the 
357 
PART III Chapter 8. Conclusion 
film and broadcasting industry. However, the practical success of this model, based on 
hybridity of Korean Wave in content and business model, is also subject to a critical 
challenge; from this perspective Korean Wave is seen as an agent of Americanisation and 
the resulting reduction of cultural diversity is seen to be driven not by Hollywood but by 
the dominance of a few powerful Korean companies. 
8.1.1 Korea as an Agent of Americanisation? 
According to the perceived Americanisation of Korean cultural products, they could be 
seen as an intermediary or surrogate for American cultural products in the Asian market. 
To what extent then have Korean cultural industries merely served as an intermediary for 
American culture? Before answering this question, it is useful to compare Korea's 
situation with that of Japanese animation and Hong Kong films. Most cultures in 
periphery have been absorbed, diluted and undermined by American culture, though 
some of them such as Japanese animations and Hong Kong action movies talk back 
through the process of globalisation. Furthermore, although Japanese animations and 
Hong Kong action movies represent the kind of counter-currents that have developed 
from periphery to centre, Japanese and Hong Kong exports were strategically made not to 
reveal their national or cultural origin. 
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As noted in chapter 6, the popularity of products from Hong Kong is generally believed 
to have occurred because `they are cheap, which appeals to distributors, and action- 
packed which appeals to somewhat unsophisticated audiences' (Moran, 1996). In the case 
of Japan, the global success of Japanese animation has been attributed to its `cultural 
odourlessness', a trait which Japanese animation producers have tried to pursue 
strategically (Iwabuchi 2004: 26-29). The strategy of Japanese animators and less 
explicitly, of Hong Kong film-makers, has been based on global standardisation thereby 
reducing cultural discount. At the same time, 'this strategy dilutes or removes their 
specific cultural identity and is consequently criticized as another form of Westernisation. 
Meanwhile, Korean cultural products' recent strength at the box office has been based 
mainly on a form of hybridisation: Korean cultural content with Western style. Certainly 
not imitation but `hybridity' has been one of the secrets of Korean success. 
The Korean blockbusters could be seen as an intermediary for an American style of 
cultural product, in style or in its underlying business model, if not in content. However, 
my argument is that Korean culture is not simply a passive `absorber' of US cultural 
influences. If Korean cultural products are just an intermediary of American culture to 
Asian countries, how can it be explained that other Asian people try to learn Korean 
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language and culture? Similarly, how can it be explained that Korean epic dramas such as 
Daejanggeum, which are contextualised in exhaustive Korean historical background, are 
also very popular in other Asian countries? 
Consolidating US business practices in economic terms and Korean concepts in terms of 
cultural content is an example of Korean hybridity. In terms of both content and 
infrastructure, the Korean cultural industry has been challenged and has changed 
accordingly. When it comes to the content, it has adopted a hybrid approach to the 
production of cultural goods, creating Korean cultural contents with Western style. This 
has the effect of reducing cultural discount, making the products more accessible to a 
wider range of audiences. Having a history of cultural assimilation through the adoption 
of other cultures, the Korean cultural industry has not just mechanically transplanted 
American and Japanese TV programmes and films. Korean hybridisation through 
imitation is filtered through specific Asian structures of feeling. Therefore, Korean 
cultural industries are still, in spite of US influences, distinctively Korean in character. 
Meanwhile, when it comes to the industrial infrastructure and business practices, Korea 
has also imitated and indigenised the Hollywood system in order to maximise its profits 
and its competitive advantage by seeking economies of scale. However, Korean 
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organisational culture in the cultural industry is significantly different from that of 
Hollywood and this in turn influences the cultural contents. For example, Korean 
production crews have been found to show less individualism and more loyalty to the 
production which they are working on than their Hollywood counterparts (Hyoungjun 
Kim, interviewed in Oct. 2004; Roy Lee, interviewed in Nov. 2004; Korea Herald, Jan. 3, 
2003). Consequently, I would like to argue that Korean cultural products do not merely 
serve as an intermediary for American culture in the Asian market but spread something 
distinctively Korean to other Asian countries. 
8.1.2 Cultural Diversity, Cultural Cost of the Wave? 
The cultural industry in Korea has been creating national champions behind a protective 
wall of tariffs and regulations in order to compete with foreign contents but the real losers 
may have been the smaller local cultural content producers. For example, 
there is an increasing concern about the fate of medium-sized and smaller feature films 
because many such films tend to have a hard time securing release, with the strongest 
competition continuing more than ever to be between Hollywood blockbusters and their 
Korean counterparts. Big-budget Korean productions tend to occupy screens while mid- 
sized artistic films are finding it harder and harder to access cinema audiences. In this 
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context, there has been an argument that economic success of Korean blockbusters 
consequently resulted in a loss of `cultural diversity' in Korean cultural products. This 
leads to a concern that Korean cultural industries may have become `victims of their own 
success'. This is both an economic and a cultural issue. Repetition in a hit-driven 
business could kill creativity in the cultural industry and this in turn might cause the 
decline of that industry in the long term. Then, to what extent has economic success been 
paid for by cultural costs? How can this be avoided? Is it impossible to preserve cultural 
diversity and promote economic success at the same time? 
Regarding cultural diversity, one of the most controversial issues in Korean culture and 
society is the screen quota system in film which is a protective measure for the Korean 
film industry. It is widely acknowledged that the quota system was instrumental for 
protecting cultural diversity in Korea by releasing Korean films against Hollywood 
domination and in the recent revival of the Korean cultural industry. As explained in the 
thesis, this functioned as a safeguard for Korean film at a time when Hollywood enjoyed 
a dominant position in the Korean film market. Thus, from a cultural perspective, the 
quota system has been understood in terms of supporting art-oriented or small films for 
cultural diversity. However, since Korean blockbusters became stronger at the box office 
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at Hollywood's expense, the main beneficiaries of the screen quota have been the Korean 
blockbusters. 
In television, terrestrial networks maintain a dominant quota of local programming, and 
other less financially independent channels provide a mix of both foreign and local 
content. However, with the tremendous increase in the number of channels available, 
both audiences and revenues have grown in line with a wider range of services. This has 
resulted in a more commercially driven approach, with fewer opportunities to broadcast 
culturally diverse and local content. As with the film industry, these developments have 
accelerated the major companies' oligopoly. 
Then, what does cultural diversity mean in a Korean context? Basically, cultural diversity 
is based on cultural identity because when we acknowledge separate cultural identities we 
are also recognising the possibility of cultural diversity (Anderson, 1983). Normally, 
countries in centre such as the U. S and the U. K. which have many different people, 
consider cultural identity as one of the most difficult and important issues that 
government cultural policy has to pursue (Kevin Robins, 2006; Dory Reeves, 2005; Tony 
Bennet, 2005; reference at UK Film Council, 
http: //ukfilmcouncil. org. uk/information/aboutus/diversity/). Therefore, they try to protect 
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and develop minorities' identities and cultures and at the same time ensure these minority 
cultures are visible through social inclusion. 
However, in the case of Korea, though it is a unique nation and has a unique language 
which is called Hangeul, cultural identity has not been a big issue in Korean history and 
community. Rather, since the 1900s Korea has been struggling between the voices of two 
divided ideologies; communism and democracy. Thus when Korean people talk about 
cultural diversity, they were more likely to be discussing whether Korean society can 
include different ideological voices. Only more recently, commentators have begun to 
refer to cultural diversity in Korean society in a more strictly cultural context, arguing 
that minority cultures and ideas need to be protected from big business and 
commercialism. 
This suggests that cultural diversity may be threatened by the recent success of Korean 
media and entertainment conglomerates. For example, major companies in the film 
industry such as CJ Entertainment seems to have become synonymous with the Korean 
film industry itself by occupying production, distribution and screens across the nation. 
Regarding this monopoly, film director Changdong Lee (interviewed in Oct 2005), Sung- 
Won Hong (interviewed in Sep. 2003) and Kim Mee Hyun (interviewed in Aug. 2003) 
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argue that domination by some major Korean companies has distorted the structure of the 
Korean film industry and will lead to a crisis in the Korean cultural industry. Meanwhile, 
representatives of major Korean entertainment companies such as Dongho Park 
(interviewed in Nov. 2004) and Michelle Park (interviewed in Jan. 2005) counter argue 
that they have been protecting the domestic market against the Hollywood major 
companies and have contributed to the current success of Korean cultural products. 
In this context, there are some misunderstandings regarding cultural diversity and cultural 
market expansion. First of all, with regard to the dominance of the U. S. cultural contents, 
the U. S. has asserted that advances in digital technology have resulted in the further 
diversification of screening methods, which is a form of market expansion and, as a result, 
the importance of screening in cinemas has been diminished. However, contrary to this 
argument, the theory of multiple release windows referred to chapter 6 shows that the 
strategy has little impact on diversity in terms of content. On the contrary, the secondary 
release windows simply replicate the initial cinema release and can be seen to further 
consolidate the market control enjoyed by media products from Hollywood. Similarly in 
broadcasting, although the number of available channels increases and although media 
technologies can help `minority' products reach mainstream outlets, the range of choice 
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does not necessarily expand and might actually diminish as a result of duplication or 
expansion of existing programmes. 
Why does this happen? In terms of the economics of cultural products, as each window 
stays open for longer and as more formats become available, the fact that cultural 
products can be redistributed at `zero marginal cost' (Vogel, 2004: 530) helps to 
maximise the profitability of Hollywood products, allowing them to achieve economies 
of scale. Once production costs are paid off, reproduction costs are at or near zero so 
sales are pure profit as long as the content owners sell the rights passing on the print and 
advertising costs to the importers. Therefore, distributors are able to maximise revenues 
across the full spectrum of screen, video and TV. In similar vein, the expansion of 
multiplexes without having in place any protective measures to guarantee fair 
competition can not be said to contribute to cultural diversity. As the above observation 
indicates, new technical environments, such as expanding digital technology and the 
increased number of multiplex cinema chains, point neither to the necessity for reducing 
the quota system nor to a need to preserve it. That is to say, whether electronic media 
leads us to either a homogenisation or a diversification of culture depends on the network 
ownership and capital. 
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Therefore, it is becoming clear not only that free trade does not guarantee cultural 
diversity, but also that a strong domestic film industry as in Korea may not guarantee 
cultural diversity either. Rather, a few large companies with strong capital backing are 
tending to monopolise the markets. Consequently, evidence and arguments presented in 
this thesis suggest that instead of free competition for a small number of contents, a partly 
controlled system that guarantees fair competition for a variety of contents would be 
preferable for securing shared profits and for giving audiences their right to choose. This 
is why we need well-planned cultural policy even under globalisation which moves 
towards free-trade and neo-liberalisation. 
8.2 Korean Approach of Cultural Policy in Periphery under 
Globalisation 
To what extent has the success of Korean cultural products been a result of government 
cultural policies? Furthermore, to what extent can government action influence what 
appears to be an inexorable global flow? Accepting that cause and effect are difficult to 
measure with certainty what are the potential effects and limitations of cultural policy in a 
global economy? It is impossible to give definitive answer to these questions, but in this 
section I will attempt to consider some of the implications of Korean cultural policy 
under globalisation. 
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Nowadays, most nations have implemented their own cultural policies, which are 
intended to preserve their cultural identities and sovereignty from foreign competitors, 
especially from American popular culture. The Korean Wave, Hanryu, is a rare case of 
counter-flow in global media flows, demonstrating that Korean cultural products 
supported by Korean government cultural policy, can be competitive in a global market. 
As noted in previous chapters, many internal and external factors have played a role in 
making Korean Wave possible. It can be summarised that the growth of the Korean 
cultural industry is supported by `three pillars': an enhanced technology-based 
infrastructure, a creative talent pool and a cultural policy designed to respond to 
globalisation. These factors caused the Korean cultural contents market to grow in Asia 
in the context of the controversial conflict between protectionists and free marketers. 
One distinctive factor in the case of Korean cultural policy and Hanryu was that it was 
made possible as a result of government policy changes as a considered response to 
cultural globalisation. Unusually, success in the market was not based on a geo-linguistic 
market, but on a cultural policy shift caused by the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the 
historically hybrid nature of Korean culture. In other cases where counter-flow has 
occurred, to the contrary, the influence of cultural policy is less obvious and we can 
identify other contributing factors as equally if not more significant. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, Korean cultural and communications policy has been 
critical in driving the Korean Wave. However, it could be argued that the Wave owes 
more to shifts in other areas of policy and/or more general economic and political shifts 
such as the Korean financial crisis in 1997. The point here is that cultural policy was 
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instrumental in causing Hanryu, but the changes in cultural policy in turn took place in a 
broader context and were themselves to some extent the result of economic policy 
changes in response to the Korean financial crisis. The financial turmoil in 1997 was an 
important motivation behind the renaissance of the Korean cultural industry. Since the 
1997 financial crisis, the Korean government has shown a growing tendency to 
concentrate its culture budget in such areas as games, animation, video, film, and the 
recording industries, that is, in areas where culture is believed to make big money. 
Thus economic policy in the 1997 financial crisis and a diplomatic policy shift towards a 
more favourable relationship with Japan were motivations for boosting the Korean 
cultural industry and opening the Korean cultural market to Japan. However, these 
economic or other policies were less directly significant than the resulting cultural policy 
changes. As we can see in the history of Korean cultural policy in chapter 4, Korea had 
painful experience of market opening driven by economic policy in 1988. Korean cultural 
industry has experienced both ups and downs since the Korean government implemented 
an open-door policy for film industry in 1988. Economic policies and market opening 
were contributing factors to Korean Wave but became so because they were embedded in 
corresponding changes in cultural policy. 
The comparison between 1997 and 1988 reveals significant differences. Although the 
main role of government policy for the cultural industries in the 1980s was to improve 
the functioning of its market by protecting it from foreign cultural products, the sudden 
opening of the market to the major U. S. film companies was a decision made with 
diplomatic and economic interests in mind in advance of the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Thus, 
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the opening up of the Korean film market in 1988 with no preparation in cultural policy 
led to a crisis that threatened the very existence of the domestic film industry. However, 
when Japanese cultural products were expected to flood the local market after the ban 
was repealed in 1998, unlike the previous opening up to the U. S. films, the Korean 
government tried to seek a way to establish legal standards to filter overly violent or 
obscene material while at the same time establishing measures to support the domestic 
market. At the same time, along with the support for the cultural industry, it has also 
attempted to repeal the screen quota system, which was a barrier to trade with the U. S. In 
other words the economic and diplomatic policies were supported by changes in cultural 
policy. 
Through this process, radical changes occurred in the infrastructure of the Korean 
cultural industry, rapidly transforming it from a monopolised system which had been 
maintained under more than 20 years of government control into a fiercely competitive 
industry. The government is no longer content to be a simple subsidy provider, but wants 
to support those cultural products with the strongest potential to succeed as international 
blockbusters or art films in the global market. The approach to market opening over the 
past ten years has been more considered and deliberate. This policy of opening the 
market and supporting local industry at the same time, the so-called `stick and carrot' 
approach, has led the Korean cultural industry to its recent success. It is this combination 
of protecting and opening up the market which characterises recent Korean cultural 
policy and distinguishes it from the earlier policy approaches. 
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Likewise, the Korean cultural policy turned the economic crisis into an opportunity, 
making possible the phenomenon of the Korean Wave. This Korean case shows a flow 
from periphery both to centre and periphery, allowing Korea to become a regional hub 
for Asia with its well planned cultural policy. Thus, in the case of Korea, cultural 
openness to foreign markets alongside government initiatives for the support of the 
domestic cultural industry consequently led to a two-way flow of culture, without 
weakening Korean cultural identity. This means that opening a cultural industry market 
results not only in cultural imperialism and cultural homogenisation but can also lead to 
cultural diversity and cultural heterogenization in a global context. Opening or protecting 
markeLis less important in itself than the cultural policy framework in which they occur. 
The key issue here is how and with what kind of preparation and process in cultural 
policy can the cultural industry be opened. 
8.3 Sustainability of the Korean Experience 
As the example of Hong Kong (Do Dong-jun, 2005) demonstrates, being at one time a 
strong regional centre does not guarantee a strong sustainable industry forever. Is the 
Korean cultural boom in Asian countries something that will carry on and can we 
generalise the Korean experience and adapt it to other countries seeking to imitate the 
`Korean model'? This is a rather challenging question because the Korean situation, 
which includes lack of diaspora, unique language and a fully controlled policy history, is 
very specific. Moreover, it is still too early to assume that the local film industry has 
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developed a stable industrial structure that can reproduce competitive films independent 
of government support. To answer this, first we need to consider what the success factors 
of the Korean Wave are. Finding out these success factors and ensuring that they 
continue to work effectively in the cultural industry is the only way to achieve the 
sustainability of Korea's cultural boom. 
As mentioned in earlier chapter, during the 1990s' there emerged more highly developed 
production infrastructure within the Korean cultural industry which included a 
streamlined planning system, availability of technical and managerial crews and the 
introduction of systemised production systems and government support. These led to 
industrial efficiency and a new spirit of cooperation between the private and public 
sectors as well as acceleration of commercialisation. These and other related factors 
outlined in chapter 5 were critical for the development of a sustainable domestic market 
and boosted the popularity of Korean cultural products overseas. Thus, a combination of 
various factors and strengths is needed for the sustainability of the `Korean model'. 
However, in spite of the success experienced by Korean cultural products in 
neighbouring countries, the signals emerging from the Korean cultural industry seem 
contradictory. Broadly speaking, there have been two different opinions about the 
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sustainability of the Korean cultural boom. One is that the Korean cultural boom could be 
temporary trend which is likely soon to evaporate. The other is that the Korean cultural 
boom will continue as a new mode of counter flow. 
Moreover, recently there have been some unfavourable signals indicating possible 
obstacles to the sustainability of the Korean model. The recent trends of neo- 
liberalisation and globalisation in Korea have helped to create big players on a national 
scale, whose interests are at the same time guarded by continuing cultural protectionism, 
whilst market share for smaller local films has drastically reduced. Consequently cultural 
diversity in the industry and in society has also diminished. In such an imbalanced 
structure, consistent growth in the sector is limited and this situation can not guarantee 
the sustainability of the industry. There have also been recent signs of a backlash against 
Korean Wave from some other Asian countries, as described in chapter 7. To ensure that 
the Korean approach to cultural policy could be generalised or sustained, two types of 
market correction measures are needed: cultural diversity to guarantee creativity and 
cultural exchange to lessen current anti-Korean Wave feelings in other Asian countries. 
Some further success factors are needed. First of all, a sizable domestic market is a good 
base for a sustainable industry, along with an aggressive attempt to exploit foreign 
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markets, as was the case with the U. S. and Japan. Second, policy factors such as 
industrial realignments and modifications in regulatory ideology, such as loosening 
censorship, can also be critical points. 
It is very difficult to predict the sustainability of the Korean cultural boom and even more 
difficult to consider how it might be generalised to other countries. However, 
understanding what has happened in Korea can provide some valuable lessons for the 
way other countries in periphery can respond to cultural globalisation. Korean cultural 
policy has been a combination of market opening and protectionism. This reveals that 
pure protection does not provide a complete response to globalisation. Of course, Korean 
cultural policy can not be duplicated. However, the Korean experience suggests clearly 
that a more measured and deliberate approach to market opening was a critical point even 
if the exact correlation between policy and outcome is not clear. Opening a market to 
foreign competition can strengthen the domestic market, provided that a sustainable 
infrastructure is in place, together with policies to ensure fair competition. This can in 
turn lead to the type of counter flow described in this thesis. 
8.4 The Possibility of an `Asian Cultural Bloc' 
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The exchange of cultural products across Asia challenges the view that Western cultural 
products dominate the world. Buoyed by rapid growth in Japan and China, Korean 
cultural products are laying the foundations for paths into Asia and even Europe, America 
and the Middle East. The pragmatic need to integrate economically into East Asia has 
superseded the desire to keep Japan and Korea apart politically and culturally. The subtle 
and largely positive reception to the lifting of the ban on Japanese cultural products could, 
from the perspective of a free trade ideology, mean that embracing this growth has 
possibly become more profitable than weakening economic growth by maintaining the 
ban. 
Especially noteworthy is the popularity of Korean TV dramas in Japan, given the bad 
blood between the two countries that followed the end of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. 
As South Korea is geographically located between Japan and China, Korean fever could 
also contribute to bridging these two nations culturally, developing a common interest 
and helping construct a pan-Asian culture. In this context, the `Asian Cultural Bloc' can 
be seen as a possible model for Asian countries. Robertson's Glocalisation theory can be 
applied here and developed to encompass an examination of the probability of a `Cultural 
Bloc Model' (Screendaily, Nov. 7,2002). 
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What then does the `cultural bloc' argument mean and where does it come from? 
Actually, the term `cultural bloc' is my suggestion for regional cooperation among the 
cultural industries in Asia. It is inspired by regional blocs such as ASEAN and 
MERCOSUR. As demonstrated in the case of the EU, people identify more with localism, 
and consequently political and economic integration is difficult and controversial, and 
can bring about discrimination against other countries outside the integration process. 
However, an Asian bloc in the cultural industry could be considered desirable for 
networking and promoting peripheral culture in Asian countries and even across the 
world, since its structure would be quite loose, unlike trade blocs which can encompass a 
variety of economic blocs including free trade areas, customs unions, single markets, and 
economic and monetary unions (Richter and Mar, 2002: 249,272). The members of the 
proposed Asian cultural bloc could promote the networking of cultural information to 
enable all citizens to access Asian cultural content by the most advanced technological 
means, creating an Asian cultural market by stimulating new production and enhancing 
cross-national collaboration. These kinds of privately funded co-productions would 
facilitate active cultural exchanges between Korea and other Asian countries, especially 
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Japan, and allow them to penetrate the Asian pop culture markets in the long term via 
strategic cooperation. 
There are some encouraging international precedents for an `Asian cultural bloc'. In 
Europe, Television without Frontiers can be taken as an example. Moreover, in 1989, the 
EU enacted a Television Directive (CEC, 1984: 2) aimed at standardising measures 
relating to the support of television production, advertising rules, the protection of 
juveniles, and the right to reply. It also ensured that member states did not create national 
restrictions aimed against the reception and retransmission of programmes from other 
member states. MEDIA 92 and MEDIA 95 programmes have sought to strengthen the 
European Community's internal market across the component national boundaries. These 
overarching programmes are divided into numerous sub-programmes that have had some 
modest impact in creating a European audiovisual market by stimulating new production 
and in enhancing cross-national collaboration. As Lull (2000: 234) mentions, the attempt 
to harmonize the European Union has revealed how difficult it is to unify and politicize 
different nations and national cultures. Despite the remarkable potential of the cultural 
products market in the Asia-Pacific region, in view of its rapid growth beyond the 
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expectations of media professionals, the possibility of creating a trade market among 
Asian countries is still at an early stage. 
However, there have been recent instances of cultural trade in the region. For example, 
the Pusan International Film Festival (PIFF), which addresses a wide spectrum of cultural 
issues, serves as a gateway for cultural trade in Asia (Korea Herald, Oct. 16,2004; 
Screendaily, Aug. 29,2003; Nov. 15,2002). To take another example, the film One Fine 
Spring Day, which was jointly produced by Applause Pictures of Hong Kong and 
Shochiku Films of Japan, is widely perceived as representing a first stage joint 
production, though as such, the potential for acquiring international funding remains low. 
Paul Yi of Korea's E-Pictures also mentions that `to set up international projects is the 
next step for Korean and Asian cinema' (interviewed in Oct. 2004). However, in order 
to truly revive Korea's cultural policy, the Korean government must move beyond this 
first step; it needs to carefully implement the policy towards the Asian cultural bloc 
model to enable the interactivity of Asian cultural flow. In this context, the Asian Film 
Industry Network (AFIN), which is a group of leading film commissions from Asian 
countries, agreed in 2002 to join together to form a regional network (Screendaily, Nov. 
12,2002; Feb. 20,2004). Initially, the AFIN focused on increasing the levels of exchange 
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in the film technology and service fields, and the drafting of co-production treaties 
between countries. 
As a long-term goal, the network hopes to consider the creation of a body for Asian film 
promotion in the manner of European organisations such as Eurimages and the MEDIA 
programme. The network intends to make it easier for local and international productions 
to gain access to audiences across the region by promoting co-operation among member 
film commissions, encouraging greater training and professionalism, and undertaking 
joint marketing efforts. Delegates from South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia and Iran are also trying to identify concrete steps that 
can be taken to encourage co-productions and the overall expansion of the Asian film 
industries. Other Asian countries are also encouraged to join the informal network. If this 
network is successful, it may lead some day to the establishment of a similar agreement 
to encourage co-production treaties. 
Moreover, KOFIC has also assisted in the creation of a network of people and systems to 
support exchanges and the development of media industries in the Asian region. It works 
to attract international co-productions and joint investment in Korean films through 
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cooperation with other Asian film commissions and its efforts to draft co-production 
treaties with other countries. Hollywood producer Roy Lee points out that `if this 
network helps to solve such problems as tax benefits and location support, it could make 
the Asian region a very attractive place to shoot' (interviewed in Oct. 2004). As such, 
there remains considerable potential for further research in this area, investigation of 
possible ways toward a cultural integration of the Asian countries which share 
homogeneous cultural aspects in comparison with Western countries, as well as ways 
toward harmonising the seemingly clashing elements of foreign and traditional culture. 
The success of such a venture would depend upon complex negotiations between member 
states and favourable external circumstances. But perhaps this cooperative model might 
prove a more fruitful legacy for Hanryu than merely attempting to imitate it. Perhaps the 
other valuable lesson of Hanryu is that the cultural policies and conditions responding to 
cultural globalisation will not conform to any single or predictable pattern, and that the 
different forms will be shaped by precise economic, political and cultural circumstances 
at the time. 
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(Hong Kong), (interviewed in Oct. 2005) 
-Shim, Hyung-Rae, CEO of Zeronine Entertainment (interviewed in Oct. 2003) 
-Shin, Hyuntaik, Chairperson of the Korean Foundation for Asian Culture 
Exchange (KOFACE) (interviewed in Aug. 2005) 
"Shuhei, Kusanagi, Managing Director of Toei, Japan (interviewed in Nov. 2004) 
"Suh, Byoung-moon, President of KOCCA (interviewed in Aug. 2003) 
"Suh, Young-joo, Managing Director of film export, Cineclick Asia (interviewed in 
Sep. 2004) 
"Suk, SongJa, Marketing Manager, Buena Vista International Korea (interviewed in 
Dec. 2004) 
"Tse, Seung Jae, President of Sidus (interviewed in Oct. 2004) 
-Wen, Chunying, Associate Professor at the Dept. of Advertising and 
Communications, University of China (interviewed in Oct. 2005) 
"Yi, Paul, CEO of E-Pictures (interviewed in Oct. 2004) 
"Yoo, In-Taek, Producer and CEO of the GiWhekSiDae film company (interviewed 
in Nov. 2003) 
"Yoo, Jin-Ryong, Director general of the culture industry division of the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism (interviewed in Aug. 2003) 
"Yoon, Zong Yeon, Managing Director, Korea IT Venture Partners Inc. 
(interviewed in Oct. 2005) 
-You, Kun, President of the Korea National Tourism Organization (interviewed in 
Sep. 2004) 
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Table 8. KOREAN SOAP OPERAS BROADCAST IN JAPAN 
As of Aug. 11,2005, Source: KOFACE) 
<Terrestrial Broadcasting Stations> 
NHK Sat 23: 10-24: 10 All In 2005/4/16--(24 episodes) 
Nihon Terevi Mon-Thu10 : 25-11 : 20 Secret 2005/6/8-(19 episodes) 
Huji Terevi Sat 16 : 00-17 : 30 Sad Love Song 2005/4/30-(20 episodes) 
<Regional Stations> 
Tokyo MXTV Tue22 : 00-23 : 00 Love Letter 2005/6/21-(20 episodes) 
Thu 22: 00-23 : 00 Glass Flower 2005/4/6-(20 episodes) 
Thu 22 : 00-23 : 00 Did we really love 
other? 
2004/8/17--(44 Epi. ) 
Chiba Terevi Wed 20: 00-21 : 00 Happy Together 2005/2/16-(16 Epi. ) 
Terevi Saitama Fri 20 : 00-21 : 00 Greeting of Love 2005/5/6-(25 Epi. ) 
TVK Tue 22 : 00-23 : 00 Beautiful Woman 2005/3/8-(16 Epi. I) 
<Broadcast Satellite> 
NHK-B S2 Thu 22 : 00-23 : 00 Daejangeum 2004/10/7--(54 Epl. ) 
Thu 23 : 00-24 : 00 First Love 2005/3/31-(40 Epi. ) 
WOWOW Fri 20 : 00-22 : 00 Popcorn 2005/6/17-(16 Epl. ) 
Thu 20 : 00-22 : 00 1% Something 2005/6/9-(26 Epl. ) 
Fri 20 : 00-22 : 00 Happy Together 2005/4/1-(16 Epl. ) 
BS N-TV Mon 21 : 00-22 : 00 Propose 2005/6/27-(14 Epi. ) 
Mon-Fri 14: 00-18: 00 Lover In Paris 2005/6/20-24(20 Epl. ) 
Mon 21 : 00-22 : 00 Glass Flower 2005/2/7-(20 Epl. ) 
BS FUJI Wed 20 : 00-2110 Sad Love Song 2005/4/27-(20 Epi. ) 
Tue 20 : 00-2110 Into the Sun 2005/4/5-(20 Epi. ) 
BS-I Sat 22 : 00-23 : 00 LOVE 2005/5/28-(16 Epi. ) 
BS Japan Sun 13 : 00-14: 00 New Glided Youth 2005/7-(16 Epi. ) 
Sun 13 : 00-14: 00 Truth 2005/4/3-(16 Epl. ) 
<Communication Satellite> 
KNTV Thu 15 : 20-16 : 30 Perfect Love 2005/6/23-(24 Epl. ) 
386 
Mon, Tue 10: 10-11 : 20 Terms of Endearment 2005/6/6-(60 Epi. ) 
Sun 19 : 45-20 : 00 Sorry, I Love You 2005/6/5-(16 Epi. ) 
Sat 19 : 50-21 : 00 Stairs of Heaven 2005/6/4-(20 Epi. ) 
Mon-Fri 11: 20-12: 00 BeStrona-minded 
Geumseoni 
2005/5/26-(60 Epl. ) 
Wed-Thu25 : 30-26 : 40 Sunshine Pours Out 2005/5/18-(16 Epl. ) 
Wed, Thu 19: 50-21: 00 Wonderful Life 2005/5/11 
Fri, Sat 19 : 50-21 : 00 Sweet Red-Bean Bread 2004/5/7-(26 Epi. ) 
Wed, Thu22 : 10-23: 20 Magic 2005/5/4-(16 Epi. ) 
Sat, Sun 21 : 50-23 : 00 Glass Flower 2005/4/16-(40 Epi. ) 
Fri 22 : 10-23 : 20 Glass Flower 2005/4/8-(16 Epl. ) 
Mon, Tue 22: 10-23 : 20 Ballad of Hanpanpsu 2005/4/4- 
Thu. Fri 15 : 20-16 : 30 Beautiful than Flower 2005/3/1-(30 Epl. ) 
Mon-Fri 16: 30-17: 40 Happiness In My Heart 2005/3/7-(16 Epi. ) 
Mon, Tue 19 : 50-21 : 00 Land 2005/2/14-(50 Epl. ) 
Thu 23 : 20-24: 30 What happened In Ball 2005/2/10-(20 Epi. ) 
Mon, Tue 25 : 30-26 : 40 Mother. Sister 2005/2/7-(50 Epi. ) 
Mon 24: 30-25 : 40 Hero's Myth 2005/2/7-(23 Epi. ) 
Sun 14: 10-16: 30 SanQDo 2005/2/6-(50 Epi. ) 
Tue 23 : 20-24 : 30 Since I Knew You 2005/1/8-(48 Epl. ) 
Satellite Screen Mon-Fri 5: 00-7 : 00 Truth 2005/6/20- (16 Epi. ) 
Tue 23 : 00-25 : 00 Asphalt Man 2005/6/14-(16 Epl. ) 
Wed 23 : 00-25: 00 New Gilded Youth 2005/6/8-(16 Epi. ) 
Mon 23 : 00-25: 00 Hotelier 2005/5/16-(20 Epl. ) 
Sun 13 : 00-15 : 00 Gookhee 2005/5/15-(20 Epl. ) 
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Sun 23 : 00-25 : 00 Love Letter 2005/5/1-(20 Epi. ) 
Home Drama 
Channel 
Sun-Fri 5: 00-7: 00 Did We Really Love Each 0 2005/6/13- (44 Epi. ) 
Thu 10 : 00-11: 00 White Night 2005/6/9-(20 Epl. ) 
Wed 10: 00-11 00 Beautiful Woman 2005/6/8-(16 Epi. ) 
Mon 10: 00-11 : 00 Nice Guy 2005/5/30-(16Ep1. ) 
Tue 10: 00-11 : 00 A Star in My Heart 2005/4/12-(16 Epi. ) 
Fri. Sat 10 : 00-11 : First Love 2005/1/7--(66 Epi. ) 
So-net Channel Mon-Fri 11 : 00-19 : Prince's First Love 2005/6/13"-(26Ep1. ) 
Sun 7: 15- +6 :0 Stairs of Heaven 2005/5/8-(20 Epl. ) 
Tue 7: 15-8: 15 To the End of the World 2005/4/5-(16 Epi. ) 
Sat 6: 00- Ir-7: 15 Bad Friends 2005/4/2-(15 Epi. ) 
Fri 6: 00-7 : 00 Happy Together 2005/4/1-(16 Epi. ) 
Tue 6: 00- V: 1 Glass Flower 2005/3/1-(40 Epl. ) 
LaLaTV Sat 19 : 00-20 : 00 Summer's Scent 2005/5/28-(18 Epl. ) 
Mon-Thu 21 : 00 Autumn's Fairytale 2005/6/6--(18 Epl. ) 
Sat 22 : 00-23 : 00 Sangdoo, Let's Go to Sch 2005/5/7-(18 Epl. ) 
Sat 20 : 00-21 : 00 Brothers In Medical Field 2005/4/2-(16 Epi. ) 
Fuji721 Wed 20 : 00-2110 Sad Love Song 2005/7/17-(20 Epi. ) 
Mon-Fri 10 : 00 Elegant Lady 2005/6/21-7/12 (16 Epi. ) 
Sun 12 : 00-13 : 40 101st Proposal 2005/4/17-(20 Epi. ) 
Tereasa Channel Wed 13 : 00-14: 00 All About Eve 2005/l/26-(20 Epi. ) 
V*Paris Sun 20 : 00-21 : 00 Farewell My Love 2005/4/2-(16 Epl. ) 
Sun 13 : 00-14 : 00 My Love Patzzi 2005/4/2-(10 Epi. ) 
Mystery Channel Sun 14: 00-15: 00 Bodyguard 2005/4/3-(22 Epl. ) 
LPerfect Choice Tue, Wed 13: 00-14 Invitation 2005/3/29-6/1(18 Epl. ) 
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Table 9. The Entry of Korean Films to International Film Festivals (source: KOFIC) 
Number of Festivals with 
Number of Korean Number of Korean 
Year Korean Entries 
Films Represented Films Submitted to 
at Festivals Festivals 
1985 24 Festivals including the 16 48 21st Chicago Film Festival 
1986 25 Festivals Including the 36th 32 74 Berlin Film Festival 
1987 27 Festivals including the 35 69 44'h Venice Film Festival 
1988 33 Festivals 39 67 
33 Festivals including the 39th 1989 Berlin Film Festival 
54 168 
1990 39 Festivals 59 165 
1991 40 Festivals 77 190 
41 Festivals including the 5th 1992 Tokyo Film Festival 
59 133 
1993 58 Festivals 51 103 
1994 54 Festivals 39 90 
1995 60 Festivals including the 45th 48 124 Berlin Film Festival 
1996 53 Festivals including the 78 160 20th Montreal Film Festival 
1997 54 Festivals including the 40 123 50th Cannes Film Festival 
1998 68 Festivals 72 187 
1999 73 Festivals 72 187 
2000 138 Festivals including the 126 387 53d Cannes Film Festival 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AFN American Forces Network 
APEC Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
BIFCOM Busan International Film Commission Showcase 
CDMI Coalition for Cultural Diversity in Moving Images of Korea 
DBS Digital Broadcast Satellite 
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sports (of the U. K) 
DDA Doha Development Agenda 
EBS Education Broadcasting System 
FBC Foundation for Broadcast Culture 
FT Financial Times 
FTC Korea Fair Trade Commission 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IT Information Technology 
KAA Korea Advertisers Association 
KBS Korea Broadcasting System 
KBC Korea Broadcasting Commission 
KCPI Korea Culture and Policy Institute 
KIT Korea Herald 
KIET Korean Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade 
KMPPC Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation 
KMRB Korea Media Ratings Board 
KNTO Korea National Tourism Organization 
KOBACO Korean Broadcasting Advertising Corporation 
KOCCA Korea Culture & Contents Agency 
KOFACE Korea Foundation for Asian Culture Exchange 
KOFIC Korea Film Commission 
KPPEC Korean Public Performance Ethics Committee 
KT Korea Times 
MBC Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation 
MBN Maeil Business Newspaper 
MIC Ministry of Information and Communication 
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MCT Ministry of Culture and Tourism 
MOFAT Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
MOFE Ministry of Finance and Economy 
MOI Ministry of Information 
MPCP Motion Picture Censorship Committee 
MPEAA Motion Picture Exporters Association of America 
MPPC Motion Picture Promotion Corporation of Korea 
NHK Nippon Hoso Kyokai, in English Japan Broadcasting Corporation 
NSO National Statistical Office 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PIFF Pusan International Film Festival 
PP Programme Provider 
SBS Seoul Broadcasting System 
SERI Samsung Economic Research Institute 
TBC Tongyang Broadcasting Company 
TNC Trans-National Corporate 
UIP United International Pictures (ofAmerica) 
USFK United States Forces Korea 
YNA Yonhap News Agency 
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GLOSSARY 
Blind Booking: A commercial practice whereby the client purchases a film or 
television programme without previewing it. 
Block Booking: A commercial practice whereby a client who wishes to purchase a 
popular high-budget film or television programme has to take along with it one or 
more second-rate programmes. 
Chaebol (http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Chaebol, accessed on Feb. 21,2006): 
South Korea's business conglomerates. The English word is a transliteration of the 
Korean word, which is now Romanized as Jaebeol. The Korean word means 
business group, trust, or plutocrat, and is often used the way "Big Business" is used 
in English. In Wikipedia, Chaebols are defined as Korea's business conglomerates, 
the several dozen large, family-controlled Korean corporate groups, assisted by 
government financing. They have played a major role in the Korean economy since 
the 1960s. 
Ecumene: Kopytoff (1987: 10) defines the ecumene as a `region of persistent 
cultural interaction and exchange. ' 
Eurimage: A declaration of intent with the aim of setting up a multilateral support 
mechanism for the co-production, distribution, transmission and promotion of film 
and audiovisual works. Nine Member States of the Community (Belgium, Denmark, 
Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal) signed it on 10 
February 1987. 
GATTs: the neo-liberal economic policies of the 1980s and 1990s led to the 
removal of protective measures for national industries, the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tax and Tariffs) aimed at elimination of tariffs and other barriers to 
`free trade' and formed the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 as its 
successor. 
Hanliu/Hanlyu and PusanBusan: In English, Hanliu has no official spelling, 
varying from Hanryu to Hanliu or Hallyu. This thesis selects Hanryu, which is the 
version used by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism. Similarly, Pusan has 
been mixed with Busan because, although officially Busan is right, the PIFF (Pusan 
International Film Festival) had been formed before the official Roman spelling was 
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fixed to Busan. Thus, they decided not to change the spelling of the acronym 
because of the specific sociality and renown of these acronyms. 
MEDIA Programme: An initiative funded by the European Union aiming to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the European audio visual industry with a series 
of support measures dealing with the training of professionals and funding for 
project and company distribution and development. 
MPAA: Motion Picture Association of America. This organisation represents the 
interests of the large Hollywood studios. Its subsidiary, the Motion Picture Export 
Association (MPEA), defends the interests of the majors in foreign markets. 
Quota: A measure aimed at limiting the volume of imported programmes, generally 
expressed as a percentage of total programming 
Telenovela (From Wikipedia: http: //en. wikipedia. orj/wiki/Telenovela, Accessed on 
March 23,2006): 
A term used to describe Spanish and Portuguese television serials derived from the 
terms tele short for television and novella ("novel"). In spite of their many 
differences, telenovelas can be compared to soap operas. 
Television Without Frontiers (Commission of the European Communities, 1984, 
(COM, 84,300 Final), CEC, Brussels: p. 2): 
The imposition of a programming quota restricting broadcasters to scheduling 
wherever practicable-no more than 49 per cent of productions of non-EU origin 
(Article 6). See also Moran, 1996: 122. 
Trendy Drama (http: //en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Dorama' accessed on Feb. 20,2006): 
Most people associate today's Japanese dramas with the more modem style of 
screenwriting, described by the term trendy drama. The trendy formula for Japanese 
dramas was invented in the late 1980s when screenwriters decided to reach the 
television audience with themes that covered real-life Japan, at a time when the 
Japanese were experiencing a bubble economy. These themes included issues 
within the family, among other social issues. The trendy formula was improved in 
the early 1990s, where the story lines changed with the times, focusing on harder 
issues, including teenage violence, child abuse, and modem family life. Still, even 
today, the success of Japanese dramas is a result of sticking with the trendy drama 
formula. Although some people consider sentai and tokusatsu type shows as dramas, 
they are not covered under the definition of trendy drama. 
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